As 13 months of war come to an end, and over 1.2 million Lebanese displaced make their way back to their devasted towns and villages, the relief at the end of this latest round of conflict is mixed with cautious hope that perhaps a pathway out of these repeated rounds of war and the collapse of governance and economic institutions is possible.
What are the signposts along this pathway? What must the Lebanese accomplish in the weeks ahead, and how can Lebanon’s friends in the region and around the world help turn this latest crisis into an opportunity?
First, we must focus on ensuring that this ceasefire is held. On the Lebanese side, this means that Hezbollah—in effect, Iran—would have to adhere to their commitment to withdraw from points south of the Litani River and not immediately begin planning ways to go back in. And unlike what happened in 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has to step up to the plate in its responsibility as a national army to protect Lebanon and ensure that Hezbollah is out of that zone and stays out.
There are reasons to believe that both Hezbollah and Iran are of the belief that they will need several years of calm to heal from their wounds, rebuild a leadership structure for the party, and reconsider their overall strategy; that might give them reason to adhere to the agreement, at least in the short and medium term.
For their part, the LAF has already started moving into the south and has a broad political and popular mandate to do so. But it is woefully underfunded and under-equipped; it needs urgent assistance from Lebanon’s regional and international friends. The Lebanese security forces should also be assisted in consolidating their hold on Beirut airport, the country’s seaports, and the country’s land borders in order to make sure that no non-state armed group in Lebanon can illegally import weapons.
An equally urgent priority is to provide humanitarian, recovery, and reconstruction aid to the 1.2 million displaced who are now rushing back to their homes. It is important for them to know that it is the Lebanese state and friends of Lebanon in the region and around the world that will care for them and help them rebuild their lives.
The mistake of 2006 should not be repeated in which Hezbollah and Iran were able to remarket themselves as the friends of those whom Hezbollah’s own actions in July 2006 unleashed the war that led to their displacement. In this sense, winning back the hearts and minds of those who have felt neglected by the state and the international community is paramount. They deserve nothing less.
At the political level, the immediate task is convening parliament and the election of a president—a critical post that has been vacant for the past two years.
While Hezbollah is painting the ceasefire as a victory and boasting that they fought Israel to a standstill, as they did in 2006, the majority of Lebanese don’t buy it. Hezbollah built its narrative after 2006 on the basis that it was the guarantor of the security of Lebanon, and the south in particular, against Israeli aggression; it has been plain for all to see that Hezbollah’s war of choice against Israel since 8 October 2023, inevitably brought on Israel’s large-scale assault on Lebanon and that while Hezbollah could continue to lob missiles into Israel, it was unable to shield its support base from the devastating air assaults that have displaced them and left the country in ruins.
Hezbollah has officially said that it would engage right away in the process of electing a president, and the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, has communicated that Hezbollah is willing to be more ‘flexible’ in the process of electing a new president.
