The Arab world’s fortunes will only change when wealth is spread

We saw conflict after conflict in 2024, and future strife is threatened in countries that can ill afford it. The best solution is to recalibrate so that wealth trickles down, rather than funnels up

The Arab world’s fortunes will only change when wealth is spread

The year 2025 could be one of maps, given the huge shifts of 2024. Changes were seen not only in terms of territorial gains and losses, but also in the balance of power in the Middle East, with the fortunes of nations differing wildly.

As we look ahead, we will analyse the movements of armies, the control of ports (both naval and air), the security of supply routes, and the profits and losses of leaders. Absent from this familiar narrative will be the plight of the people—the true ‘substance’ of these conflicts—whose lives are consumed by wars for months, if not years.

In-depth studies abound on the geopolitical ramifications of Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsing, including the potential repercussions for Lebanon and Iraq, but scant attention is paid to the profound social, economic, and political changes that will shape the lives of millions of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese.

How they will navigate the coming months remains uncertain. Syrians, for instance, still labour under Western sanctions imposed during Assad’s reign. Their continuation, for now at least, may be designed to nudge Syria’s new rulers in certain directions.

Perpetuating ruin

It is a similar story in Lebanon, a country already suffering from five years of political and economic disintegration before Israeli bombs caused billions of dollars’ worth of damage, not least to the state’s fertile agricultural land.

Despite the catastrophic economic situation, Lebanon’s entrenched ruling elite stubbornly insists on perpetuating the status quo, which is nothing short of criminal, since they clearly seek to exploit the disaster for personal gain.

Scant attention is paid to the profound social, economic, and political changes that will shape the lives of millions of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese

With more than 5,000 Lebanese dead from the latest war (many of them civilians) and hundreds of thousands of housing units destroyed, many are still displaced, living on the streets and in makeshift shelters. 

The final number to have died in Arab countries in recent months in places like Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine may never be known, but those who survived know they have little hope of compensation for the extensive losses they suffered, both public and private.

Unlike in 2006, money for reconstruction is not forthcoming. A lack of donor trust in Lebanon's leaders is a major factor. They have been burned in the past. Major reconstruction efforts following Arab civil wars or conflicts with Israel have shown that donor funds are often channelled to consolidate the political dominance of victorious factions. 

Lebanon's post-2006 war reconstruction offers a stark example. The money was used to entrench Hezbollah's influence and control over state institutions, while the Lebanese people stood powerless, like orphans at the table of a miser, waiting for scraps. 

Alienation and instability

This lack of agency underscores the persistent alienation between Arab populations and the authorities, never more so than in the allocation of public funds. 

Such alienation is deeply rooted in the sectarian and regional divisions that plague Arab societies, perpetuating internal tensions and instability. It can be a vicious cycle: of wealth monopolisation, sectarian and ethnic discrimination, and calls for justice pursued through violence and conflict. 

A lack of agency underscores the alienation between Arab populations and the authorities, never more so than in the allocation of public funds

This cycle now threatens again. Consider how the events of 2024 were often cloaked in slogans promising liberation from foreign domination enforced by arms and the pursuit of justice for the marginalised and humiliated. These lofty promises about a brighter future typically amount to empty rhetoric.

The living standards in Arab countries battered by conflict in recent years are now among the lowest in the world, according to international indicators. Yet the solution is not just the standard formula of opening markets, modernising infrastructure, and attracting (and diversifying) investments. 

The heart of the remedy lies in states enacting a system of political governance that prevents the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few (normally those with law-making powers), leaving the majority to languish in poverty. Shattering that dynamic is the best way of avoiding future civil strife.

While the time for such changes may not yet have arrived in Syria, the ruling elites in Lebanon have no such excuse. Depressing, then, that they seem to remain resolute in exploiting their citizens' suffering to the very last drop. 

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