How the fall of Assad has been a strategic loss for Russia

Will al-Assad be safe in Moscow, or will his stay be short-lived? Many remember Erich Honecker, the former East German leader, who sought refuge in Chile's embassy in Moscow following Germany's reunification, only to be extradited a year later to face trial for human rights violations.

Once a dominant actor in Syrian political affairs (in part by working with Turkey and Iran), Russia has now arguably lost its leadership role. In contrast, by backing the successful opposition militias who ousted al-Assad, Turkey is now the more relevant actor. As work begins to shape a 'new Syria,' Ankara's interests are likely to be borne in mind.

By sea and air

For now, Russia retains vital military bases in Syria. Over the years, Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia province—Russia's sole airbase outside the former Soviet Union—has become almost as important as the presidential palace in Damascus. Russia uses Hmeimim to fly its military contractors in and out of Africa.

Since the 1970s, Russia has also maintained a naval facility in Tartus. This is Moscow's principal 'warm water port', allowing access to the Mediterranean. It is primarily used as a repair and refuelling hub, which lets Russian vessels stay in the area rather than having to return to the Black Sea.

Furthermore, Tartus is a deep-water port, meaning it can host nuclear submarines. In return for Russia's help in keeping al-Assad in power, the now-ousted dictator gave Moscow a 49-year free-of-charge lease on the facility. Seemingly secure, in 2017, Putin approved its refurbishment.

As the rebels took control of the country, Russian warships left Tartus and took up positions off the coast, while Hmeimim was reportedly emptied before rebels effectively cut it off by taking nearby towns. 

Russian state media has since reported that the Syrian opposition has "guaranteed" the facilities' security, but it is unclear if Moscow will keep control of them. Analysts say the loss of Tartus would severely impact Russia's ability to project power in the region. Any decision will be for the emerging authority, but Turkey may have a say in the matter. 

Gaining influence

Russia's losses in Syria are not just political and military but economic. Yet despite its much-vaunted intelligence capabilities, statements from the Kremlin suggest that Russia was caught off-caught. Moscow has since called for all parties to "eschew violence and address governance issues through political dialogue", adding that "Russian military bases in Syria remain on high alert".

It is a far cry from September 2015, when Russia intervened so decisively for al-Assad. It was good PR for Putin and reassured Russia's allies around the world that Moscow would go to great lengths to support them, making it a reliable counterweight to the West. This helped Russia considerably expand its political influence in the Middle East.

It established itself as a balanced mediator capable of safeguarding the interests of conflicting parties in Syria and those invested in its future. Through careful calibration, Moscow also managed to maintain relations with Israel, Turkey, and the Arab world.

After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 with little resistance from the West and then bombed Syrian rebels to shore up Assad in 2015 (again with little resistance from the West), analysts began to talk of a new global power axis. Syria was also a useful proving ground for testing and marketing Russian weaponry. 

Around the same time, Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group were leading ground combat operations to secure key infrastructure such as oil and gas facilities in Syria, Libya, Sudan, and sub-Saharan African nations, where Moscow was increasingly preferred to the United States and Western former colonial powers like France.

Losing influence

After Assad fell, some accused the Russian military of not doing more, but Moscow's priority at present is Ukraine, where most of its military resources—including some normally based in Syria—are currently engaged. Besides, Putin has always suggested that there were limits to how far Russia would go. "Russians will not be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves," he said in 2015. 

Nevertheless, analysts now think al-Assad's fall jeopardises Russia's expansion into Africa and Latin America and risks straining its relations with Central Asian countries, in part because it dents Russia's claims of being a steadfast guarantor of security for allies, who recall Putin saying in 2017 that "if terrorists dare to resurface (in Syria), we will strike them with a force they have never seen before."

Events leading up to the Assad regime's collapse contradict those assurances and appear to show that Moscow was either unwilling or unable to defend its ally. All it did was "express solidarity" and hope that "Syrian authorities impose order and restore constitutional governance".

After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 with little resistance from the West and then bombed Syrian rebels to shore up Assad in 2015 (again with little resistance from the West), analysts began to talk of a new global power axis. Syria was also a useful proving ground for testing and marketing Russian weaponry. 

Around the same time, Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group were leading ground combat operations to secure key infrastructure such as oil and gas facilities in Syria, Libya, Sudan, and sub-Saharan African nations, where Moscow was increasingly preferred to the United States and Western former colonial powers like France.

Losing influence

After Assad fell, some accused the Russian military of not doing more, but Moscow's priority at present is Ukraine, where most of its military resources—including some normally based in Syria—are currently engaged. Besides, Putin has always suggested that there were limits to how far Russia would go. "Russians will not be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves," he said in 2015. 

Nevertheless, analysts now think al-Assad's fall jeopardises Russia's expansion into Africa and Latin America and risks straining its relations with Central Asian countries, in part because it dents Russia's claims of being a steadfast guarantor of security for allies, who recall Putin saying in 2017 that "if terrorists dare to resurface (in Syria), we will strike them with a force they have never seen before."

Events leading up to the Assad regime's collapse contradict those assurances and appear to show that Moscow was either unwilling or unable to defend its ally. All it did was "express solidarity" and hope that "Syrian authorities impose order and restore constitutional governance".

Speaking to Bloomberg, Kremlin insiders say Russia lacked a firm plan to save al-Assad and saw little value in doing so given the Syrian army's retreat. Few in Russia wanted its engagement in Syria to mirror its involvement in Afghanistan from 1979-89, which left around 20,000 Russian soldiers dead, 55,000 injured, and hundreds of tanks, jets, and helicopters destroyed, with no strategic gain at the end of it.

Looking ahead

For Russia, a lot will depend on how well Moscow works with HTS and others who take the reins. With Russian naval movements away from Tartus and cargo flights out of Hmeimim, some think Moscow is preparing to withdraw and forfeit two crucial logistical hubs key to Kremlin efforts to expand its footprint in Africa.

When the dust settles, Russia's failure in Syria is likely to be linked to its inability to convert military victories into political settlements, economic reconstruction, and security guarantees that would have safeguarded the return of millions of Syrian refugees around the world. 

While al-Assad bears huge responsibility for the corruption and mismanagement of Syrian resources, Russia also fell short. Whether it keeps its bases or not, this will have raised allies' eyebrows and will be remembered by the likes of Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states when Russia next seeks to wield influence and power in the Middle East.