'Make Syria Great Again': how Sunni populism is reshaping post-war Syria

Promising a new golden age, neo-Umayyadism resonates with a broad spectrum of Syria’s Sunni Arabs, particularly those from small towns and suburbs that had been disenfranchised under the Assad regime

'Make Syria Great Again': how Sunni populism is reshaping post-war Syria

President Donald Trump's public admiration for Syria's transitional president came as no surprise. The two leaders share a mutual appreciation for strength and for going up against the system and winning. After their meeting in Riyadh, Trump told reporters that Ahmed al-Sharaa was a “young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Strong past. Very strong past. Fighter.” Trump and al-Sharaa also share a remarkable ability to connect with their respective constituencies through social media, positioning themselves as the sole saviours and champions of their people.

Al-Sharaa’s journey—from his stints with the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda to becoming a head of state welcomed in global capitals—has solidified his image among ordinary Sunnis as a hero. Sunni pride in having triumphed in the civil war translates into support for the wartime leader.

An Economist survey published on 2 April polled 1,500 Syrians from across the country’s provinces and sectarian groups, and found that 81% of Syrians approve of al-Sharaa’s rule. That figure has likely risen following the lifting of US sanctions.

But not so long ago, al-Sharaa enjoyed nowhere near this level of popularity. He was considered too closely associated with jihadist extremism to be accepted into the mainstream of the Syrian revolution. Many of the TV pundits and social media influencers who today wax lyrical about his charisma and political acumen had once denounced him in the harshest terms.

Of course, success inevitably draws supporters to the winning side; such opportunism is hardly surprising. Yet another subtler dynamic is at play: al-Sharaa’s deliberate courting of Sunni Arab populism. This is a factor often overlooked in the West, where discussion primarily revolves around investing in al-Sharaa’s pragmatism and lifting sanctions to tap into Syria’s reconstruction bonanza.

In parallel, however, a distinctly different narrative has gained momentum inside Syria—one carefully cultivated to make al-Sharaa unassailable in the Sunni street: Umayyadism.

Bandar AL-JALOUD / Saudi Royal Palace
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) watching as US President Donald Trump (C) shakes hands with Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh on May 14, 2025.

Neo-Umayyadism

Promoted by al-Sharaa’s close advisers and amplified by loyal social-media influencers, this nostalgic concept proclaims to Syria’s Sunni Arabs that they are the new Umayyads. Pro-government media personality Musa al-Omar (685,000 followers on X) posted on his socials on 19 February a video of al-Sharaa riding a horse to a song whose opening line was: “The Umayyads are of golden lineage / their name sent fear in Persian kings/books cannot praise them enough.”

When al-Sharaa visited King Abdullah II in Jordan on 26 February, “The Umayyads meet the Hashemites” was the main tag line of HTS-run social media accounts. Pro-government cleric and chairman of the national dialogue preparatory committee, Hasan al-Dughaim, proclaimed to a group of Christian leaders on 21 April that the new state would treat them fairly “just as the Umayyads did.”

It is a flattering and powerful comparison: for 89 years (661-750 CE), the Umayyad dynasty ruled an empire stretching from North Africa to the Caucasus and Central Asia, with Damascus as its imperial capital.

Later, the Umayyads established themselves in Spain, ruling from Cordoba for 275 years (756–1031 CE). Known as a worldly and pragmatic dynasty, they adapted and refined Byzantine administrative structures, maintained relative tolerance towards Jews and Christians and suppressed the Kharijites–the Islamic State (IS) of their day.

The Umayyads were also the historic enemies of Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam and the most revered figure among the Shiites. The Umayyads rebelled against Ali and fought his descendants, most notably his son Hussein, who was slain by the second Umayyad “caliph” Yazid in Karbala. This history makes the Umayyads the epitome of evil in Shiite theology.

Moreover, the Umayyads were Arab nationalists whose policies systematically discriminated against Persians. In an Arab country saved from “Iranian occupation”, the Umayyads represented everything that al-Assad and Iran were not.

An Economist survey found that 81% of Syrians approve of al-Sharaa's rule

More than a dog whistle

The Umayyad label is more than just a sectarian dog whistle. By invoking the legacy of the historical Umayyad state, HTS imparts practical legitimacy to its political project and broadens its appeal among Sunni communities beyond the narrow confines of Salafist circles. It helps HTS transform from being simply a radical Islamist armed group into a more "patriotic" political entity—one perceived by its supporters as capable of effective governance and ambitious achievements that will bring back glory to Syria.

The mainstream opinion of Sunni jurists is that the Umayyads were at fault in their quarrel with Ali, and that their killing of Hussein was unacceptable and a crime, but that the interest of the ummah required that Muslims accept their leadership and move on. Ancient and modern historians agree that under the Umayyads, secular interests trumped religious principles. They were not about religion as much as effectiveness.

Today, the term bani umayya has become synonymous with Sunnis who support al-Sharaa and his government, irrespective of their degree of religious observance. The Umayyads not only dispensed with piety in matters of statecraft but also ditched consultation (shura). This renders them especially useful as a reference, given that the emerging state in Syria will similarly lack democratic credentials, resembling more a quasi-monarchy than a constitutional republic.

The Umayyadism label is to a rural Sunni Arab from Raqqa what a red MAGA hat is to the white working class in Alabama

Sunni street appeal

Not all Syrians share enthusiasm for Umayyadism. Religious minorities view it as synonymous with an Islamic state, Kurds as a euphemism for Arab chauvinism, liberal Sunnis as jingoism, and even some Islamists see it as a retreat from the ideal model of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions.

For HTS, however, the Umayyads represent the perfect identitarian blend of ancient and modern: Islamic but not Islamist, traditional but aspirational, tolerant but also capable of cruelty, outwardly pious but also attuned to material wealth, and distinctly "Syrian."

Umayyadism is not especially sophisticated as ideological symbolism, but its populist simplicity may be what gives it its power. Precisely because it promises a new golden age, it resonates with a broad spectrum that bore the brunt of the war, and who felt discriminated against and talked down to by bureaucrats, intellectuals, and minorities. Thanks to al-Sharaa, they are reclaiming their dignity and a large slice of state patronage.     

A bani umayya song or meme is to Sunni Arabs from rural Aleppo what wearing a red MAGA hat is to the white working class in Alabama. It's their way of signalling that it's their country, that they're taking back control, and they're going to 'Make Syria Great Again'.

Like their new leader in Riyadh, they've arrived.   

font change