Where there is opportunity in the Middle East, disappointment is not far behind

Minor details, major problems

Back then, the peace agreement was almost fully negotiated on the Syrian side. All major points were settled, including Israel's withdrawal from the entire Golan Heights up to the 4 June, 1967 line. Security measures were agreed, as was normalisation of relations between Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Only "minor detail" was in the way: the demarcation of the 4 June line on the ground. Al-Assad sought control over the shores of Lake Tiberias. But Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak refused, considering the shoreline "vital to Israel's security."

Much like today, the 2000 peace agreement was almost entirely completed, with 99% of its terms written, leaving only a few details to finalise. However, the Clinton-Assad summit in March of that year ended in failure, and the agreement was abandoned. Al-Assad passed away in June of that year without ever signing it.

The focus then shifted to the Palestinian track, and Clinton, in the final months of his presidency, aimed for a significant breakthrough. He hosted a summit at Camp David in July and continued efforts to reach an agreement until his final days in the White House.

So much has changed since then, and yet there are so many similarities. With so much agreed over Gaza, sticking points are preventing major progress. Over 90% of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement had been finalised.

The agreement includes detailed provisions on the Palestinian state, its borders, demilitarisation, airspace, land swaps, refugees, and settlers. The remaining "minor detail" concerns the future of Jerusalem, including certain neighbourhoods and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

When the negotiations collapsed in 2000, it triggered the Intifada. Arafat was besieged and died in late 2004 without ever signing a peace agreement. At that time, the hope was that signing peace agreements would create a new dynamic, leading to the emergence of a new Middle East.

Today, the American vision – as expressed by Burns and Moore in London – is that a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, along with a hostage exchange, could initiate a similar transformation in the region.

This includes presenting "a better alternative to Hamas," addressing the "day after" scenario for a post-war Gaza, launching a political process that enables peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians, securing agreements on the Blue Line in southern Lebanon, and protecting Red Sea shipping lanes from Houthi attacks.

Fragile hope

The overarching hope is that these steps will pave the way for a new regional framework and a reimagined Middle East. The future of the region hinges on the final 10% of the Gaza agreement, which involves critical issues like control over the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel's newly constructed corridor inside Gaza, Netzarim, and its complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

But these seemingly "minor details" carry significant weight for Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose political future could be shaped by these decisions, as well as for Hamas, whose priorities and regional alliances – particularly with Iran – are at stake.

Meanwhile, some of Biden's advisors are increasingly convinced that this may become yet another missed opportunity in the Middle East.

This week's deadly incident at the King Hussein Bridge between Jordan and the West Bank –whether it was indeed "a lone-wolf attack" as Amman suggested, or part of the Iranian "axis of evil," as Netanyahu claimed – is just another reminder of the region's long history of disappointments and missed opportunities for peace.