31 years later, Oslo takes its last dying breaths

Netanyahu’s current war on Gaza and the West Bank seems to be the final nail in the coffin.

On 13 September 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed between Israeli and Palestinian leaders under US auspices. Since then, Israel has put facts on the ground that make a Palestinian state impossible.
Andrei Cojocaru
On 13 September 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed between Israeli and Palestinian leaders under US auspices. Since then, Israel has put facts on the ground that make a Palestinian state impossible.

31 years later, Oslo takes its last dying breaths

On 4 December 1992, Israeli history professor Yair Hirschfeld and top Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei (aka Abu Alaa) secretly met at the Cavendish Hotel in Piccadilly Circus, London. Facilitating the London meeting was 45-year-old Norwegian statesman Terje Rod Larsen, then-president of the Institute of Applied Science, who decided to invest in Hirschfeld’s friendship with the deputy foreign minister of Israel Yossi Belin, who was serving in the cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Belin contacted his boss, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, to inform him of the meeting with Abu Alaa. Peres did not say a word, which Belin understood as a silent nudge to move forward.

Later that month, Hamas carried out a series of attacks, including the kidnapping and killing of an Israeli soldier on 13 December, which led to the arrest and forced expulsion of 415 Palestinians to South Lebanon. Amid simmering regional tension, a serious breakthrough in the peace talks was not expected, and this could be why, during the early stages, Rabin—who deeply mistrusted Peres—wasn't even informed of the talks. Neither was US President Bill Clinton, who came to the White House in January 1993. Only Peres and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) chief Yasser Arafat were on board, and pretty soon, so was Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the current president of Palestine.

At the time, Abbas summoned Abu Alaa and said: “There is no such thing as just an academic in Israel. They all either work for the Mossad or the foreign ministry.” He lobbied for a new round in Norway to be fully under Rod Larsen’s sponsorship, and after obtaining Arafat’s permission, he called for the expansion of the Palestinian delegation to include his trusted confident Hasan Asfour and Maher al-Kurd, a Palestinian economist. The two sides then decided to inform Rabin first and then the Clinton Administration via Israel. The Palestinian side informed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and told him to keep the matter strictly confidential.

Round 1

The first round of Norway talks took place in a secluded manor in Sarpsborg, 80 km south of Oslo, on 13 January 1993. Two days later, the Israeli delegation drafted a Declaration of Principles (DOP), agreeing to a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, where one million Palestinians were crammed into a densely populated area of 360 square kilometres.

Every Israeli government considered Gaza a security nightmare, with the country’s first premier, David Ben Gurion, describing it as a “cancer”, while Rabin himself said that he longed for the day he would wake up to find Gaza vanished from the face of the earth. That summer, the Israeli daily newspaper Maariv conducted a survey that found 77% of Israelis polled supported a withdrawal from Gaza.

Round 2

On 11 February 1993, a second round of talks was held in Oslo, but Peres demanded more senior Palestinian representation—claiming that he had never heard of Qurei—to make sure Arafat was aware of the meetings and that they had his mandate. Meanwhile, formal talks in Washington between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators—which commenced in the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference—were stagnant.

Peres wanted Oslo to complement and revive the Washington talks rather than replace them. He needed the Washington track to pressure the Syrians, who were also engaged in peace talks with the Israelis post-Madrid, making Oslo conditional on renewed US involvement. Arafat agreed, approving a ninth round of talks in Washington, which unsurprisingly yielded no results.

Round 3

On 13 May 1993, Hirschfeld and Abu Alaa returned to Oslo, this time with Uri Savir, director of the Israeli foreign ministry. He left Tel Aviv for Paris, claiming that he was planning to meet his wife in Cannes on the French Riviera. After throwing around a few towels to make his hotel room look occupied, he hung a “Do Not Disturb” sign on its door and sneaked off to Norway. At the meeting, Abu Alaa asked him: “Where are you from?” to which Savir confidently replied: “From Jerusalem.”

The following exchange occurred:

Abu Alaa: “Your father?”

Savir: “My father was born in Europe.”

Abu Alaa: “Aha ... but my father was born in Jerusalem. So was my grandfather and all of my ancestors.”

Savir: “Do you want to take us back to the time of King David?”

Abu Alaa: “No...We don’t agree on the past and seemingly never will. But let’s try to agree on the future.”

Netanyahu's current war on Gaza and the West Bank seems to be the final nail in the coffin of the Oslo Accords

The two men then went out for a walk in the woods and agreed to postpone the issue of Jerusalem until a further date, especially given the fact that Rabin had announced from Tel Aviv: "No one can preach to me about Jerusalem. I fought for it. I made sure we liberated it and I will not surrender it."

Abu Alaa told Savir that Arafat wanted something more than Gaza, something concrete and symbolic in the West Bank, suggesting Jericho—one of the oldest cities in the world. He needed Jericho to peddle the agreement both within the Arab world and among Palestinian sceptics, doubters, and opponents who were sure to stand in its way, like Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Arafat had forcefully told the negotiators: "I want Gaza and Jericho. What will I do with a Declaration of Principles? Frame it and hang it on the wall?"

The Israelis then contacted their lawyer Joel Singer, and sent him a copy of the DOP. He was then asked to meet with Rabin, who trusted him fully, in order to explain the DOP and hear out his opinion. Singer seconded the withdrawal from Gaza, followed by Jericho, conditioning that, in return, Arafat would call off the Palestinian intifada that had been raging since December 1987.

The Israeli negotiators reminded him: "They won't stop the intifada until we recognise them as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. This is a must for Arafat."Qurei added: "The intifada cannot be stopped by a simple decision. We need to work together to convince our people and not do anything that would put us in a confrontation with them."

