For the first time in decades, Syrian Druze were allowed to enter Israel. Buses made their way to the grave of Sheikh Amin Tarif—the community’s spiritual leader from 1928 to 1993. Members of the Druze community met them in the Israel-annexed Golan Heights. There was excitement surrounding the pilgrimage as Druze flags flew on the road and as two communities separated by a border and the enmity of two states met once again.
Yet, while the moment offers new opportunities, it also carries with it many pitfalls and dangers for the religious group, which stretches across three countries: Israel, Syria and Lebanon. In his speech, the leader of the visiting Syrian Druze acknowledged that this was a “sensitive” moment.
This was the latest demonstration of a blatant Israeli effort to sway Syrian Druze. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel is trying to position itself as a self-styled defender of minorities—be it the Druze, the Kurds and even Alawites and Christians.
Syrian Druze are at the centre of those efforts both because they are closest to Israel and because Israel can claim it is extending protection to the country’s own Druze community. As part of those efforts, Israel has distributed aid to Druze communities in southern Syria and pledged to give them the right to work in Israel.
More importantly, Israeli officials have pledged to protect the Druze: As clashes broke out between residents in the Druze-populated town of Jaramanah south of Damascus and fighters belonging to the new Syrian government, Israel warned that it would not allow government forces to enter the town.
For his part, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz ordered his army to “prepare to defend” the town, saying: “We shall not allow Syria's extremist Islamist regime to harm the Druze. Should the regime harm the Druze, we will strike it”. Israeli planes even flew over several Druze-majority areas in a show of strength. However, Syrian government forces eventually entered Jaramanah without any Israeli reaction.
Dangerous options
Syrian Druze are now stuck between the danger involved in siding with Israel and its warranted reservations about the new Syrian government. On the one hand, there are genuine concerns about the new Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Druze community remembers that Jabhat al-Nusra, a group he once led, did carry out attacks against the Druze community.
And while al-Sharaa has sought to reassure the Druze over their safety and security, they still fear being marginalised or even attacked despite his promises to protect them.
Read more: Time will tell if Sharaa will truly protect Syria's minorities
The violence that took place over the past weeks in Syria's coastal areas fuelled those concerns. After pro-Assad cells attacked government forces in Jableh, shocking reports emerged of widespread killings of Alawites by government forces—violence later condemned by al-Sharaa himself.
It is possible these cells wanted to provoke sectarian backlash, which many members of the government forces happily obliged, demonstrating that al-Sharaa's control over his own forces is not absolute.
Therefore, some Syrian Druze could look at Israel's offer to protect them as a welcome barrier between them and a similar fate to those of the Alawite community. However, it also carries significant risks. By claiming to protect the Druze, Israel has also put a target on their back, raising suspicions that some in the Druze community would prefer to be Israeli rather than Syrian.
After years of civil war and the breakdown of order, the Druze community has been left to fend for itself. As such, it has essentially been functioning as an autonomous region. Though they never expressed any intention to break away from Syria, their de facto autonomy could fuel suspicion that they are angling to build their own state.
Loyal citizens
For their part, Druze elders have mostly pushed back against those suspicions, expressing their rejection of efforts to divide Syria and highlighting their Druze identity. Druze communities across the region have been loyal citizens of their home countries, be it Israel, Lebanon or Syria. Even Sheikh Tarif—the spiritual leader of the Israeli Druze community who met Syrian Druze visiting Israel— made sure to emphasise his support for Syrian unity.
Read more: Syrian Druze wary of Israel's creeping presence in Quneitra
In southern Syria’s provinces of Daraa and Quneitra, anger is brewing over Israel’s continued occupation of villages near the border, and protests have broken out. By claiming to protect the Druze community, Israel risks implicating them in what many regard as an attempt to annexe parts of Syria.
In the weeks that followed al-Assad’s fall, Israel pushed into southern Syria, seizing most of the buffer zone between the two countries and even further outside of it. It is visibly building new military posts that look anything but temporary, not to mention Israeli officials themselves have described Israel's presence there is as "indefinite".
