Intricately bound: Lebanon’s army and UN Resolution 1701

Blocks to implementation

For those now asking why UN Resolution 1701 was not implemented, another factor to consider is that it coincided with political tensions between various factions and internal security crises that demanded the LAF's attention, not least along Lebanon's 375km border with Syria in 2007, which required the deployment of 4,000 troops.

The LAF has around 80,000 troops. To police that border effectively would take almost all of them. Alongside this, the influx of more than two million Syrian refugees fleeing civil war further strained the LAF's resources, exacerbating its diminished presence in the south, which was deemed relatively secure compared to other regions. 

When the LAF did deploy to the south in 2006, this ended its 30-year absence from the region. In 2000, after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, it had the opportunity to do so, but the presence of better-armed and more capable Syrian soldiers in effect prevented it.

At the time, the US pledged to establish an international monitoring body composed of American and French personnel to oversee the implementation of the agreement, including no Hezbollah fighters south of the Litani River, weapons confiscated, and Israeli forces withdrawing to the Blue Line. 

It further stipulated that 15,000 LAF troops be stationed south of the Litani River, but this target was never achieved due to personnel shortages and a deterioration in Lebanese security following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. In the end, only two brigades and one regiment (4,500 soldiers) deployed to conduct joint patrols with UNIFIL forces.

The LAF is understaffed and underfunded. LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun has presented a plan to enhance its capabilities to US, French, and Italian military leaders, which includes bolstering troop deployment in the south and equipping the army with the necessary resources, but resources are hard to come by.

In October, the Lebanese government approved the recruitment of 1,500 soldiers (Aoun asked for 6,000) contingent on securing adequate funding. Suspended recruitment and natural attrition (such as retirements) have further weakened the LAF.

A newly recruited soldier requires months of initial training before they can be deployed, but Lebanon's ongoing economic crisis is severely limiting Beirut's ability to finance LAF operations. Its annual budget of $1bn barely covers soldiers' salaries, healthcare, food, and minimal maintenance. In short, without outside money, the army cannot meet its obligations under the Resolution. 

The recent war showed that neither UNIFIL nor the LAF could protect against advanced Israeli military capabilities, showing how international guarantees are needed if both forces are to carry out their roles under Resolution 1701.

LAF takes centre stage

Keeping order internally is once again an LAF priority. According to the Lebanese Emergency Committee, the 2024 war displaced around 1.2 million people from villages in the south, Bekaa, and Dahiya, in addition to less than one million Syrian refugees from these areas. About 300,000 housing units have been destroyed, meaning that their owners cannot return, so areas of alternative shelter, therefore, need security coverage, not least to protect Syrian refugees from hostility. 

According to high-ranking Lebanese military sources, US envoy Amos Hochstein worked with Lebanese and Israeli officials towards a ceasefire that finally took effect between Hezbollah and Israel last month. The initial draft included a contentious clause allowing Israel to intervene in response to any violations, but during the final round of negotiations, this clause was removed and substituted with a provision for a monitoring body operating independently of UNIFIL.

By committing to implement the remaining provisions, Lebanon effectively agrees to the executive framework of Resolution 1701. In effect, this means extending the authority of the Lebanese state and enforcing Resolutions 1559 and 1680. However, the resolution suffered from a fundamental weakness: the lack of a binding mechanism to guarantee compliance by all parties.

Several critical issues persist. For one, the 30km stretch between the Blue Line and the Litani River has not been cleared of Hezbollah fighters, nor have Israeli forces ceased their operations there. Additionally, the dispute over the Shebaa Farms remains unresolved, despite the Resolution tasking the UN Secretary-General with presenting solutions within 30 days of its adoption.

Fragile stability

So far, all the resolution has been able to do is bring fragile stability to either side of the border. By endorsing the ceasefire, the White House sought—albeit belatedly—to secure a diplomatic outcome but left its implementation to the next administration. It is of note that the handover in Washington coincides with the planned withdrawal of both Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants.

Regardless of their political affiliations, and despite differing views on the war's cost and significance, the Lebanese people broadly agree on the importance of implementing Resolution 1701, the fundamentals of which guarantee each party's right to respond when necessary and require the absence of militants south of the Litani.

North of the Litani, however, there are still weapons and militants. What role do they play? Will the oversight body have jurisdiction here, or is this out-of-bounds? Are there areas of potential misinterpretation that could spark a future conflict? Furthermore, what awaits the Lebanese army? Al Majalla understands that the LAF strictly adheres to political decisions made collectively by the government, which encompasses all political factions, so when the government approves a ceasefire, the LAF is duty-bound to honour it.

The ceasefire agreement requires that Hezbollah fighters move north of the river, after which the LAF will dismantle its military infrastructure south of the river, not dissimilar to the post-civil war process of disarmament when warring factions voluntarily surrendered their heavy weaponry to the army or through inspections and confiscations conducted by the army in coordination with UNIFIL.  And the whole process could be delayed if Hezbollah does not cooperate by granting access to its weapon stockpiles and missile platforms. Not doing so may result in Israeli pressure on the LAF through the monitoring body, which may be accused of failing to enforce the Resolution. 

The agreement mandates the creation of an international body to oversee its implementation. The operations of both the LAF and UNIFIL will therefore be under American and French scrutiny (Germany is excluded after pro-Hezbollah media accused its naval forces of negligence when Israeli commanders landed onshore in the Batroun area on 2 November to kidnap a Hezbollah operative). 

It is not yet clear whether this monitoring body will direct the LAF and UNIFIL to intervene or whether such matters will be entrusted to Israel. The agreement does allow Israel to intervene militarily in Lebanon based on reports from the monitoring body, which means that if Israel thinks Hezbollah is rebuilding its military capabilities, it could take action. 

Although the agreement mandates the removal of Hezbollah "militants" south of the Litani, the LAF will have to interpret the word 'militants' before doing so. Could it include local Hezbollah members and supporters, or is it only armed and active fighters? If it includes local residents, this could prevent thousands from returning to their homes, leading to clashes.

Finally, the agreement mandates indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel to demarcate land borders. If these talks fail to gain agreement, fighting may recommence, posing one of many significant challenges for the LAF, which is being tested by a series of both internal and external threats from war, mass displacement, a large refugee population, a political power vacuum, and an aggressive neighbour. Navigating them will not be easy.