The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been invaded by Rwanda five times. The first two times (from 1996-1997 and 1998-2003), it led to large, bloody wars that engulfed the whole country and the broader region, drawing in nine African armies. The following two conflicts (2006-2009 and 2012-2013)—in which Rwanda has denied involvement but it has been confirmed by United Nations investigators and independent observers—were limited to a small area along the border in North Kivu province.
This time, unfortunately, it’s most likely to be a repeat of 1998.
The DRC says that it is in the throes of a new invasion. The conflict has internally displaced close to 3 million people over the past 14 months and killed thousands. It risks setting the entire region ablaze, which could destabilise already rickety regimes such as the one in Burundi.
Amazingly, the reaction of donors and diplomats—who, in contrast with crises from Sudan to Ukraine, have significant leverage—until recently has largely been to condemn the Rwandan invasion but do little else.
The most recent conflict began in November 2021, when Rwanda backed a dormant rebel group, the March 23 Movement (M23), that was hunkered down on the flanks of Mount Sabyinyo, an extinct volcano on the border between Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC. The movement gained steam, seizing control of wide swaths of the DRC’s eastern highlands. In January, it escalated dramatically, storming into two towns on either end of Lake Kivu—Goma and Bukavu—within three weeks. Today, it controls a Connecticut–sized area.
With the fall of these two cities, each of around 1.5 million people, it is now clear that this rebellion wants to reshape the region. The rebels have begun to set up administrative structures—a population census, tax offices, and even new customary chiefs—that suggest that they are here to stay. They have recruited—sometimes voluntarily, sometimes not—local leaders to undergo political and ideological training in the various camps, and they have set up their own police force.
Increasingly, there are signs that senior opposition figures in Kinshasa, including former President Joseph Kabila, are at the very least in contact with the rebels. Several former senior officials from Kabila’s administration, including former Election Commission President Corneille Nangaa, are in the coalition of rebel groups that includes M23, and Kabila came out this past weekend with an op-ed in South Africa’s Sunday Times that echoed M23 talking points, placing the blame for the conflict squarely on Kinshasa.
Kabila is certainly not interested in becoming the governor of a rebel province—his aims appear to be targeted at the national level.
Perhaps most tellingly, the Rwandan government is believed by the DRC to have invested significant blood and treasure in this endeavor. Estimates by intelligence officials who spoke with the Guardian have placed the number of Rwandan Defence Force casualties in the thousands. United Nations experts believe that Rwanda has deployed between 4,000 and 7,000 troops to assist M23 in the eastern DRC, along with drones, armoured vehicles, GPS-jamming equipment, and surface-to-air missiles. (Rwanda continues to deny that its military is present in the DRC.) They are unlikely to be content with a modest peace offering.
Finally, the narrative voiced by the rebellion has shifted from one of protecting Congolese Tutsi—an ethnic group that is present in the area close to the border—and dismantling the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—a Rwandan rebel group based in the same area—to larger ambitions. The M23 has said that it will march all the way to Kinshasa; Rwandan President Paul Kagame said in mid-February that he sympathises with this viewpoint.
The rebels—and Rwandan troops widely believed to be accompanying them—have already headed north toward Butembo, far beyond any FDLR position or area inhabited by Tutsis.
The shock waves can be felt in capitals across the region. In Kinshasa, the frailty of the regime has been put on display. The fall of Goma sparked protests in the capital, some of which led to violent attacks against embassies. Various media outlets have reported these were organised by the ruling party. There have also been persistent rumours of plans for a coup.
This has led Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi to reduce his travel schedule and increase his security—he was already protected by a private Israeli firm in addition to Congolese security services. Few believe that the M23 can march all the way to Kinshasa, roughly 1,000 miles through largely roadless jungles from the territory it currently controls, but the pressure on the government could lead it to collapse under its own fractious weight.
In an excess of caution, the United States and several other embassies have evacuated part or all of their diplomatic staff and families. Meanwhile, South African troops have continued to arrive in the southern Congolese mining town of Lubumbashi, perhaps to head off M23 advances in that direction.
There is panic in Burundi, as well. According to diplomats who spoke with us, the government there has sent upwards of 10,000 troops to fight alongside the Congolese army.
Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye has made his disdain for his northern neighbour clear, calling Kagame a hypocrite and liar. On 18 February, Ndayishimiye asked his citizens to prepare themselves for war, calling Rwanda an “enemy of Burundi” and stating that “(w)e will not accept to die like the Congolese who are killed like goats.”
Nonetheless, we have spoken with diplomats and Congolese security officials who have reported heavy casualties among their forces. Humiliated on the battlefield and struggling with a dire economic crisis, Ndayishimiye now appears to be reaching out to Rwanda to try to avoid the worst.
