Trump and Putin plot a course to a new world

A sudden ditching of US support for Ukraine and a more understanding approach to Russia, has sent shudders through Europe and pricked ears in Beijing. As the war looks set to end, what next?

A woman walks outside St. Iveron Convent, which was heavily damaged by artillery and gun fire during battles for the local airport in Donetsk, a Russian-controlled region of Ukraine, on February 25, 2025.
REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko
A woman walks outside St. Iveron Convent, which was heavily damaged by artillery and gun fire during battles for the local airport in Donetsk, a Russian-controlled region of Ukraine, on February 25, 2025.

Trump and Putin plot a course to a new world

The Riyadh negotiations between Washington and Moscow last month ushered in a new phase in US-Russia relations, increasing the prospects not only of ending the war in Ukraine, but of cooperating on other issues, too.

It will become clear in time, but the talks could have fired the starting gun on the biggest change in dynamics of the post-war world, changes that will break the alliances and assumptions that guided the last 80 years, reshape the future security order in Europe, and inform the structure of a new world order.

Three years after Russia invaded Ukraine, there is growing belief that 2025 will be the year it comes to an end through negotiations, determining the fate of south-eastern Ukraine, most of which is currently occupied. Most suspect that it will also cement Kyiv’s pro-European political, military, and economic alignment.

US President Donald Trump is known to want the war to end, but this is not the only factor motivating a ceasefire. Across much of the frontline, both sides have reached a stalemate and neither currently seems likely to reach a decisive victory (although Russia’s resources are far deeper than Ukraine’s).

REUTERS/Thomas Peter
A man looks at the Romanivska Bridge that was destroyed on the 3rd anniversary of Russia's invasion in Irpin outside Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 24, 2025

Three years of war

On both sides, war has taken its toll economically and in lives lost. Since the invasion, both sides have taken and lost territory, and both have had moments of momentum and of slowing, advance, and retreat. Like many wars, it has ebbed and flowed, with changing dynamics, tactics, and strategies.

Invading from the south, east, and north on 24 February 2022, Russian forces tried to take the whole country swiftly. Capturing vast swathes, including the strategic southern city of Kherson, they soon reached the outskirts of Kyiv. But logistical shortcomings—from communication failures and disrupted supply lines to fuel shortages—combined with the resilience of Ukraine’s forces and leadership (buoyed by Western support) forced Moscow to reassess its aims.

In April 2022, Russian forces abandoned the fight to Kyiv and shifted their focus to the south and east to establish a land corridor linking Russian-held areas in the east with the Russian-held peninsula of Crimea. This meant capturing strategic cities, most notably Mariupol, effectively turning the Sea of Azov into a fully Russian-controlled body of water.

Later that year, Ukrainian forces launched a dramatic counter-offensive, reclaiming Kherson in the south and Kharkiv in the north-east using Western weapons. But a much-touted counter-offensive in the summer 2023 was delayed, then failed to gain ground, as the war became a grinding battle of attrition. Ever since, the frontline has changed very little.

One of the most notable developments was Ukraine's surprise incursion into Russia's Kursk region in August 2024. While this caught the eye, it ultimately backfired, as Ukrainian forces suffered heavy losses on the central and southern Donbas frontlines, particularly in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. The Ukrainians had assumed that Russian troops would redeploy to Kursk, but this did not transpire.

The Riyadh talks could have fired the starting gun on the biggest change in dynamics of the post-war world

Russian losses

Over three years of war, both countries have suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment. Russia has lost hundreds of tanks, armoured vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and artillery pieces. Western sanctions have made it difficult for some of these to be replaced, hampering the Russians' effectiveness on the battlefield.

The high consumption of munitions, missiles, and artillery shells has led Russia to ramp up domestic arms production and increase its purchases of weapons from countries like Iran, but Western sanctions on Russia's industrial sector and restrictions on access to advanced technology mean some precision weaponry is difficult to source. 

The effect of this 'militarisation' of Russia's economy means that it can now produce four times as many weapons as the combined output of European countries, yet Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi said in January that Russian forces were now being far more economical with their ammunition—using around 20,000 artillery shells per day, compared to 40,000 just a few months earlier. 

Despite its heavy human losses, Russia faces no immediate military manpower crisis, deploying sufficient numbers of new soldiers to the frontlines owing to its much larger population. Soldiers from North Korea, deployed to Kursk, have also helped Moscow. Yet the Russian army has now lost a big portion of its most experienced and best-trained fighters in Ukraine, as well as several generals.

