Politics

Have the Camp David Accords overstayed their welcome?

The 1979 peace between Egypt and Israel served its purpose for almost half a century, but the latter's 17-month-long onslaught on Gaza has thrown it into disarray. What now for the accords?

Jordan's King Abdullah, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and French President Emmanuel Macron pose during a trilateral summit to discuss the situation in Gaza, at the Presidential Palace in Cairo, Egypt, April 7, 2025.

Have the Camp David Accords overstayed their welcome?

Khaled Essam Eleslamboly

last update on 07 Apr 2025

On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron was in Cairo, where he gave a press conference with his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. He said he strongly opposed any displacement or annexation in Gaza and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, describing any would-be action as "a violation of international law and a serious threat to the security of the entire region, including Israel."

For his part, el-Sisi has been consistent and vocal in his stance, emphasising that any attempt to push Palestinians out of their land and into the Sinai would constitute a red line for Egypt, adding to speculation over the durability of the Camp David Accords.

When Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in 1979, it was widely seen as marking a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. For almost half a century, it has performed as intended—namely, by offering a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes rather than resolving them through military conflict.

Both bilateral relations and the treaty have faced tests since 1979, but few have been as serious as that posed by Israel’s response to the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. Tensions between Egypt and Israel have escalated over the course of the latter's 17-month-long assault on Gaza.

Its decimation of Gaza and its sinister intentions toward its Palestinian inhabitants have sparked a charged debate over whether certain provisions of the treaty should be reconsidered, amended, or suspended or whether Egypt should, in fact, withdraw altogether. That, in turn, has sent experts scouring over the relevant details of international law concerning such action.

The Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty was signed on 26 March 1979 by former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin under the personal sponsorship and supervision of former US President Jimmy Carter.

Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by Egyptian Islamists opposed to peace with Israel and irked by his historic visit to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) in 1977, signing the Camp David Accords a year later, in 1978.

AFP — Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (L), Israeli Premier Menachem Begin (R) and US President Jimmy Carter (C) shake hands after a press conference in the East Room of the White House, on September 17, 1978.

Treaty provisions

The 1979 peace treaty consists of a main text, articles, annexes, memoranda of understanding (MoUs), and maps. The annexes include the Protocol on Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements, with specific geographical coordinates, and the Protocol on Bilateral Relations, outlining the nature and level of diplomatic relations.

A main reason for signing the peace treaty was to commit to resolving disputes through peaceful means rather than armed confrontation. In international law, a dispute or conflict is “a disagreement or divergence over a matter of fact or law which leads to a clash of interests between two or more subjects of international law”.

In line with this principle, Article VII of the treaty stipulates that any dispute regarding the application or interpretation of the agreement shall be resolved through negotiations. Should these fail, it would be addressed through conciliation or referred to arbitration.

Negotiation is direct engagement between the disputing parties only. Conciliation refers the dispute to a body, committee, or individual tasked with examining the matter comprehensively before proposing non-binding solutions. Arbitration is a formal legal mechanism whereby the dispute is referred to a tribunal composed of judges selected by the disputing parties. Its ruling is based on international law and on procedures and conditions previously agreed upon by both sides. The ruling is binding.

Arbitration mechanism

Egypt invoked the arbitration mechanism under Article VII in the 1980s when a legal dispute emerged during the treaty's implementation, specifically on the positioning of 14 border markers around the city of Taba. The markers determined the precise international boundary. An arbitration agreement over Taba was signed in September 1986, following approval from the Israeli cabinet under US pressure.

Egypt’s aim was to compel the Israelis to comply with the ruling within a defined, binding timeframe. It worked. The tribunal delivered its verdict in September 1988, and the decision was duly implemented, with the Egyptian flag raised over Taba on 19 March 1989.

Israel's decimation of Gaza has sparked a charged debate over the future of the Camp David Accords

If the parties to the treaty do not agree on peaceful settlement mechanisms, one option is to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yet its proceedings can be protracted, and its jurisdiction is based entirely on the mutual consent of the states involved, with both parties agreeing not only to submit the dispute to the court but also to comply with its rulings. In practice, this makes an ICJ referral unlikely.

