The Palestinian strategy in confronting the Israeli strategy

Israel was never sincere about a two-state solution, but we will continue to push for our national independence, with or without the 'peace process'

Axel Rangel Garcia

The Palestinian strategy in confronting the Israeli strategy

The Israeli strategy is clear, even if we do not want to acknowledge it. In the past, the Palestinian national movement believed that our agreement to coexist in a two-state solution—merely our acceptance of a small Palestinian state within the 1967 borders—would guarantee the implementation of this solution, as Israel was supposedly eager for Palestinian and Arab approval. We were divided on this issue, with one camp, which included the majority, supporting this acceptance and the other, the Rejectionist Front, opposing it. Both camps operated under the same assumption.

Unfortunately, no one pointed out that the assumption itself was flawed. This assumption persisted, and I dare say it still holds sway today. It can explain many positions, including the national leadership’s decision to enter the Oslo Accords and the subsequent events.

In truth, Israel has never agreed to the idea of partition or coexistence between two states. It has consistently insisted—whether openly or covertly—that all the land is “the Land of Israel” and that the Jewish people have the right to settle in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip (the Palestinian land occupied since 1967). From their perspective, the Palestinian presence is merely that of a minority population within Israel, and thus, any solutions proposed are focused on addressing this minority.

Israel has never agreed to halt the colonial settlement of our land, although it has occasionally, and reluctantly, agreed to freeze settlement expansion for a period of time. It has also never recognised the legal status of the West Bank, including Jerusalem and Gaza, as occupied land. Israel has never accepted the idea of partition into two states—two states for two peoples.

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US President Bill Clinton (C) stands between PLO leader Yasser Arafat (R) and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (L) on September 13, 1993, after signing the Oslo Accords.

Read more: 31 years later, Oslo takes its last dying breaths

When Israel reached the Oslo Accords with the Palestinian leadership, it remained committed to these positions. As a result, the agreement contained no reference to stopping settlement colonialism nor any mention of the existence of an occupation or the establishment of a Palestinian state in accordance with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Despite Israel's commitment to its stance and the flawed terms of the agreement, the Israeli far-right assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel at the time, as punishment for reaching agreements that, merely by their existence, could open the door to unforeseen developments that might ultimately lead to a Palestinian state. Since this far-right ultimately seeks to seize all the land and expel the Palestinians, or most of them, rather than relinquish Palestinian territory, it does not mean that the national leadership, represented at the time by Yasser Arafat, agreed to this outcome.

In fact, this leadership fought for the establishment of a state, and when it realised that the Israeli side had no intention of agreeing to this, it effectively abandoned the Oslo Accords and opened the door to confrontation. The Israeli response, however, was extremely violent, resulting in the destruction of the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatuses and the assassination of Yasser Arafat.

What remained unclear is that the leadership that followed—which had accused Arafat in various ways of being responsible for the failure of the peace process—had, in fact, accepted the alternative reality created by Israel. This leadership agreed not even to return to the Oslo Accords or the concept of self-rule, an acceptance that continues to plague us to this day.

It has become advantageous for the extremist ministers in the Israeli government to see the collapse of the PA

The Israeli shift towards further extremism has continued, not in terms of the core position, but rather in terms of the blatant disclosure of that position. We began hearing statements from Israeli officials publicly asserting that all the land belongs to them and reaffirming the right of Jews to settle and exist on all of it. Meanwhile, successive Israeli governments have continued to encourage Palestinian division, promoting the existence of two separate entities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to avoid international pressure to implement the two-state solution. However, they continued to view the Palestinian Authority as useful, as it provided a high level of security for Israeli settlers.

Recently, this picture has begun to change, particularly with the presence of far-right ministers in the Israeli government pushing for the annexation of the West Bank or most of it to Israel. These ministers have prompted the government to take serious steps in this direction. As a result, it has become beneficial for these figures to see the collapse and dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, as they have shifted from the phase of protecting settlers, which the Authority used to provide, to the phase of seizing land and officially annexing it to Israel.

All of the above confirms the fallacy of the one-state solution as proposed by some Palestinians. Not those who still have the boldness to call for the liberation of all the land, with whom we may disagree, but rather those who call for individual rights and a "struggle" for equality, perhaps at a later stage. In practice, this means accepting "Greater Israel" in exchange for some rights. This, of course, pleases certain Israeli circles that are willing to accept any stance that involves abandoning the Palestinian identity and the national state, as the outcome aligns with the broader Israeli strategy.

The support of some liberal Israelis (or liberal Jews) for this, in my opinion, stems from their need to reconcile their support for Palestinian rights with their inability to reject the Jewish presence in the West Bank or demand their departure. Their solution, therefore, is what is called the "one-state solution" because, at the same time, you relinquish the legal status of the land as "occupied territory" and thus abandon the illegality of colonial settlement and the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to this land.