Evgeniy Maloletka / AP
Andrii Rubliuk, a senior sergeant with a Ukrainian intelligence unit who lost both arms and a leg in combat, holds a rifle during military training near Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 14, 2025.

Ukrainian losses

Ukraine is not only grappling with a critical shortage of weapons and ammunition, it is also struggling to mobilise soldiers, and is gradually losing territory in the east. Despite substantial and sustained Western military aid, Ukraine—like Russia—has lost huge amounts of military equipment, including tanks, artillery, and drones. 

The big change of recent weeks is that Ukraine now worries that US military aid will end. In early March, it was revealed that new shipments had already been halted. Europe alone cannot compensate for the loss. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged in mid-February that Kyiv's chances would be slim without US support.

In terms of the human cost, both sides are reluctant to disclose the full extent of their losses, but the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that Russia has lost at least 783,000 soldiers and officers, including 172,000 killed and 611,000 wounded. Of the latter, 376,000 have severe injuries resulting in permanent disability.

In terms of equipment, it estimates that Russia has lost around 1,400 main battle tanks, 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles, and armoured personnel carriers, among the roughly 14,000 combat vehicles it has so far lost. 

Zelenskyy acknowledged in February that Kyiv's ability to keep fighting would be slim without US support

On 16 February 2025, Ukraine said 46,000 of its soldiers had been killed and 380,000 wounded since the invasion. A month earlier, the United Nations estimated that 12,300 Ukrainian civilians had been killed. Open-source data indicates that Ukraine has lost around 700 tanks, 800 armoured personnel carriers, 900 infantry fighting vehicles, and around 80 fighter jets since the war began.

Post-war problems

Western experts argue that a successful political settlement to the war in Ukraine would require internal changes in both Russia and Ukraine that could, paradoxically, motivate both sides to continue fighting, as each seeks a better negotiating position.

Polling suggests that support for a negotiated settlement is far higher among Russians (79%) than it is among Ukrainians (52%), according to studies by the Russian Field Research Group and Gallup, both conducted in November 2024. It is not yet known whether President Trump's second term has changed these figures, although this would seem likely.

After the fighting stops, Zelenskyy and his government will face the immense challenge of rebuilding and restoring stability. Ukraine's presidential elections were scheduled for late March 2024, but were cancelled due to the ongoing war and Ukraine's constitution forbidding voting during periods of martial law. Zelenskyy's term officially ended on 20 May last year. He has offered to step down immediately in exchange for NATO membership.

AFP
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy inspecting the construction of fortifications at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine on November 18, 2024.

The country may need to deal with deep societal divisions after the fighting ends, and at the same time, it will have to rebuild infrastructure, including roads, bridges, public facilities, hospitals, and schools. A significant decline in industrial output and agricultural production is expected in the near-term.

Restoring Ukraine's economy to its pre-war health will be further complicated by American interests in the country's natural resources, not least its rare earths, many of which are coveted by big US tech firms. A bigger challenge for Zelenskyy will be resettling the millions of displaced Ukrainians, many of whom have lost their homes. 

Likewise, Russia may face substantial economic, political, and social challenges when the war ends. Although Donald Trump has notoriously warm relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, most expect US sanctions on Russia to remain in place for the time being, hindering Russia's private sector.

This is likely to impact Moscow's ability to restore its economy to pre-war levels, perhaps triggering a prolonged period of stagnation and recession. A lot will depend on Russia's sales of oil and gas, and the price it gets for them.

Although Putin rules Russia with an iron fist, post-war divisions and disgruntlement among Russia's elite cannot be ruled out, particularly if Russia does not achieve its war aims. Public discontent over the heavy battlefield losses may yet be voiced on the streets, despite the risks of doing so. 

When the war finally ends, the geopolitical landscape will look very different, with alliances ripped up and new ones formed

When the war finally ends, the geopolitical landscape will look very different, with alliances ripped up and new ones formed. Divisions between East and West will have deepened, as will internal divisions within the Western bloc that once stood so firmly together. 

China learning lessons

The fragility of European security will have been exposed, reigniting debates about deterrence and triggering concern that Russia will simply regroup before invading its next target, perhaps the Baltics, while Trump's sudden willingness to drop US support for Ukraine may embolden China to finally push forward its territorial claim over Taiwan. 

