Syria and Israel: warm peace, or fleeting truce?

In 2018, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin (who had influence in Syria) brokered a new understanding aimed at ensuring Israel's security, withdrawing all "non-Syrian elements" (i.e. pro-Iranian militias) and their heavy weaponry back to 85km from the Golan line. In return, the Syrian army redeployed to the south, and the US stopped supporting armed opposition in the area.

Following the fall of the regime on 8 December 2024, Israel quickly advanced into the Golan buffer zone, seizing key strategic points including the summit of Mt Hermon and pushing toward Damascus. It also conducted hundreds of airstrikes across Syria, destroying much of the country's strategic military infrastructure.

Borders and 'lines'

The Shebaa Farms are another bone of contention that Israel and Syria are trying to find agreement on. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, a political meeting in Damascus devised a pretext to justify Hezbollah's continued armament by designating the Shebaa Farms as occupied Lebanese territory, thereby framing Hezbollah as a resistance movement for their liberation.

Today, Damascus faces pressure to affirm sovereignty over the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba Hills and to clarify the status of the UN-designated 'Blue Line' which currently divides the village of Ghajar. The practical demand is for the Syrian government to provide written confirmation to Beirut that these areas are Syrian territory occupied by Israel, enabling the UN to redraw the Blue Line. The unstated goal is to undermine Hezbollah's rationale for maintaining its arsenal and resistance activities.

Intelligence-sharing is another area for discussion between Damascus and Tel Aviv. It is also an important one. With increasing militia activity and rampant arms and drug smuggling across the Syrian border, some have suggested a new regional security mechanism involving both Syria and Israel to combat terrorism and regional instability, while fostering a broader sense of order and cooperation.

Abraham Accords

As regards the Abraham Accords—which normalises relations with Israel and has been adopted by Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Sudan—the current US administration wonders whether Syria may sign up too, with talk of a potential summit that could bring Syrian and Israeli leaders together for a joint declaration.

The Trump administration, along with certain Western capitals, believes that it has already extended substantial concessions to the Syrian government, with diplomatic recognition, an end to international isolation, sanctions relief, and economic aid. In return, it wants Syria to move towards normalisation with Israel, including accession to the Abraham Accords as part of a broader vision to reshape the Middle East.

Yet the assumption that Damascus can quickly embrace such a sweeping realignment is overly optimistic. More feasible is the pursuit of urgent and realistic measures such as a non-aggression pact with Tel Aviv that would renew commitments to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. This would necessitate Israel's withdrawal from the Golan buffer zone and the positions it has occupied since 8 December.

Keeping militias out

Full implementation of the agreement under UNDOF oversight, with its limits on troop numbers, weapon types, and their deployment, would provide credible security guarantees, ensuring the absence of militias or uncontrollable actors. This could prevent what Israel describes as a potential "repeat of the 7 October scenario" in southern Syria.

Should Tel Aviv request the involvement of US forces within the UNDOF framework, it is plausible that Damascus would then insist on the inclusion of Arab or Turkish forces—echoing the dynamic of 1974, when Kissinger proposed US troops and Assad responded by requesting Soviet forces.

Damascus could also take the initiative to demarcate its border with Lebanon, officially declaring that the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba Hills are Syrian territory. Such a move would be in-line with its interests in asserting control over border zones and curbing arms and narcotics trafficking, to which end Syria may be open to participating in a regional counter-terrorism mechanism, particularly since Türkiye previously proposed a bloc comprising Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.

Pushing for peace

As for joining the Abraham Accords, none of the four existing signatory states share a border with Israel, or has land occupied by it, so comparisons are unhelpful. Unlike these signatories, Syria's current priorities include regaining full sovereignty over its territory, rebuilding internal cohesion, restoring its armed forces, and advancing reconstruction. Entering into the Accords at this early and crucial stage of that rebuilding process could complicate efforts, rather than support them. It might also challenge the fragile unity of Syria's military apparatus.

Undoubtedly, there is a push by some for a 'warm peace' between Israel and Syria, in the wider context of a major regional recalibration, given the significant setbacks suffered by Iran and its proxies since October 2023. But pushing too hard for a rapid breakthrough could give Iran the pretext it needs to disrupt the process, offering Türkiye an opportunity to intervene and hinder Syria's re-engagement with the region.  

In such a scenario, "peace" risks becoming fleeting. Prioritising the negotiation track between Damascus and Tel Aviv is essential to securing Syria's successful transition from one regional axis to another.