A new regional security order in the Middle East?

Clarity in US Middle East policy will determine how—or if—this will take shape

Eduardo Ramon

A new regional security order in the Middle East?

As long as states in the Middle East exhibit political fragility, Iran will find a way to spread its nefarious influence through a mix of coercion and persuasion. However, there is no denying the fact that today, Iran is at its weakest point since the birth of its Islamic regime in 1979, barely able to survive, let alone prey on its neighbours’ political weaknesses and exploit their sectarian divisions.

The militia network that Iran has so painstakingly built for decades is in disarray due to the military defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah following their latest wars with Israel and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—Iran’s only state ally in the region. These outcomes raise a crucial question: does this moment of increased relative weakness of Iran create an opportunity for a new regional security order?

The answer is yes, if—and it is a big if—the United States and its Arab partners cooperate and coordinate on security in ways like they never have before.

Arab partners’ position

But first, it’s important for the Trump administration to factor into its Middle East policies the strategic position of its Arab partners. Countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have no interest in seeking any confrontation with Iran. The opportunity to further weaken Iran exists, and they can see it, but they won’t take the lead. They never have and probably never will for understandable reasons.

The days of lobbying Washington for a more aggressive approach towards Iran—especially on the issue of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ sponsorship of political violence across the region—are over for the foreseeable future.

Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and others have chosen the path of accommodation and normalisation with Tehran so they can focus on their top priority: economic development. They want a calm and stable region that can attract the foreign direct investment they need to fulfil the goals they laid out in their long-term economic visions.

Whatever opportunity Iran's current relative weakness presents, America's Arab partners have a ceiling on security cooperation with Washington and Israel

Even when the UAE and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020, they deliberately underemphasised security cooperation to avoid alienating or provoking Iran. Four years have passed since the signing of those Arab-Israeli normalisation deals, and we have yet to hear of any joint security initiative between its members.

Even to this day, when Gulf Arab leaders meet with their US counterparts in Washington or the region, the discussions centre on economics, technological innovation, and investments. There is barely any talk of joint security. Gulf leaders also continue to refuse to let the US military launch attacks against Iran's regional allies—be it the Houthis in Yemen or the militias in Iraq—from their own territories.

None of this suggests that the Arab partners suddenly trust Iran or do not worry about their security. But it means that whatever opportunity Iran's current relative weakness presents, the Arab partners have a ceiling in terms of security cooperation with Washington and Israel. A wounded Iran, they correctly assess, is still a dangerous Iran.

US position

In his statements on Iran, US President Donald Trump seems to have prioritised the issue of reaching a nuclear settlement. His general preference, like that of the Arab partners, is to stop all wars in the Middle East and promote economic development.

Although Trump did not say much on Iran's regional conduct, and his strategy for Iran has yet to mature, it seems clear he is more interested in focusing on the nuclear issue, which appears to be moving quickly. The gist of his approach towards Tehran is likely to be fairly simple: reach a deal or risk getting bombed, either by the United States or jointly with Israel, which already has its finger on the trigger.

Eduardo Ramon

Read more: Unpacking Trump's Iran ultimatum

However, this doesn't mean that Trump will totally ignore Iran's destabilising activities in the region. In his first term, he ordered the killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. It was a debilitating blow to Iran's military power in the region. Soleimani was the glue that kept Tehran's regional network together, and the Iranians have had a very hard time finding a capable replacement. Trump might view such aggressive US tactics against Iran as a means to compel Tehran to make concessions on its nuclear programme.

Room for more cooperation

But beyond the general dispositions of Trump and the Arab partners, there is no question that there is plenty of room for further security cooperation. Indeed, there is no clash or major disagreement on Iran between the two sides. Each will pursue its national interest, as always, but it would be foolish not to take advantage of this historic moment in the region—one where Iran is not on the ascendancy and wreaking havoc across the region but on the decline.

The ultimate form of security cooperation is a scenario whereby Trump extends a formal defence pact to Saudi Arabia—and possibly other Arab partners—either as a result of a bilateral negotiation or a multilateral one that includes Israel (the US idea presented so far is that a Saudi-Israeli normalisation would earn the Palestinians a path towards an independent state and the Saudis a formal defence guarantee from Washington).

Should that come to pass, it could considerably influence how Saudi Arabia (and again, possibly others) decides to treat its cooperation with the United States on regional security. With a robust US defence pact, Riyadh could accept greater risk than before, knowing that if a conflict with Iran erupts or if Iran attacks the kingdom again as it did in September 2019, the United States will be legally obligated to intervene militarily on its behalf.

Under such a framework and the US security umbrella, various forms of security cooperation between the two countries could be entertained and instituted, especially on integrated air and missile defence, which could benefit the whole region.

Short of a US defence pact, the Arab partners will continue to shy away from any anti-Iran coalition and focus instead on upgrading their own defences by lobbying Trump for equipment that has been off the table for years, including fifth-generation aircraft, communications systems, autonomous weapons, and various munitions.

With a robust US defence pact, Riyadh could accept greater risk than before, knowing that if a conflict with Iran erupts, the US would be legally obligated to intervene

The X factor

While Trump's team is in the midst of formulating a strategy for Iran, Israel is wasting no time. It is bent on countering and further weakening Iran in any way it can. It has already dealt a heavy blow to Hamas and Hezbollah. It has neutralised a good portion of Iran's defences following last year's kinetic tit-for-tats. And according to US intelligence, it is considering a strike against some of Iran's nuclear facilities, which could happen by mid-2025.

If the Gulf Arab states have reservations about teaming up with the United States against Iran, they have even worse fears about joining Israel in a fight with Iran. They know that if Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities, it cannot finish the job on its own, and as a result, Iran will lash out against not just Israel but them too (even if they don't lift a finger to help Israel; it's all about perceptions).

The more likely policy and course of action of America's Arab partners, in the absence of a US defence pact, is to continue to keep their distance from Israel's kinetic activities against Iran and its regional surrogates while cooperating in the most subtle and discreet way possible, through intelligence sharing and/or air-and-missile-defense measures, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE did in April of last year. It is very hard to imagine any of these countries pursuing something more audacious or formal with Israel against Iran.

The road ahead

But maybe they don't have to. Maybe all that Israel and the United States want—assuming no US defence pacts with any Arab partner materialises—is the Arab states' cooperation on diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction, and a bit of security similar to what we witnessed last year when Iran and Israel traded direct blows twice.

The Arab partners can seriously contribute and even make a difference by boosting US and international diplomacy towards Iran, granting political legitimacy to anything constructive the United States does in the region, and devoting resources towards the reconstruction of  Gaza and southern Lebanon, which Israel pummeled in the past 15 months.

At the risk of oversimplification, the United States, as always, should take the lead on forming a new regional security order in the Middle East. It all starts with Washington. Clarity in US Middle East policy will determine how—or if—this will take shape.

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