In mid-March, the EU convened its ninth international Syria donor conference, but it was the first time the Syrian government participated, with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani presenting Syria's priorities to attendees in Brussels.
At present, the Syrian government enjoys widespread support from the international community; however, it will need to act judiciously if it is to retain that support—not only by developing an inclusive political process but also by carefully managing relations with its partners.
Shoring up and maintaining support from actors such as the EU, Türkiye, Russia, and the Gulf Arab states will require deft diplomacy and making difficult decisions. At times, Syria may need to push back against initiatives that its closest ally, Türkiye, wishes to pursue, including signing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement.
Cost vs benefits
Syria’s territorial waters are believed to hold significant untapped natural gas reserves, comparable to the resource-rich formations found off the coasts of Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. A 2025 US Geological Survey estimates that the Zagros Fold Belt—in which Syria sits—potentially contains 3.3 billion barrels of oil and 80.3 trillion cubic feet of gas.
In December 2024, Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced Ankara’s plan to negotiate an EEZ with the new Syrian government. This signals Türkiye’s intent to capitalise upon the change of government in Damascus and reverse the policies of the Assad era, which had sidelined Türkiye’s maritime claims and granted Russian and Indian companies offshore exploration rights.
A Türkiye–Syria EEZ agreement would naturally benefit Türkiye and broaden its influence in the East Mediterranean, changing the geopolitical balance in Türkiye’s favour. However, for Syria, the risks would outweigh the benefits. While the country needs to generate indigenous sources of income to assist in its recovery, doing so via the EEZ route could potentially compromise international support for its reconstruction.
While Türkiye would frame the agreement as a legitimate assertion of its rights, regional powers such as the EU, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt would view it as a provocative and unlawful move by Türkiye because such an agreement would not consider Cyprus’s territorial waters and would deepen tensions in an already volatile environment.
Syria’s leadership will need to balance Türkiye’s ambition of signing an EEZ against its own goal of securing and retaining unequivocal EU support. Being a signatory to an EEZ with Türkiye would likely jeopardise the EU’s goodwill towards the new Syrian government. This, in turn, could slow the lifting of sanctions, reduce diplomatic backing, and deter European energy companies from investing in onshore and offshore prospects.
Clearly, demarcated maritime boundaries are a crucial factor in offshore exploration as international energy companies consider them an essential criterion for managing risk.
Competing energy alliances
Ankara’s ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are driven by a desire to secure new energy resources, consolidate its role as a transit state between Central Asia and Europe, and assert influence over the region.
A maritime demarcation agreement with Syria would complement its 2019 compact with Libya, in which Ankara struck a deal with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) to delineate an EEZ stretching from Türkiye’s southern coast to Libya’s northeast. That agreement, which cut through waters claimed by Greece and Cyprus, was part of Ankara’s broader effort to challenge the emerging energy alliance of Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt.
Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt have forged a strategic alignment in the Eastern Mediterranean, driven by shared energy interests and a mutual desire to enhance regional stability. Their cooperation centres on developing and exporting natural gas, with key projects such as the EastMed pipeline—a proposed conduit linking Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to European markets via Greece.
Egypt—with its well-established liquefaction infrastructure— serves as a hub for processing and re-exporting Eastern Mediterranean gas. However, maritime disputes between Türkiye on one side and Greece and Cyprus on the other are complicating exploration and development efforts and are reinforcing a broader struggle over securing energy corridors to Europe.
Ancient rivalries bleed into modern disputes
Competition between Türkiye and Greece—which is rooted in longstanding territorial disputes—has intensified in recent years due to energy exploration. At the core of the rivalry are competing claims over maritime boundaries and EEZs.
Greece relies on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to establish its rights within the region of the Aegean, while Türkiye applies the equity principle, arguing that islands should be given limited effect in maritime boundary delimitation if their location distorts equitable outcomes. This principle has led Türkiye into direct disputes with Greece and Cyprus.
Türkiye does not recognise Cyprus’s EEZ, arguing that the Republic of Cyprus does not represent the Turkish Cypriot community’s interests. Consequently, Ankara has deployed seismic survey vessels and naval escorts into Cyprus’ territorial waters and, in doing so, signalled its intent to challenge the established energy order in the East Mediterranean.
Unless Syria demarcates a maritime border with Cyprus and establishes clear rights over its EEZ, it will risk contravening UNCLOS and antagonising Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. However, reaching an agreement with Cyprus would strain relations with Türkiye at a time when Syria is drawing upon its neighbour for critical support. Balancing these competing interests will require careful diplomacy to avoid alienating key partners.
Pursuing its own interests
Over the past two decades, natural gas discoveries have transformed the East Mediterranean basin into a highly contested sub-region. The Syrian government will need to resist being drawn into the competing axes of Türkiye, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. Otherwise, its political development and pace of reconstruction could be compromised.
At present, the Syrian leadership enjoys the support of Türkiye, the EU and other international partners. Rushing into an EEZ agreement now would put Syria on one side of a longstanding regional competition when it needs to preserve and expand support from a range of international partners.
Adopting a more cautious approach would enable its leaders to protect recent diplomatic gains and keep the door open for future energy development under more favourable conditions.