More to the story
The “hyper-security” mindset that prevailed after the October 7 Hamas attacks can partly explain Israel’s offensive posture in Syria. Hezbollah's known militant infrastructure along the border, including a network of cells dubbed the “Golan File”, means it can easily exploit the chaos to carry out attacks. Also, fear of extremism among the ranks of al-Sharaa’s own troops is another justification for its pre-emptive positioning.
However, Israel’s continued campaign of air strikes deep inside Syria, its refusal to even entertain the idea of building ties with the new Syrian government (even discrete ones) and its bid to co-opt Syrian minorities all suggest there is more to the story.
Read more: Israel’s actions in Syria are part of its regional ambitions
In Israel, commentators express fears the new Syrian government could become a de facto “vassal” of Türkiye, owing to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) longstanding ties with Ankara. A recent strike on an airbase in the Homs countryside came amidst claims that Türkiye could soon deploy air defences there. Israeli outlets have reported the strike was intended as a “message”—a sign that Israel may already be acting to counter Turkish entrenchment in Syria, much like it did with Iran.
A flawed strategy?
Yet the view that Syria is bound to become a “vassal” of Türkiye isn't very sophisticated. It fails to take into account the tensions that existed between Ankara and al-Sharaa before the fall of al-Assad—especially his effort to build ties with other Arab countries as a counterbalance to Türkiye.
There is also a real risk that, by aggressively targeting the new Syrian government, Israel will push al-Sharaa closer into Ankara's orbit. This cannot be ruled out as the new Syrian president has to turn to someone to rebuild the country's military, making his government more—not less— dependent on Türkiye.
What Israel may be trying to do is secure leverage over the new government. By positioning itself as the “defender of minorities”, it may be looking to make sure it has a way to shape Syria's future. When the Syrian civil war broke out, Israel largely stayed on the sidelines and let the war play out, despite some calls at the time to ground Assad’s air force, as it was shelling its own citizens.
Despite this initial reaction, Israel quickly discovered that geography cannot be ignored and that power vacuums do not last forever. Iran and Hezbollah immediately intervened in Syria to prop up the Assad regime and used their presence to build a land corridor that stretched from Iran to Lebanon. As a result, Israel was forced to play catch-up and a game of whack-a-mole that saw it conduct hundreds of strikes in Syria.
Israel seems to have drawn some lessons from Syria's civil war, including that it simply cannot stay on the sidelines. It may also be betting that, by "protecting" minorities, it can weaken Damascus’s central authority and remove Syria as a future threat.
To this end, Israel has also extended its "protection" offer to Syria's Kurdish population. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is indeed best positioned to create its own autonomous region. SDF-held territories in northeastern Syria are already functioning as a de facto state. The SDF—which Israel views as a bulwark against Türkiye—may be tempted to push for a Syrian version of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region.
Wrong lessons
Though Israel should indeed draw lessons from the Syrian civil war, it may well be drawing the wrong ones, showing little understanding of the moment in Syria. After more than a decade of fighting, Syrians have no appetite for more violence.
Though minorities are concerned about their place in a future Syria, they are generally disinclined to form their own stateless, knowing such a move would trigger renewed violence. The SDF knows that pushing for independence could well prompt a Turkish intervention, once again showing that Israel’s strategy could inadvertently strengthen Ankara's hand in Syria rather than weaken it.
This also raises the question of whether Israel’s “guarantees” can truly be counted on. So far, they haven’t been backed by action. It has hit military bases but hasn't moved to protect minorities. Any minority counting on Israel for its long-term survival may well end up disappointed.
As a result, minorities have largely refused to engage. The Kurdish-led SDF has signed an agreement in principle aimed at laying the groundwork for a united Syria that recognises the rights of minorities. The Druze community in southern Syria has also explored agreements with Damascus.
Israel is pursuing a very narrow security-oriented strategy, closing itself off to a more holistic approach where diplomacy could open the door to other paths, including cautious normalisation with the new Syrian government and coordination with other Arab states to prevent Damascus from falling into Türkiye's orbit.
Instead, Israel has exposed its intent on dividing Syria. Even if this more holistic approach may not pan out the way it wants, its security-focused approach seems doomed to fail.
