Eyes on Iran as Israel sets its sights on Tehran’s golden child

Hezbollah has been badly hit in recent days with damage inflicted at every level, leaving the world wondering what Israel’s ultimate intentions are and what (if anything) Iran will do about it

Israeli troops deploy in an area in the Upper Galilee region in northern Israel on September 27, 2024.
Jalaa MAREY / AFP
Israeli troops deploy in an area in the Upper Galilee region in northern Israel on September 27, 2024.

Eyes on Iran as Israel sets its sights on Tehran’s golden child

Hezbollah advises its supporters to follow the Israeli press. Read articles in Haaretz, Yedioth Ahronoth, and Maariv they are told. Watch Israeli political TV programmes. Gain insights into Israel’s internal political, economic, and social situation. To do so and take all the pessimistic commentary at face value would be to presume the imminent collapse of Israeli society, which in turn would let Hezbollah leaders fulfil their promises to pray at Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Yet those observing Israel seem to have misread the situation and overlooked the Israeli government’s openly discussed plan for Lebanon since October 2023, when Hezbollah began firing at Israel in support of Hamas in Gaza. They also seem to have ignored the long string of threats and warnings issued by Israeli officials no longer willing to tolerate the status quo in the north, where the threat posed by Hezbollah is often compared to the threat posed by Hamas.

Reading the signs

These Israeli decision-makers have been vowing not to allow a threat similar to that posed by Hamas exist on any of Israel’s borders on the basis that nothing like the 7 October 2023 attacks would ever be repeated—no matter the cost.

This messaging was unmistakably aimed at Hezbollah. Israelis had earlier learned that Hezbollah had dug tunnels extending into Israeli territory, intended for use in the so-called Galilee Liberation Plan, which envisaged Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force capturing towns and villages in Israel’s far north.

The magnitude and fortitude of Israel's response should have been foreseen, given the fundamental shift in how Israel responds to rocket attacks over the past year. Before it exploded Hezbollah’s pagers, Israeli air strikes had killed 426 Hezbollah fighters and 26 members of the Amal Movement in 11 months.

A woman holds a poster of Ibrahim Aqil, the head of Hezbollah's elite Radwan Force, during his funeral procession in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 22, 2024.

This many combatant deaths in less than a year of relatively low-intensity fighting is unprecedented in the history of Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel. Since then, the Radwan Force’s entire leadership team has been killed, its communication methods thoroughly compromised, and the group’s strongholds across Lebanon bombed.

Israeli war aims

Comments made by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, and military spokespeople like Avichay Adraee suggest that the Israeli plan is the destruction of infrastructure across a 10-15km stretch on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border.

This would prevent the return of Lebanese civilians, the Lebanese army, and, of course, Hezbollah fighters. The region between the border and the Litani River, about 20km away, would be placed under strict security surveillance, making it effectively a ‘kill zone,’ where civilian movement is severely restricted.

If that is what transpires, Israel will be replicating its strategy in Gaza by first imposing control of southern Lebanon through firepower and (if necessary) a physical presence, then rejecting diplomatic solutions that restore the status quo.

US envoy Amos Hochstein has met Lebanon's caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Speaker Nabih Berri to persuade them to convince Hezbollah to engage in diplomatic efforts for a ceasefire, to no avail. Hezbollah insists on supporting Gaza and has reiterated its stance that residents of northern Israel would not return to their villages before a ceasefire in Gaza is agreed. Yet Hezbollah has been badly weakened and is in no position to impose demands.

Israel plans to destroy infrastructure across a 10-15km stretch on the Lebanese side of the border to prevent citizens from returning, turning it into a "kill zone"

Taking the initiative

Israel's killing of all Radwan Force leaders last week, a so-called "decapitation operation," targeted the most mobile and responsive unit ahead of Israel's broader assault this week. By eliminating the decision-making centres within its elite units, Israel has succeeded in neutralising Hezbollah's offensive capabilities. This is to prevent retaliatory ground operations by the Radwan Force and to stop Hezbollah's mobile missile launchers—most of which are mounted on vehicles and trucks—from being deployed from shelters to predetermined launch points.

