Syria's 8th Brigade disbands: a blueprint for military consolidation?

Tensions escalated over time as efforts to negotiate Al-Awda's integration stalled. Disputes over rank, areas of operation, and authority created a climate of mistrust, hampering the government's ability to consolidate power in Daraa.

Mirroring HTS's model of consolidation, the transitional government began eroding Al-Awda's influence by isolating his faction and cultivating local alliances. A key move was appointing Binian Ahmed al-Hariri—a native of the region and a member of one of Daraa's prominent families—as head of Daraa's military division. His community ties helped redirect the loyalties of several groups previously aligned with Al-Awda.

Damascus also infiltrated Busra al-Sham by backing Bilal al-Droubi, a local rival. Al-Droubi was tasked with establishing a General Security cell to challenge Al-Awda's dominance and establish a foothold for Damascus. These efforts, among other factors, significantly weakened the Eighth Brigade. Its forces shrank to 300–400 fighters, confined mostly to Busra al-Sham and increasingly cut off from wider support networks.

The death blow

The final phase of Damascus's strategy was patience—waiting for the right opportunity. That moment came when Al-Awda clashed with al-Droubi under the guise of a counter-narcotics operation. The mission backfired. Al-Droubi died from injuries sustained in a firefight, sparking anger among his supporters and leading to violent clashes.

Damascus seized the moment. On the same day, 1,200 troops from General Security were deployed near Busra al-Sham, signalling readiness for a full-scale offensive. Rather than immediately use force, General Security opened negotiations with local notables. To maintain pressure, al-Droubi's burial was delayed, and mosques were used to rally public protests against the Eighth Brigade.

Faced with growing community opposition and the looming threat of military confrontation, the Eighth Brigade's leadership agreed to disband. On 13 April, they accepted terms that included disarmament, the transfer of security control to General Security, and the appointment of an interim leader to oversee the brigade's integration into the Ministry of Defence. It marked the likely end of Al-Awda's influence in the area.

Not afraid to use force

The use of HTS-style tactics against the Eighth Brigade suggests that the al-Shara'a administration may replicate this model elsewhere if negotiations fail to bring other armed factions under a unified command within the Ministry of Defence. However, outcomes will vary depending on the size of the faction, the level of local support, and how communities perceive the central government.

Even though Al-Awda's forces were dismantled without blood spilt, this doesn't mean force won't be used elsewhere. When force is deemed necessary, Damascus is likely to favour high-intensity, decisive action designed to break resistance quickly and push factions into accelerated negotiations.

Still, even if this strategy successfully extends state control, it won't resolve the deeper structural issues plaguing the transition. Grievances voiced by reluctant factions—such as calls for decentralisation, rejection of HTS's dominance in decision-making, and demands for meaningful power-sharing—cannot be solved through coercion alone.

Without genuine dialogue and meaningful inclusion, discontent will continue to build beneath the surface. And when voices are excluded, violence is never far behind—driven not by ideology, but by frustration and the failure to share power in a new political order that was supposed to offer change.