The 8th Brigade agrees to dissolve in boost for Damascus
A high-profile armed group in Daraa in southern Syria has reluctantly agreed to hand over its weapons, with its fighters joining a national army under the Ministry of Defence. In the end, it had to.
Bakr ALKASEM / AFP
Members of Syria's security forces stand guard during the funeral of three people killed in Israeli strikes a day earlier, in the southern town of Daraa on March 18, 2025.
The 8th Brigade agrees to dissolve in boost for Damascus
A key week in Syria’s south, which began with protests, clashes, and an assassination, ended with the Daraa-based 8th Brigade finally agreeing to disband and integrate into a new national army under Syria’s Ministry of Defence.
Events took a turn when Bilal Al-Droubi, a local commander supportive of the national government in Damascus, was arrested and shot by four attackers believed to be from the 8th Brigade, which he had criticised. That triggered clashes between local armed factions and government forces in the city of Busra Al-Sham in rural Daraa.
The 8th Brigade is led by Ahmad Al-Awda, who previously fought in the army of Syria’s recently deposed ruler Bashar al-Assad before joining the opposition. In 2018, when Assad’s forces regained control of southern Syria, al-Awda led the 8th Brigade, working with Russian forces.
The 8th Brigade took part in the southern operations room that led to the overthrow of al-Assad in November and December 2024, setting up prisons, a judicial system, and security forces in the areas under their control. It was an independence that al-Awda was loathe to give up.
Quick escalation
Al-Droubi, also known as Bilal al-Mustafa, was one of the local leaders who opposed al-Awda, and his killing is seen as part of a wider campaign by al-Awda to cement his position locally, prior to the showdown with government forces, who began arresting 8th Brigade personnel, confiscating their weaponry (including tanks and armoured personnel carriers), and seizing control of buildings and a prison.
To defuse the crisis, the General Security Administration reached an agreement with the leadership of the 8th Brigade. The deal allows the establishment of a security checkpoint at the city’s entrance and mandated the handover of the four individuals accused of killing al-Droubi.
Fighters loyal to the government began arresting 8th Brigade personnel and confiscating their weapons, seizing buildings and a prison
On 13 April, Brigade spokesman Mohammad Suleiman Al-Hourani said it would surrender its weapons to the national government, disband the faction, integrate its members into the Ministry of Defence, and transfer its detainees to the Syrian state.
The Brigade had been under increasing pressure from Damascus to integrate into the regular army structure, but al-Awda had been demanding clear guarantees over the military ranks of his fighters and the geographic scope of his forces' deployment.
Bumpy history
It signals the end for a group initially founded as the Shabab al-Sunna Brigade in 2013 with support from the Military Operations Centre, which brought together intelligence agencies from 11 Arab and foreign countries, led by the CIA. On 21 August 2016, several factions from the Free Syrian Army joined it under al-Awda's leadership.
By mid-2018, the Russian military campaign in southern Syria led to secret discussions with commanders from local armed groups, with Shabab al-Sunna later being reconstituted as the 8th Brigade, operating under the 5th Corps of the Syrian army with Russian backing.
Al-Awda was accused by some of "treason" and of surrendering Daraa to the Russians and al-Assad. Others defended his decision as a strategic move to shield the region from Russian bombers, which had launched a scorched-earth campaign in other parts of the country. By the end of 2018, the 8th Brigade was affiliated with the Russian-backed Fifth Corps, effectively serving as Moscow's military proxy in southern Syria.
The Brigade is a vastly shrunken force, numbering only 300-400 fighters largely confined to Busra al-Sham
Its fighters regularly deployed to Latakia on the coast. In June 2020, a bus carrying 8th Brigade personnel was bombed as it returned from rotation, killing nine and injuring 25. The following month, an 8th Brigade graduation ceremony attended by Russians near the historic Busra Castle also became a demonstration demanding regime change in Syria.
Russia deployed the 8th Brigade to fight Islamic State (IS) in the Syrian desert, where Brigade fighters were attacked by Iranian-backed militias. In 2021, the 8th Brigade's affiliation shifted to Branch 265 of the Military Intelligence Directorate, headed by Lu'ai Al-Ali.
Analysts say this was part of Russia's wider strategy to eliminate any armed local faction operating independently of the Syrian state, curb Iranian influence in southern Syria, and contribute to anti-narcotics efforts, an area traditionally dominated by Iran-affiliated militias.
Losing power
Announcing its dissolution this week, the Brigade is a vastly shrunken force, numbering only 300-400 fighters, who are largely confined to the Busra al-Sham area, having repeatedly tried and failed to expand into western and central Daraa.
Tensions between the 8th Brigade and others who helped oust al-Assad erupted on 8 December when al-Awda's forces entered Damascus and pre-emptively deployed across state institutions ahead of the entry of fighters aligned with al-Sharaa and his Idlib-based Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the largest anti-Assad fighting force.
Al-Awda and his fighters posing with Ahmed al-Sharaa
Al-Sharaa, who is now the country's increasingly powerful interim president, met al-Awda on 11 January. This led to al-Awda's forces withdrawing from Damascus and ceding control to the national administration, but tension remained between the 8th Brigade and the Syrian Ministry of Defence.
While the latter announced in February that 100 Syrian factions had now agreed to join the army, the 8th Brigade held back to preserve its local autonomy, al-Awda having been notably absent from a national conference held on 29 January.
Fearing a loss of influence, he wanted guarantees over compensation, the military ranks of his fighters, and their deployment remit, but could not force Damascus to meet his conditions. His hand had been weakened by deteriorating relations with other factions in Daraa, most of whom favoured alignment with Damascus. Likewise, he failed to build alliances with groups in Sweida due to past grievances. Even his own support base in Busra al-Sham had eroded, particularly following the imposition of levies.
Brigade fighters grew increasingly unhappy with al-Awda's detachment from Damascus, especially with Israel threatening from the south. These combined pressures ultimately accelerated the Brigade's dissolution, something al-Awda could no longer resist owing to his weakened position.
Consolidation continues
The disbandment highlights the growing influence of new security bodies, such as the General Security Administration, in reasserting state authority over formerly unstable regions. The agency's successful entry into Busra al-Sham and its ability to contain tensions there could serve as a model for other areas.
Forces loyal to the new Syrian government in the town of Busra in Daraa Governorate, southern Syria, on January 5, 2025.
Southern Syria may now be on the cusp of a new wave of state-led reconciliation initiatives aimed at curbing disorder. Fighters from local factions are likely to adapt for the sake of self-preservation, agreeing to disarm, disband, and declare allegiance to the state. A minority of hardliners may resist, but their influence is increasingly limited.
The events of 10-11 April serve as a warning to other armed groups in southern Syria. The message from Damascus is unequivocal: there will be no weapons outside the authority of the state in Daraa, and no local force will disrupt the government's efforts to impose order.
The region will have a relatively secure and stable future if combatants are reintegrated and their status is regularised. For local figures such as Ahmad al-Awda, who operated in a grey area between opposition and regime alignment, this looks like the end of the line, but he has shown in the past an ability to adapt. Perhaps he will reappear.
For al-Sharaa and his government, the dismantling of independent military entities in the south and their consolidation under state control marks a new phase that could bring an end to a decade of fragmented power and make it harder for Israel to pursue a strategy of 'divide and conquer' in its northern neighbour. In short, the government will feel that this was a fight worth waging.