A revised DOP was drawn up and sent to both Arafat and Rabin, who, still fearful of the Palestinian leader's intentions, asked Norwegian foreign minister Johan Holst to meet him in Tunis.

Round 4 and 5

After securing Arafat's full endorsement, more talks followed in Norway, at the Institute of Applied Science on 27 June, and in Halvorsbole on 25 July. A final agreement was reached that contained full mutual recognition, with a clause for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to renounce violence and terrorism. In return, Israel would recognise Arafat as a genuine peace partner. When reading the DOP, US negotiator Dennis Ross told Peres: "Ben Gurion would be proud." The agreement was signed on 18 August, two days before the Oslo talks formally ended.

On 9 September, Rabin phoned Clinton to brief him on the results, and on the very same day, he and Arafat publically exchanged letters of recognition, pledging to turn a page in history and work together for sustainable peace.

Interestingly, Clinton's Secretary of State Warren Christopher claims that he knew nothing about the Oslo process and was informed only a few days before its announcement, on 20 August 1993. In his memoir Chance of a Lifetime, he wrote: "I was surprised by the message and the absence of leaks." Chuckling, Peres replied: "Keeping secrets is not usually one of our national characteristics."

Deal sealed

The Clinton Administration decided to host and claim ownership of the Oslo process, inviting Arafat and Rabin to sign an agreement on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993.

AFP
US President Bill Clinton (C) stands between PLO leader Yasser Arafat (R) and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (L) on September 13, 1993, after signing the Oslo Accords.

In his memoir My Life, Clinton says he woke up at 3 AM to read the Bible, looking for inspiration for his keynote address. Former presidents Jimmy Carter and George HW Bush were invited, along with eight former secretaries of state, including Henry Kissinger, who had led the disengagement talks between Egypt and Israel back in 1994, and James Baker, architect of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

Rabin was nervous and very uncomfortable. Although his name would forever be associated with the Oslo Accords (which would lead to his assassination in 1995), he knew that he had never initiated the process and nor did he approve of its final outcome, saying privately that it "rewarded Arafat for terrorism." He was especially worried about shaking hands with his long-time foe, reminding Clinton of how many Israeli youths he had buried because of Arafat.

'No kissing'

But when Clinton invited him to Washington, Rabin replied: "I will come; I have no choice." He immediately added one condition: "No kissing." Arafat was famous for his kisses, and Clinton and his team did a rehearsal on how to keep him at bay, extending a hand to hold him by the arm to keep a safe distance. They reasoned that if he couldn't kiss Clinton, then he wouldn't kiss Rabin as well.

But that was not the only worry for the Clinton White House.  Arafat insisted on wearing his hallmark olive military fatigues, with his checkered keffiyeh placed neatly upon his head and shoulder, folded to the shape of a map of Palestine.

All of that could be arranged, but then came the issue of Arafat's pistol, which he always hung to his waist. Clinton staffers told him it was strictly forbidden at the White House. Arafat suggested unloading its bullets, but they said no. He complied, not wanting to upset his hosts. So excited was Arafat about landing in the US that upon arrival at Andrews Air Base, he grabbed Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar by the shoulders, embraced him and said: "Andrews, my friend. Yasser Arafat is at Andrews!"

Uncertain future

In his memoirs, current Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas shared his reflections while flying from Tunis to the US to sign the Oslo Accords. "Is this the journey that will take us back to the homeland? Or are we signing an agreement that will lead us to abandon large parts of the homeland? The burden is heavy, and the responsibility is great. The risks might be higher than the gains. How will our people react, both at home and in the Diaspora? What will history write about us?"

The Oslo agreement allowed limited self-rule for the Palestinians but failed to identify its shape and parameters. It also said nothing about the future of Jerusalem.

When the Oslo agreement was brought before the Israeli Knesset, 61 MPs voted in favour, 50 said no, and eight abstained. On the Palestine side, it was fiercely rejected not only by Hamas and PIJ but by veterans of Arafat's own Fatah Movement, led by party co-founder Faruq al-Qaddumi. 

Two weeks later, a donor conference was held in Washington to raise money for the interim Palestinian administration. Forty-six countries attended, pledging $2.5bn over a two-year period, with Saudi Arabia alone contributing $100mn. In 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed to complement Oslo, which gave birth to the present Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and allowed for Arafat's return to Palestine, where he was elected president in June 1994.

Two years later, Arafat and Rabin signed the Oslo II agreement, this time in the Egyptian city of Taba on 25 September 1995. It divided the West Bank into three unconnected areas: A, B, and C. The Palestinians alone would rule Area A on approximately 18% of the West Bank, where approximately 2.8 Palestinians presently live in al-Khalil (Hebron), Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Nablus, all under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The Israelis and Palestinians were given joint security control of Area B, on 22% of the West Bank, and Israel alone was left in control of Area C, on 61% of the West Bank, which just so happened to be the richest in terms of natural resources.

It was agreed that parts of Area C would be transferred to the Palestinians by the end of 1999. None of that happened, and Area C remains until this day fully under Israel's jurisdiction. The UN estimates that the number of illegal Israeli settlers in the Occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem today stands at over 700,000.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stands at an overview of the Israeli settlement of Har Homa (background) on February 20, 2020.

Slow death

All of the optimism that surrounded those critical years in the 1990s would evaporate into thin air, killing Oslo multiple times, first with the assassination of Rabin on 4 November 1995 and then with the outbreak of the second intifada after Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque in September 2000. Then came Arafat's death in November 2004, following two years of being under siege at his office compound in Ramallah, topped by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's present war on Gaza and his most recent incursions into the West Bank.

It can be argued that Netanyahu's current war on Gaza and operations in the West Bank is the final nail in the coffin of the Oslo Agreement. He has effectively erased Areas A, B, and C from the map and transformed Palestine into an open battlefield for Israel for all eternity.

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