Working with its intelligence agencies, Israeli forces took advantage of the shock generated by successful and consecutive attacks on Hezbollah's leadership and communications to impose their own rhythm on military operations, depriving Hezbollah of the ability to respond in the way it had prepared to.

Israeli calls for Lebanese civilians to distance themselves from houses where Hezbollah stores its weapons are, in effect, calls to evacuate areas where Hezbollah militants are present, sowing doubt and fear among the population. If any house could be a weapons depot, any house could be bombed.

Sending messages

Warnings to civilians, together with the brutal bombardment of villages (leading to more than 550 deaths), have created a state of panic and mass displacement from the south towards Beirut, its suburbs, and the mountains, despite these areas also being bombed. Civilians in Bekaa were given just two hours to leave.

Vehicles wait in traffic in the town of Damour, south of the capital Beirut, on September 24, 2024, as people flee southern Lebanon.

The bombing of the Aamchit area in the highlands of Jbeil also sent a message to Lebanese Christians that they would not be spared if any among them, like those aligned with the Free Patriotic Movement, offered support to Hezbollah.

The security and military apparatus of Hezbollah seems like it hasn't learned any lessons from its experience of Israeli strikes on Lebanon since Hamas attacked southern Israel. This past week has revealed confusion and logistical missteps. It has also damaged the party's image—something it has cultivated among both its supporters and other Lebanese over recent years. Hezbollah's apparent disregard for the humanitarian aspects of its conflict with Israel has also not won it any fans.

Buffer strategy

After Israel assassinated Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh within hours of each other, most Lebanese asked: what will Iran do?

Iran's response to Israel's April 2024 attack on its consulate in Damascus was so measured and telegraphed as to be excessively restrained, so many now wonder whether Tehran will abandon Hezbollah to its fate. From its experience of the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-88, Iran's strategy has boiled down to preserving the regime by way of distancing itself from direct conflict. In a sense, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon are buffer zones.

Iran's strategy is to preserve the regime by distancing itself from direct conflict. In a sense, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon are buffer zones.

The killing of Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists, attacks on its nuclear sites, the theft of its nuclear archive—all have passed without commensurate response because Tehran thinks this would provoke an Israeli escalation that would threaten the regime, especially if the US got dragged in.

It is no coincidence that, in recent days, Iran's president and foreign minister have spoken of "our American brothers," the possibility of resuming nuclear talks in New York "if the other side is willing," and their desire to "make the world a place to live in peace."

The reason is simple: Iran fears that Netanyahu could exploit Washington's preoccupation with its November election by striking Iranian nuclear facilities. Domestically, Iran's ruling regime knows that it could not withstand the fallout from any direct military confrontation.

Hussainian or Hassanian?

Before the 2015 US-Iran nuclear agreement was reached, Khamenei praised what he called the "Hassanian approach" as opposed to the "Hussainian approach." The former refers to Hasan ibn Ali's decision to relinquish the caliphate to Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan to avoid bloodshed and end discord among Muslims. The latter refers to the Battle of Karbala and the confrontation that led to Hussein ibn Ali's death.

Iran currently aims for a Hassanian approach, as it seeks to avoid a devastating confrontation while still standing firm over its principles. This explains why it has not responded to Haniyeh's assassination. Does that mean Iran has abandoned Hezbollah in the face of an Israeli onslaught? The simple answer is no.

Hezbollah remains the crown jewel of Iran's foreign policy and an indispensable tool for exerting political and military influence, including over allies like Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has maintained silent indifference to attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, and even on Syria.

Iran will continue to support Hezbollah to prevent the cornerstone of its regional strategy from collapsing, lest the rest of the Iranian dominoes fall. Yet this does not mean it will engage in direct intervention. Instead, it will opt for strategic patience and wisdom.

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