Iran has no place in Netanyahu's 'new Middle East' vision

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains a key obstacle to Netanyahu's post-October 7 vision for a 'new Middle East'. This helps explain the ferocity of Israel's unprecedented attack on its long-time foe.

Iran has no place in Netanyahu's 'new Middle East' vision

To understand the current fighting between Iran and Israel, it helps to know how the world changed since the Middle East’s last big wars, and specifically, how it was changed since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. Indeed, the ‘Rules of 7 October’ are a good starting point.

While this eruption of direct attacks between Israel and Iran evokes major Middle Eastern conflicts in recent decades—such as the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the Arab-Israeli wars (1967 and 1973), and the Suez Crisis (1956)—it operates under its own distinct logic and carries far-reaching consequences.

Israel and Iran are waging war in a world that has moved beyond the neat East-West split of the Cold War era. Not all Western nations support Israel, nor does the entire Eastern bloc back Iran. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump is unlike any of his predecessors, not just in his method but in his outlook.

Then and now

In the latter half of the 20th century, many of the Middle East’s traditional regional powers were relatively strong. The likes of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had decent militaries and were politically stable. Today, they are either emerging from severe economic crises, civil war, or both. As they try to recover their strength of influence, the centre of Arab power has shifted to the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, while other regional actors—notably, Türkiye—have also risen in prominence.

These emerging powers seek economic prosperity and stability, and are investing considerable diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and mitigate their consequences. But they are having to do so in the new post-October 2023 world.

The intention was to wage war far from Iranian soil, sparing Tehran direct engagement, but that strategy has unravelled

Israel's war on Gaza, its decapitation of Hezbollah's top brass leadership in Lebanon, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have left Iran with very few friends. The strategy conceived by Iran's former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani (killed on Trump's orders in Baghdad in early 2020) was centred on Iran extending its reach through proxy forces across various Arab capitals and conflict zones.

The intention was to wage war far from Iranian soil, sparing Tehran direct engagement, but that strategy has unravelled, not solely because of Soleimani's death, but because of the systematic dismantlement of Iran's shield of proxies and allies, having cleared the way to the direct, open confrontation being waged right now.

Sensing vulnerability

The very forces Iran spent years training and arming are now absent from the battlefield after their leaders were killed and their arsenals destroyed. The four Arab capitals that once symbolised Iran's regional influence—Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa—are no longer an effective part of this strategic theatre. None are willing or able to fight for Iran in its moment of need, for many reasons.

In Tel Aviv, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sensed Iran's vulnerability and set far-reaching war objectives. These include toppling the Iranian regime, removing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, facilitating the return of Reza Pahlavi (the eldest son of the last Shah of Iran), and dismantling the country's nuclear programme (at the time of writing, Israel had just claimed full control over Tehran's skies).

In short, Netanyahu wants the same results in Iran as in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and he is instigating it under the 'Rules of 7 October.' The assassination of key political and military figures, the targeted strikes against military positions, the disruption of command structures, the creation of opportunities for opposition forces to emerge—these are all now well-thumbed pages of the new rulebook.

The confrontation between Israel and Iran is not a skirmish; it is a war. And Iran is not Syria; its government is far more resilient than Assad's ever was

Question of survival

When it comes to Iran, the Israeli hope is that this weakening of the regime will spark internal challenge and change, forcing the country's leaders to abandon their nuclear ambitions or die defending them. Even if it survives, a significantly weakened Iranian regime would shift the regional power balances and achieve a strategic realignment.

There is now a bigger chance that Iran's nuclear ambitions will forever remain just that. Next door, in Syria, the chemical weapons programme of Bashar al-Assad is being dismantled, as the new Syrian leadership recalibrates its alliances. But drawing simplistic parallels would be a mistake. Iran is not Syria, its government is far more resilient than Assad's ever was.

For years, Netanyahu has sought to pull the United States into what he frames as an "existential war". So far, US involvement has been largely defensive and intelligence-based, but images of Tel Aviv in flames could put pressure on Washington to do more.  

Under the new 'Rules of 7 October,' Netanyahu is urging a regional reframing, which would include a robust, American-led coalition response to Iran, to facilitate a "new Middle East" (Trump's vision) from the ashes of this war, through negotiations, settlements, accords, and ambitious post-war reconstruction.

Will this vision materialise? Not necessarily. The confrontation between Israel and Iran is not a skirmish; it is a war. There are two stark possibilities: a return to negotiations informed by the new geopolitical realities, or continued escalation with all the attendant internal and regional repercussions. Prudence is essential before making that choice. After all, this is a war governed by the 'Rules of 7 October.'

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