Al-Sharaa's Russia balancing act

Syria's new interim president seems to be wavering between two choices: maintain ties with Moscow despite domestic and international opposition or sever ties and risk alienating a global power

Syria's new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (R) and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov posing for a picture during their meeting in Damascus on January 29, 2025.
Reuters
Syria's new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (R) and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov posing for a picture during their meeting in Damascus on January 29, 2025.

Al-Sharaa's Russia balancing act

Since the fall of the Syrian regime on 8 December, diplomats from around the world have flocked to Damascus at a pace unseen in decades. However, among the many delegations arriving in the capital, one visit stood out. Few expected Russian officials to return to Damascus so soon, merely weeks after the overthrow of their longtime ally, Bashar al-Assad.

The visit sparked criticism from Syrians and Western officials, given Russia’s role in Syria’s war and its ongoing military operations in Ukraine. Despite domestic and international opposition, Syria’s new authorities have chosen to keep diplomatic channels open with Moscow. With Russia holding veto power at the UN Security Council, HTS is keenly aware that securing Russian backing is essential to its efforts to be removed from the UN’s terrorist list.

However, HTS’s swift decision to receive the Russian delegation followed another significant development—the termination of the commercial Tartus port contract with a Russian company. Widely seen as a blow to Moscow’s interests, this move—alongside direct diplomatic engagement—suggests a calculated strategy by HTS: curbing Russia’s footprint in Syria without directly antagonising Moscow.

Moscow’s surprise visit

A high-level Russian delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and President Putin’s special envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, arrived in Damascus last week. The delegation met with Syria’s newly appointed president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, as well as his foreign minister.

Following the talks, Russian officials described the discussions as frank and constructive, stressing that Syria’s leadership change would not affect bilateral relations or Russian military facilities in the country. However, they declined to provide further details.

According to Syrian sources, the delegation expressed its desire to restore diplomatic ties, including reopening Russia’s embassy in Damascus. It also sought assurances that Russia could maintain control over its two key military bases—the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia—both critical for Moscow’s power projection.

AFP
A military parade commemorating the 78th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany during World War II, at the Russian Hmeimim Air Base in Syria's Latakia governorate.

State-run SANA reported that al-Sharaa made it clear that any restoration of relations required Moscow to acknowledge past mistakes and compensate for the destruction caused by Russian military operations. He insisted that trust could only be rebuilt through tangible measures, including compensation, reconstruction, and economic recovery.

Al-Sharaa is also reported to have demanded the extradition of former President Bashar al-Assad and his close aides, who fled to Russia in early December. However, when asked whether Syria had formally requested al-Assad’s return or financial compensation, the Kremlin refused to comment.

Public outrage

Despite al-Sharaa’s push for accountability, the visit triggered criticism among Syrians. Many still see Russia as the primary enabler of al-Assad’s rule, having provided him with diplomatic cover, military support, and airpower.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria, which helped turn the tide of the war in al-Assad’s favour, is estimated to have caused at least 24,000 civilian deaths, according to conservative estimates. Moscow’s decision to shelter al-Assad and other key regime figures after the government’s collapse has only deepened resentment toward Russia.

Read more: Mazen Darwish: Assad must be publicly tried in Syria

The visit also drew quiet but firm disapproval from Western diplomats, who have recently established engagement with the HTS-led caretaker government. Since initiating contact, Western officials have consistently called for the expulsion of Russian forces from Syria, at times even framing it as a key condition for lifting sanctions. While they remained publicly reserved, privately, they expressed strong disappointment over the Russian delegation’s reception.

While this reaction was expected, al-Sharaa has still expressed a desire to maintain relations with Moscow. In addition to Moscow’s veto power at the Security Council, which is crucial for removing HTS from the UN’s terrorist list, Russia could also serve as a potential ally for the group if al-Sharaa’s engagement with the West reaches a dead end.

Russia could serve as a potential ally for HTS if al-Sharaa's engagement with the West reaches a dead-end

Walking a fine line

Aware of the controversy surrounding the establishment of diplomatic contact with Russia, al-Sharaa appears to be walking a fine line—engaging Moscow while minimising domestic and Western backlash.

This balancing act was evident in the caretaker government's decision to terminate a contract with a Russian firm that al-Assad's government signed in 2019, granting it a 49-year lease to operate the Tartus commercial port. The timing of the move was strategic, coming just before the Russian delegation's arrival in Damascus.

More significantly, the way the contract was terminated reflects this careful approach. Rather than cancelling it on political grounds, the caretaker government used a legal loophole, citing the company's failure to meet contractual obligations, particularly regarding infrastructure investments.

By adopting this calculated approach—alongside al-Sharaa's willingness to receive the Russian delegation—HTS aims to reduce Russia's influence without provoking a direct confrontation. The strategy appears to have partially succeeded, as Russia downplayed the contract's cancellation, emphasising that the deal had been signed with a private Russian company, not the government. The Russian delegation's visit further signals Moscow's continued interest in maintaining diplomatic ties with Syria's new authorities.

Kremlin's resistance

While al-Sharaa's initial demands may buy him some time domestically, his ability to allow Russia to maintain its military bases in Syria without significant backlash will largely depend on Moscow's willingness to cooperate—an outcome that remains unlikely.

According to Russian sources, the Kremlin is highly unlikely to comply, at least not in the way Syria's new leadership envisions. These sources indicate that Moscow will not agree to extradite al-Assad, as the reputational damage of such a move would far outweigh any potential diplomatic benefits.

Valery SHARIFULIN/AFP
Russia's President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with Syria's President Bashar al-Assad during their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 24, 2024.

Likewise, Russia is unlikely to pay reparations for its military actions in Syria, particularly if they are explicitly labelled as war crimes. Beyond the financial burden, Moscow is unwilling to admit responsibility for the devastation it caused—a concession that would be implicit in any agreement to provide reparations. Additionally, given Russia's economic constraints, it is not in a position to allocate substantial funds toward Syria's reconstruction, further diminishing the likelihood of compliance with al-Sharaa's demands.

Cautious reduction

Despite Russia's reluctance to meet al-Sharaa's demands, he is likely to continue cautiously reducing Moscow's influence in Syria.

To that end, the caretaker government is expected to review major investment contracts signed with Russian firms, particularly in the mining and energy sectors, searching for legal loopholes that could justify their termination. If cancellation proves unfeasible, renegotiating the terms to Syria's advantage may become the preferred approach.

Similarly, Russian sources anticipate that al-Sharaa will seek to renegotiate the terms governing Russia's military bases in Syria, which are overwhelmingly favourable to Moscow. Potential areas for revision include the free use of land and facilities, the type and scale of military equipment stationed there, the terms for the arrival and departure of Russian warships, inspections of the bases, and overall contract validity. By imposing stricter conditions, al-Sharaa may attempt to curb Russia's influence while avoiding unnecessary friction.

The key question remains whether al-Sharaa's balancing act can hold. For now, he appears to believe the benefits of this approach outweigh the risks, but how long this calculation remains viable is uncertain.

At some point, mounting pressure on the caretaker government may force it to make a definitive choice—either maintain diplomatic engagement with Russia despite growing domestic and international opposition or sever ties and risk alienating a global power. Like much of Syria's transitional period, the outcome remains unpredictable.

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