Mohammed al-Dairi: Libyan state-building killed by corruption and division

You have spoken about the need to rebuild the political process from the ground up. What is needed to overcome the current political and institutional fragmentation?

Today, we lack a functioning state that exercises authority over the entirety of Libyan territory. We also lack a unified vision and a coherent strategy to define what we want from Libya, politically, economically, and socially.

In the short term, the focus must be on ending institutional and military fragmentation. That means bringing an end to the existence of two competing governments, one in Tripoli and the other in the east, along with the divided security and military apparatus that accompanies them.

Another urgent priority is ending excessive centralisation, which remains one of the key drivers of conflict. In this regard, I call for the activation of Law No. 59 of 2012 to empower municipalities, so that the central government does not monopolise all financial, political, and administrative powers.

In the medium term, we must initiate a serious process of political reconciliation. An effort made last February in Addis Ababa did not gain the consent of all parties. True reconciliation can only happen when all political factions come together at the same table and commit to negotiating a comprehensive settlement.

It is equally critical to forge a new social contract before any parliamentary or presidential elections take place—one that is preceded by a constitution capable of laying the groundwork for rebuilding a new Libya on solid and legitimate foundations.

In the long term, Libya must pursue an ambitious national renaissance project—one that prioritises the reconstruction of a state rooted in law and institutions and shifts the country away from its dependence on oil as the sole source of income. Diversifying the national economy is key to realising the vision of a new Libya that its citizens have long aspired to.

The "new Libya" you envision faces enormous challenges, including the influx of tens of thousands of irregular migrants, with rumours of European pressure to settle migrants inside Libyan territory. How do you view this crisis and its impact on Libya's security?

The flow of migrants is not new—it existed even under the former regime, with arrivals from Niger and Sudan—but today it is accelerating, especially since the military coup in Niger in July 2023 and the repeal of legislation criminalising irregular migration.

We are deeply concerned by this trend. Libya is increasingly becoming a hub for the settlement of numerous groups, some of them criminals. This threatens Libya's national security and endangers other migrants as well. We need a clear strategy and to monitor Libya's borders, whether with Chad, Niger, or Sudan. This is essential to reduce or eliminate a problem that poses a direct threat to our sovereignty.

We have seen several rounds of political talks. Why have these negotiations failed? Have they, in fact, deepened the Libyan crisis, rather than resolved it?

Talks were held under UN auspices. They were not genuinely Libyan-Libyan dialogues, whether in Geneva, Skhirat, or elsewhere. They unfolded within an international framework, and that framework, since 2011, has not been serious about reaching new Libyan-driven decisions or understandings.

A political agreement was signed in Skhirat on 17 December 2015, followed by another in Geneva in February 2020, but they all led to the division of power rather than the establishment of a functioning state. Neither the tracks nor the participants appeared focused on rebuilding the state or restoring its authority.

International actors have played roles, while UN envoys have come and gone without producing decisive outcomes. Who was the key player, and why did efforts fail to foster consensus among Libyan rivals?

The UN role was largely limited to European actors. UN envoy Ghassan Salamé was caught between a rock and a hard place. In 2017-18, both France and Italy vied to lead the process. President Emmanuel Macron hosted a summit at the Élysée Palace in May 2018, and Italy organised a parallel conference that November. Italian officials even said: "Leadership in Libya belongs to us—not France."

Then came the Berlin Summit of 2018, which received broad backing from multiple Libyan parties... The initiative of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Berlin Process yielded tangible results. The 2019 Berlin Conference launched both political and security tracks. This ultimately led to a ceasefire agreement signed in Geneva on 22 October 2020, under the auspices of UN envoy Stephanie Williams.

That process was both serious and effective. In fact, Merkel travelled to Moscow a week before the summit to personally request President Vladimir Putin's attendance. This represented the highest level of Russian engagement in the process, alongside the participation of several Arab heads of state.

Following the Skhirat Agreement, the Government of National Accord (GNA, headquartered in Tripoli) gained international recognition, but new divisions quickly surfaced. Did Russia play a disruptive role?

The Russians engaged with both sides: with us (the House of Representatives, based in the east), and with the GNA led by Fayez al-Sarraj. This dual-track approach was consistent with their broader strategy. In the end, they opted to deal primarily with the GNA, despite its strong and longstanding relationship with the (eastern) Libyan National Army (LNA) under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, dating back to 2017–2018.

Libya is seeing a growing Russian military presence alongside an increasingly assertive US. What is the impact of this international tug-of-war over Libya?

Even during Gaddafi's era, the Russians wanted to establish a military base in Libya. That ambition still exists today, but there is broad rejection—both from the army and from the majority of Libyans—of any foreign military bases on Libyan soil.

As for AFRICOM (the United States' Africa Command), prior to President Donald Trump's arrival in office, the US Department of Defence worked with various Libyan actors to unify the country's military establishment and create a cohesive national army. We are strongly opposed to any foreign military presence, particularly in eastern Libya.