Many believe that Trump's strategy over Ukraine is to shift the responsibility for defending the country onto Europe, freeing the US to instead focus on the Asia-Pacific region, where Trump feels the need to confront China. This was the suggestion from new US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth following a NATO summit in Brussels in February.

China will have gained critical insights into how the West might respond if China tried to annex Taiwan. Trump's description of Zelenskyy as a "dictator", his dismissal of Ukraine's NATO membership, and his assertion that Ukraine must concede territory, all echo Russian narratives, with Putin seeing Ukraine as an integral part of the Russian world, frequently referring to the two nations as "one people". 

Likewise, China sees Taiwan as a breakaway region that is, in fact, part of its territory. The US has given Taiwan military equipment and technology to repel an invasion, but adheres to its policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding any US military intervention to defend the island.

It will therefore have been of interest to Beijing to hear Trump criticise Taiwan in recent weeks, saying it should pay the US for its defence, accusing Taiwan of taking semiconductor manufacturing jobs away from the US, and hinting that he may impose tariffs on the products that power mobile phones, computers, TVs, cars, and advanced healthcare equipment. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently issued a joint statement with Japan and South Korea, saying "peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable element for international security and prosperity", but Trump's sudden ditching of Ukraine gives credence to Chinese arguments that the US is an unreliable partner. 

Some in Iran fear that Moscow might sacrifice Iran's interests in exchange for concessions from Washington over Ukraine

Russia's next stop

If the US and Russia become economic partners in a relationship free from sanctions, it could reduce Russia's dependence on China and give Moscow access to much-needed Western technology. It may also help the US, Russia, and China agree to mutually reduce their nuclear stockpiles in future arms control agreements. 

Yet Trump's pro-Kremlin stance will only heighten concerns among Russia's neighbours, particularly Georgia, Moldova, and Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan. These are countries that Russian nationalist politicians increasingly see as part of Russia, questioning their legitimacy as independent, sovereign states.

Diplomatic tensions have already flared after Russian officials and lawmakers claimed that Kazakhstan did not exist as a state before the Russian Empire took control in the 19th century, and that Moscow, as the capital of the Soviet Union, had granted Kazakhstan Russian territories.

Meanwhile, Moldova fears that a withdrawal of US support for Ukraine will embolden Russia to annex the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria, where more than 80% of residents hold Russian citizenship. Concerns also extend to Gagauzia, a predominantly Turkic-speaking region that follows Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 

Both Transnistria and Gagauzia voted against pro-European President Maia Sandu, and both opposed Moldova's accession to the European Union (the constitutional amendment favouring EU membership was narrowly approved).

Georgia is increasingly aligned with the Kremlin under the leadership of the Georgian Dream Party, which refuses to assist Ukraine or impose sanctions on Russia, arguing that this helps keep Georgia out of the war. But a Trump-imposed settlement on Ukraine that favours Moscow could pose a direct threat to Georgia's territorial integrity. 

This raises fears that Russia may formally annex the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which it occupied after the 2008 war and has since supported politically and economically through separatist leaderships.

AFP
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy greets Latvia's President Edgars Rinkevics on February 24, 2025, prior to a meeting with European leaders in Kyiv, to mark the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Concessions and sacrifices

While Belarus and its pro-Moscow President Alexander Lukashenko welcomes talk of a US-Russia rapprochement, the Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—remain deeply concerned. Given their significant ethnic Russian populations, they fear Putin might use the same pretexts he applied in eastern Ukraine to justify intervention.

There is also concern in Iran, which has supplied Russia with many of the drones used to target Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. On 20 February, the conservative Iranian newspaper Jomhouri Eslami warned that Moscow might sacrifice Iran's interests in exchange for concessions from Washington over Ukraine.

The newspaper's editorial suggested that Moscow could agree to secure its territorial gains in Ukraine if it helped Washington protect Israeli interests, adding: "Iran will be drawn into this equation along with Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine... and Russia will turn a blind eye to any measures the United States may take against Iran."

The reformist daily newspaper Shargh also expressed concerns, asking: "Will Tehran be sacrificed in a Trump-Putin deal?" The article then urged Iranian authorities to swiftly decide whether to continue direct negotiations with Trump over its nuclear programme.

In summary, the process that began in earnest at the high-level talks at Diriyah Palace in Riyadh last month looks likely to continue apace, upsetting assumptions, upending alliances, and ultimately ushering in a new world order. 

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