Why Aleppo's decentralisation deal can't be easily replicated

The ambiguity of the agreement may work in Aleppo, where external interference is negligible, but it is unlikely to hold in the northeast or Sweida

Why Aleppo's decentralisation deal can't be easily replicated

A recent agreement between Syria’s interim government and Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in Aleppo has sparked debate over whether it could serve as a model for the country’s reunification. The 14-point deal—reached with representatives of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh—includes the withdrawal of military forces, maintaining security management in the hands of local security forces, and the recognition of existing local civil administrations.

At first glance, the agreement offers a peaceful framework for addressing disputes over governance and security in areas where Damascus still lacks full control. However, applying this model beyond Aleppo is not so simple. In regions like the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) or Sweida, both the issues at stake and the political dynamics are significantly more complex.

Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh have remained under Kurdish control throughout the Syrian conflict—even as other parts of Aleppo shifted hands. A tacit arrangement, which sidelined Kurdish forces during the final offensive on Aleppo in November, allowed this status quo to persist even after the fall of the Assad regime. However, with the transitional government stepping up efforts to reassert authority across the country, new terms became necessary.

The resulting agreement calls for the demilitarisation of the two neighbourhoods through the withdrawal of Kurdish fighters affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In return, security inside the neighbourhoods will continue to be managed—at least for now—by local security forces.

The deal also recognises the role of the local civil administration, allowing existing educational, municipal, and service institutions to operate without interruption until a long-term solution is reached. Crucially, it affirms the cultural and social identity of these Kurdish-majority communities.

A step forward

The Aleppo agreement marks a significant step in Syria’s path toward unity. It offers a peaceful resolution to local tensions by enabling the withdrawal of a rival force seen by many residents as hostile. This has helped restore internal connectivity in the city, brought back a degree of normalcy, and reduced the risk of renewed military confrontation.

The Aleppo deal is important for Syrian unity in that it reduces the risk of renewed military confrontation

Crucially, the agreement sets a precedent for formalised cooperation between the transitional authorities and decentralised local actors, laying the groundwork for joint governance and coordinated service delivery. It also guarantees fair representation for the neighbourhoods in Aleppo's governorate council, as well as in professional bodies such as trade and industry chambers.

Recognising its broader significance, Ilham Ahmad, a senior Kurdish official, described the agreement as a step toward decentralisation—one that could help resolve lingering disputes between Damascus and authorities in the northeast.

Not a 'one-size-fits all' solution

Despite its promise, the Aleppo agreement is not easily replicable. Its temporary nature and ambiguous language—particularly regarding the status of security forces—raise important concerns. According to official Syrian sources and the text of the agreement, internal security is to be managed by forces under the Interior Ministry.

However, Kurdish officials contend that Asayish forces, affiliated with the SDF, will continue to perform this role. The agreement's use of the term internal security forces—which is also the Arabic term for the Asayish—instead of general security, the terminology typically used by the transitional government, reinforces this interpretation. This ambiguity appears to be an intentional, short-term compromise designed to postpone a final decision on a sensitive issue.

Such ambiguity may work in Aleppo, where the geographic scope is limited and external interference is negligible. But it is unlikely to hold in regions like the northeast or Sweida, where local governance structures are more entrenched and demands for permanent, irreversible arrangements—along with constitutional guarantees—are stronger.

The withdrawal of military forces in Aleppo won't work in other regions of Syria where there are no fallback areas to retreat to

The same applies to local governance, where existing models are more expansive and institutionalised, requiring comprehensive, long-term solutions rather than short-term, piecemeal fixes.

Moreover, the withdrawal of military forces, which helped de-escalate tensions in Aleppo, is not a viable strategy elsewhere. In the northeast and Sweida, there are no fallback areas to retreat to, making the integration of local armed forces into national military structures a far more complex issue that defies simple or temporary remedies.

Willingness to experiment

The Aleppo agreement is a hopeful development. It demonstrates that negotiated compromise between rival sides is possible and that peaceful resolution can replace armed confrontation. It also shows a willingness to experiment with decentralised governance—an idea long resisted by Damascus.

But while the deal matters, it is not a blueprint for national reunification. Syria's different regions have distinct political, ethnic, and security realities. Reunification will not come through one-size-fits-all agreements but through tailored solutions that reflect these differences.

Ultimately, rebuilding a unified Syria will require more than symbolic deals. It demands sustained political will, inclusive dialogue, and a shared commitment to a decentralised but cohesive state—one where power-sharing, cultural rights, and representation are guaranteed by law, not left to interpretation.

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