Another option is to amend, suspend, or even withdraw from the treaty altogether. Egypt respects and upholds its international legal obligations, but there is a legal precedent for it unilaterally withdrawing from an international treaty. In 1951, it pulled out of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty after Britain failed to fully meet its obligations.

Designed to evolve

In international law, a treaty is considered a living instrument—one that is established under specific parties, conditions, and circumstances, but which must adapt over time as the world evolves. This evolution naturally generates a tension between continuity and change, one that affects the legal frameworks underpinning international treaties.

International treaties can be amended or revised, typically when developments do not warrant complete termination of the treaty but require adaptation. They can also be terminated or suspended. Termination means its complete annulment, which can be immediate or retroactive (the latter restoring the prior status quo), whereas suspensions can be implemented pending the resolution of the issue that triggered it.

One party might terminate or suspend a treaty because its terms can no longer be fulfilled, because there has been a breach (when one party violates the treaty's core obligations), or because there has been a fundamental change of circumstances, significantly altering the conditions under which the treaty was concluded.

AFP — Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and US President Jimmy Carter sign the Camp David Accords at the White House, September 17, 1978

Commitments made

The Egypt–Israel peace treaty contains no explicit provisions allowing either party to unilaterally suspend or withdraw, but some articles offer insight into the treaty's legal structure. Article III, for instance, commits both parties to refrain from threatening or using force, directly or indirectly, against one another. They also undertake to resolve all disputes through peaceful means.

Furthermore, each party is obliged to ensure that no act of war, aggression, violence, or threat is launched from its territory or by any forces under its control or stationed on its soil against the citizens, population, or private property of the other party.

Article IV outlines the agreed security arrangements, including demilitarised zones on both Egyptian and Israeli territory and the deployment of UN observers and forces. The article also provides for the possibility of reviewing and modifying these arrangements at the request of either party, provided both sides agree.

Article II of Protocol I, which addresses Israeli withdrawal and related security arrangements, establishes four distinct zones. A, B, and C cover the entire Sinai Peninsula, while D extends into adjacent Israeli territory. These zones are delineated in proportion to the size of each state and are measured from the international border. It sets out the type, scale, and composition of military forces and weaponry permitted in each zone, as well as the role of UN personnel.

Allowing for change

The treaty was signed 46 years ago, and some fundamental changes have taken place since. Among the most significant is the security vacuum that emerged following the uprisings of January 2011 and June 2013, which facilitated the rise of armed terrorist groups in Sinai and a wave of attacks against the Egyptian state.

The Egypt–Israel peace treaty has no specific provisions allowing either party to unilaterally suspend or withdraw

Egypt responded to this growing threat in phases. In 2018, it launched its own 'war on terror,' engaging in large-scale military operations against non-conventional militant groups employing guerrilla warfare tactics. The scope and intensity of the threat required the deployment of all branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces.

In line with the treaty's provisions, Egypt activated the clause allowing for a review of the security arrangements outlined in Article IV of the main treaty and Article II of the annexed Security Protocol I. It formally notified Israel of the altered security conditions and coordinated its actions within the framework of the treaty.

Following Israel's (ongoing) war on Gaza, some Israeli officials suggested that Egypt's expanded military presence in Sinai constituted a breach of the treaty. Egypt denied this, arguing that its increased military deployment—carried out in full accordance with the treaty—was essential to prevent the re-emergence of armed groups in Sinai, adding that its operations were conducted under the supervision (and with the approval of) United Nations observers.

Egypt further noted Israel's own violations of the treaty, most notably its incursion into (and occupation of) the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, which lies within Zone D. This, Egypt contended, represented a direct violation of the security arrangements specified in Security Protocol I of the treaty.

Whether Egypt and Israel can resolve their differences peacefully through the mechanisms of the ageing treaty remains to be seen. If not, both sides have options short of war.

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