New realities in Ukraine awaken old challenges in Europe

Europe continues to reel from a series of shocks dealt by the 'America First' administration of Donald Trump. The fate of Ukraine and Europe's security architecture hangs in the balance.

Axel Rangel Garcia

New realities in Ukraine awaken old challenges in Europe

The third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine comes at a moment of heightened anxiety for European leaders. Donald Trump’s decision to initiate direct talks in Saudi Arabia with Russia, without either European or Ukrainian representation, is a major concession to Russian President Vladimir Putin and a slap in the face to both Brussels and Kyiv.

Trump’s evident hostility to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his determination to press on with the peace deal he promised during his election campaign could come with serious costs to both Ukraine and long-term European Security. But as European leaders scramble to navigate the new realities being created by Trump, they face some familiar challenges—namely, how to forge a united front despite their inherent fragility.

New realities

The new Trump administration delivered a series of shocks to Europe in February. First, the new defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, announced that the US would no longer be the “primary guarantor of security in Europe." Days later, Vice President JD Vance told the Munich Security Conference that the “enemy within” was a greater threat to Europe than either Russia or China. He then effectively endorsed the far-right Alternative for Germany (AFD) by meeting its leader on the eve of Germany’s election while snubbing the current chancellor, Olaf Scholz.

Two days later, Trump broke with the Biden-era policy of isolating Russia by engaging Putin in a long phone call, while on 18 February, US officials, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, met a Russian delegation in Riyadh to discuss Ukraine. Not only were Ukraine and European powers excluded from these preliminary talks, but in their aftermath, Trump appeared to blame Kyiv—not Moscow—for the war while proposing Ukrainian presidential elections that might see Zelenskyy lose—something Putin has long craved. Days later, he labelled Zelenskyy “a dictator.”

AFP
US, Russian and Saudi officials, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian FM Sergei Lavrov, meet at Riyadh's Diriyah Palace on February 18, 2025.

Read more: Trump breaks the ice with Russia, leaving Europe in the cold

Combined, these developments point to a dramatic shift in US-European relations. On Ukraine, Trump has upturned two key pillars of NATO strategy since 2022: that Russia should be excluded and that Kyiv should be involved in any decisions about Ukraine’s future. Moreover, in attacking Zelenskyy and calling for elections, he risks further undermining Kyiv’s position.

The meeting in Riyadh raised the serious possibility that Washington might cut a deal over Ukraine’s head, presenting an unfavourable outcome to Kyiv that it must accept or risk losing US military support. Trump’s interest in gaining access to $500bn of Ukraine’s critical minerals in payment for aid already supplied only reinforced the idea that the days of Washington’s deep commitment to Ukraine’s defence are over.

Most European governments, in contrast, continue to see Ukraine as the first line against an expansionist Russia. Should Putin succeed via negotiation with Trump to retain large swathes of Ukrainian territory, restrict the prospects of Kyiv ever joining NATO or the EU, and bring its neighbour back into Russia’s sphere of influence, many fear Moscow will be emboldened to try something similar in the Baltic or eastern Europe.

They favour a peace deal, but only one that Ukraine agrees to and doesn’t open Europe’s door to Putin. This is why Hegseth and Vance’s comments raise concerns. Despite their commitment to Ukraine, European powers lack the military capacity and weaponry to easily replace the US were it to pull support and the fighting to continue. It must also be questioned whether a European military presence, were it deployed without American support, would be sufficient to deter Russia from future aggression.

Tensions over Ukraine are symptomatic of the problems Europe is likely to face if the US does retrench from the continent

Old challenges

Faced with this seismic shift in US policy, key European leaders met in Paris the day before the talks in Riyadh, from which they were excluded. However, though they showed unity in their commitment to Kyiv and a desire for both Ukraine and Europe to be involved in peace talks, an old challenge resurfaced. While Russia and the US each have single governments, allowing for relatively clear strategies and policies, the Europeans have long struggled to forge a united path with so many decision-makers.

In fairness, the 2022 invasion did prompt a remarkable level of joined-up thinking and strategy. European allies, plus the UK, agreed to sanction Russia, militarily support Kyiv and welcome millions of Ukrainian refugees. Old orthodoxies were quickly abandoned, such as Germany's reluctance to increase military spending and Britain's reluctance to take migrants, while the whole continent weened itself off Russian gas despite the high cost to domestic economies.

But division remains a feature of European policymaking. In the Paris meeting, for example, France was keen to send European troops to Ukraine to guarantee any future peace that Kyiv agreed to if the US was unwilling to send its own, as Hegseth had suggested. Britain—invited despite leaving the EU because of its sizeable military power—showed willingness, but Prime Minister Kier Starmer insisted only on a US security guarantee 'backstop', which might prove impossible. While the Netherlands were open to the idea, Germany, Spain and Poland were reluctant.

But divisions run deeper than this one policy. Hungary and Slovakia, governed by populist right-wingers who are sympathetic to both Trump and Putin, denounced the Paris meeting, from which they were excluded. Hungary's Viktor Orban called the summit a "meeting of losers," trying to derail Trump's peace plan. Italy's position is similarly conflicted. While its populist leader, Giorgia Meloni, is no fan of Putin, she is close to Trump, and she reportedly loathes France's president Emmanuel Macron.

Ludovic MARIN / AFP
French President Emmanuel Macron (C) walks with Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (L) after European leaders discuss the situation in Ukraine and European security at the Elysee Palace in Paris on February 17, 2025.

Though previously supportive of the Ukraine war, she may prove more supportive of Trump's plan, if it comes, than other Europeans. Even more pro-EU states like Slovenia criticised the Paris meeting for only including the largest EU states and Britain not the smaller governments.

In many ways, the tensions over Ukraine are symptomatic of the problems Europe is likely to face if the Trump administration does retrench from the continent. Despite most (apart from Hungary and Slovakia) being committed to defence against Russia, many are reluctant to step up themselves.

As well as a reticence to committing troops, many Europeans are loath to spend more on defence. Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium and several smaller states remain below NATO's target of 2% of GDP on defence. Even Germany, France and Britain spent little more than this, though the latter has mooted raising spending from 2.5% to 3%.

One positive outcome from the Paris meeting was the move to establish new mechanisms to make it easier for EU states to increase defence spending without violating EU spending rules, though this is more likely to prompt minor alterations than a serious rearmament programme.

Europe's NATO members have built their defences on the assumption of continued access to US weaponry and tech. If cut, it would take years and billions to replace.

Europe without America?

The scale of the challenge for European governments should not be understated. Since the Second World War NATO members in Europe have built their defences on the assumption of a continued US presence and access to US weaponry and tech. Were this to end it would take years and billions of Euros to replace.

Moreover, the US currently has 90,000 troops in Europe, according to the Financial Times, including 20,000 sent by Biden to the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. Were Hegseth's forecast to come about and these troops, weaponry and tech be withdrawn, Europeans would need to spend far more than 2% of their GDP to come close to replacing them.

Any such disorderly withdrawal from Europe by Trump would present an attractive opportunity for Putin and is, therefore, something European leaders want to prevent or, at the least, delay.

In this context, there's a clear need to strike a delicate balance with Washington regarding Ukraine: being careful not to provoke Trump into a rapid withdrawal from Europe, while still protecting Europe and Ukraine's vital interests in any settlement, ideally by getting both a seat at the table. To do this most effectively though, Europe needs to be as united as possible, a feat it has struggled with ever since the 2022 invasion, if not before.  

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