Did the delayed support from Russia and the US for Libya's army and government create a power vacuum that Türkiye and Italy exploited in the west?

Initially, Türkiye held the upper hand, particularly after 2019. Today, both Türkiye and Russia have a substantial military presence in Libya; this is undeniable. Russian military equipment and weapons were transferred from Syria to Libya in December 2023. That said, Russia's presence in Syria continues with the consent of the ruling regime and is not currently under threat.

By contrast, the recent visit of a US Sixth Fleet warship to both Tripoli and Benghazi sent an unmistakable signal that America—despite the policies of the Trump administration—remains invested in Libya and is working to contain Russian influence.

Given the extent of foreign involvement in Libya, can we say that political decision-making in Tobruk and Tripoli has ever been genuinely Libyan?

Unfortunately, political decision-making in Libya has never been fully sovereign, and that remains true today. Around 80-90% of decisions are influenced by regional and international actors.

Has the absence of an effective Arab role allowed external parties unfamiliar with Libya's internal dynamics to fill the vacuum?

Thank you for raising this point. Indeed, the Arab League played a significant role in 2011, but that faded year after year. Today, it is nearly non-existent. When we speak of an 'Arab role,' we mean genuine, coordinated Arab action. Unfortunately, no such coordination currently exists with regard to Libya.

In other areas, such as Gaza, we see strong and commendable coordination between Arab leaders and foreign ministers. We hope to see a similar effort for Libya, led by influential Arab states and coordinated with regional powers, especially Türkiye.

Amid the ongoing chaos, who benefits from keeping the Libyan oil fields outside state control?

Sadly, the beneficiaries are those with personal ambitions who seek to maintain control over the oil fields for their own gain. The solution lies in establishing a unified central government with representatives from all sides. Without such inclusive participation, genuine governing authority cannot be built. There is currently Western support for this, and we hope the political conditions will soon allow for its realisation.

Did your government fail to secure the necessary international support to assert control over Libya's sovereign institutions? And looking back, what would you have done differently in managing foreign affairs?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could and should have played a more prominent role in that process. At the time, Bernardino León led international efforts to facilitate dialogue between the elected House of Representatives and the General National Congress, but the Foreign Ministry was not effectively engaged.

In post-conflict situations, the ministry typically plays a central role. I now believe we should have asserted ourselves more. At the time, I chose to support the negotiating delegation representing the House of Representatives, which had been given the mandate to engage with the opposing side under UN auspices. In hindsight, that may have been a mistake. In truth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have contributed much more to shaping that diplomatic track.

Given the east–west divide, how did you manage the split in foreign policy decision-making? Did your differences with Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni affect the ministry's performance during that critical period?

It was an extremely difficult period. Near the city of Al-Bayda, where the government was based, Derna was under the control of extremist groups. The Islamic State (IS) announced its presence there less than a month after we were sworn in on 29 September 2014.

There were attempts to bomb the parliament, and as a cabinet, we faced assassination attempts and terrorist attacks. In November 2014, UN envoy Bernardino León attended a meeting at an airport, and shortly before it began, two car bombs were discovered just 400 metres away.

Beyond the political chaos, Libya has struggled with rampant insecurity and unregulated weapons. Why did disarmament efforts fail?

In 2014, when the core of the LNA was established, there was direct engagement with extremist groups. In 2017-18, Benghazi and Derna were liberated—important military and security milestones—but at the same time, political Islam continued to dominate in Tripoli, working to create a parallel government with independent financial authority. While the actual power was based in the west, we operated under legitimate authority, but we faced immense political and financial obstacles.

When it comes to building the military, who bears responsibility for obstructing efforts to arm the Libyan army, despite your repeated appeals?

The international community refused to allow the army to be armed, citing UN Security Council Resolution 1970 of 2011. Some Arab states were also wary of backing the National Army aligned with the parliament, fearing it would come at the expense of political Islam factions in the west. Regional rivalries and a sweeping arms embargo on all Libyan parties prevented us from acquiring essential military equipment.

With the institutional split and a parallel government in Tripoli, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was effectively divided and penetrated. How did you handle this reality?

Initially, the so-called National Salvation Government emerged, backed by political Islam—specifically the Muslim Brotherhood and allied Islamist factions. It controlled oil revenues and redirected funds through the Central Bank in Tripoli. Some embassies chose to work with them to secure financial support.

However, we succeeded in maintaining our presence in key diplomatic posts such as New York, Paris, and Washington, where we had qualified personnel committed to legitimacy and capable of running the ministry's external affairs.

The Foreign Ministry has also been accused of facilitating corruption, especially with appointments. How did you manage that issue?

Quota-based appointments were widespread across the state, including within the Ministry. There were strong pressures from regional communities, particularly in the south and east, to appoint candidates from their areas, often under the pretext of historical marginalisation. Both I and the prime minister were subjected to direct pressure to make certain appointments.

Later, under the Dbeibeh government, there was an unprecedented level of corruption, with appointments being handed to relatives of militia leaders. The situation, frankly, became disastrous.