We prefer to achieve national independence through negotiations, but if not, we will do it without the 'peace process'

Does the above mean the end of the idea of partition into two states (regardless of borders)? The answer is no, but it does mean that the idea is under intense pressure due to the Israeli stance. More importantly, it signifies the necessity of changing the Palestinian policies proposed in this regard. It is essential to uphold the legal status of Palestinian land as occupied territory and ensure that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to it. This means viewing Israeli colonial settlement as a grave violation of the Convention, amounting to a war crime. Additionally, it is crucial to uphold the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and national independence in their existing state.

This point is extremely important because we are not fighting for the establishment of a state (as some Palestinian officials claim), and we do not accept that its establishment is conditional on Israel's approval. Like all other peoples, we are struggling for national independence in our existing state by virtue of our people's historical and natural rights, even if this state is under occupation or subject to colonial settlement.

We, as Palestinians, are still prepared and prefer that this national independence is achieved peacefully and through negotiations. However, these negotiations require a clear Israeli agreement on the principle of two states—Palestine and Israel—on the 1967 borders. Otherwise, we are heading toward achieving national independence without these negotiations or without the so-called "peace process."

It is important here to mention Israel's stance toward the United Nations and international law. Israel categorically rejects any involvement by the United Nations or any group of countries in matters related to the conflict because it knows that these countries are "natural" (positions that align with international law and the idea of partition) and may not agree with Israel's "unnatural" goals. Moreover, the position of the United Nations and its member states is rooted in the concept of partition, while Israel opposes this idea, as we have mentioned.

Of course, Israel also categorically rejects international law. It is worth noting here the fundamental contradiction between international humanitarian law—particularly the Geneva Conventions—and Israeli colonial settlement, which is deemed a war crime. Over the years, Israel has worked diligently to neutralise international law, deeming it irrelevant.

It has succeeded in shifting the US position from one that affirmed the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to all territories occupied in 1967 to a more ambiguous stance on the Convention's application, one that does not support settlement activity, to a position that considers settlements an obstacle to peace; and finally to a stance that regards settlements as merely a unilateral action, akin to Palestinian incitement (unfortunately, with the approval of some Palestinian officials). These evolving US positions have naturally influenced its stance at the UN Security Council, where it (the US) has at times exercised its veto power for this reason alone.

This decline has been mirrored by a retreat on the issue of the legal status of the land. Recently, the US State Department's annual report on human rights around the world has made no mention of this land as being occupied.

Israel's far right seeks to seize all the land and annex the West Bank and even the Gaza Strip

The issue of statehood remained, and Israel worked hard to twist the arm of the European position, for example, shifting it from one that supported and endorsed the existence of a Palestinian state (alongside the State of Israel) to one that conditioned the existence of this state on Israel's approval. This shift occurred when the European stance began supporting a "negotiated two-state solution." The European side attempted to balance this by adopting the 1967 borders as the foundation for the two states and emphasising that no changes to the borders would be recognised unless mutually agreed upon through negotiations. While this is positive, it remains a mere promise and could change in the future. In any case, developments have been both negative and positive in light of the Gaza war and the impact this war has had.

Returning to the two strategies, we summarise by saying that the Israeli strategy is clear and includes the positions we have presented. There is a disparity within Israel with the far right, which has become an important part of the mainstream, seeking to seize all the land and annex the West Bank and even the Gaza Strip, with the intention of completely or partially depopulating it.

The rest of Israel is willing to accept the existence of a Palestinian entity—a Palestinian state or a quasi-state—provided that Israel grants it to the Palestinian side. This situation and Israeli positions may change as a result of the Gaza war and Israel's failure to achieve the objectives of this war. As for the Palestinians, we made mistakes in understanding the situation, treating the strategy superficially, with some of us believing that the strategy could be manipulated or left undefined. In any case, the Palestinian side must adhere to the points we have mentioned, as they form the core of a sound strategy in confronting the Israeli strategy and could lead to the building of a genuine peace based on the idea of partition into two states.

I must point out that there is no contradiction between what has been mentioned in this article and my positions expressed in the joint paper with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. We seek national independence in a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders—alongside Israel—and we are willing to negotiate on this. However, this requires Israel's prior agreement with two states existing side by side with mutual recognition, even if that recognition comes later.

The presence of any Israeli party, such as Olmert, that agrees to the existence of two states and their coexistence is very important. I believe it will lead to positive changes (this does not imply his agreement with what is mentioned in this article). The public needs to support this paper, and it is equally important for the concerned states to support it.

**This is a direct translation from Arabic**

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