Lessons from Syria: what Trump 2025-29 could mean for Ukraine

The key actions and policies implemented by Trump in Syria during his presidency offer insights. At that time, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was leading a clandestine programme to support the Syrian opposition.

This was coordinated through a secret operations room in Jordan, involving regional and Western countries, and in northern Syria via a similar operations centre in southern Turkey. Yet with a single surprising tweet on X (formely Twitter), Trump publicly announced the cancellation of this secret programme.

This move was widely interpreted as a gift from Trump to Putin, who had deployed Russian forces to Syria at the end of 2015 and established naval and air bases in the country's west.

Meetings and deals

Trump met Putin in Helsinki in July 2018. Their private meeting, with only their respective interpreters, lasted for two hours. Both said they discussed Syria. The process culminated in a deal involving the US, Russia, and Jordan.

This deal led Western and Arab nations to withdraw their military, financial, and media support for the Syrian opposition, allowing Syrian government forces based in Damascus to reclaim the south, up to and including border areas with Israel.

In return, there were promises that Iranian militias would be withdrawn, and that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights would be re-established, to help ensure Israel's security.

There are numerous questions regarding the seriousness of the withdrawal of Iranian militias, the cessation of arms and drug smuggling into Jordan, and the degree of stability in southern Syria.

Nevertheless, this arrangement served as a model for Trump-Putin dealings in Syria, with an American concession to Russia in exchange for promises that Washington would be interested in.

A year earlier, in mid-2017, an alternative model emerged. After the US-led coalition defeated IS with Kurdish help in north-east Syria, Washington's allies took control of the eastern Euphrates and parts of Aleppo's countryside.

Secret US-Russian talks in Geneva and Amman resulted in a "deconfliction" agreement, whereby the territory east of the Euphrates was designated for America and its allies, while the area west of the Euphrates was allocated to Russia and its allies.

To avoid US-Russian clashes, or others involving Israel and Turkey, direct lines of communication were established to coordinate air sorties and ground operations, conveying forces' proximity and managing the occasional overlaps.

A third model emerged in October 2019 when Trump surprised the world by deciding to withdraw US forces from areas in north-east Syria.

This decision left the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) vulnerable to the Turkish army, which advanced between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain.

This Trump decision was seen as another 'gift', this time to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Subsequently, a deal between Washington and Ankara organised military deployments and patrols.

Threats and escalation

A fourth model involved Trump's repeated threats to withdraw US forces from north-east Syria, only to be pressed by Western allies and US intelligence services' advisors. He later agreed to retain a small contingent "to protect the oil".

Today, around 1,000 US troops and contractors are stationed at the Al-Tanf Base on the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi border, east of the Euphrates. They are accompanied by French and British special forces.

The fifth model involved secret negotiations between Trump's envoys and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government representatives concerning the fate of American journalist Austin Tice.

Reports suggest that Trump was willing to trade Tice's release (or information about him) for a complete or partial withdrawal of US forces east of the Euphrates. Talks later broke down, however, in part due to Trump's threat to kill al-Assad.

Trump, who wanted US special forces to carry out the assassination alongside French and British forces, conducted airstrikes on Syrian military sites in early 2018 "in response" to the use of chemical weapons, after informing Putin of the timing.

These five models show how Trump handled Syria during his presidency through talks with Putin, Erdoğan, and Assad, oscillating between strikes, deals, threats, and concessions. Can a blend of these five models be replicated in Ukraine?

Just one deal away

There are indeed some parallels between the two situations. Ukraine is currently divided in two: the east is under Moscow's control, while the west is under Kyiv's control. The battlelines have hardly shifted in the past 18 months.

However, significant differences exist between Ukraine and Syria. For instance, Ukraine is seeking membership of both NATO and the European Union.

In Syria, Trump oscillated between making deals with Putin and launching strikes on Putin's ally, Assad. It is unlikely that he would contemplate attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Still, Trump's personality will more than likely be a crucial factor in America's choices, if he is re-elected.

A dealmaker who made his money in real estate (skyscrapers, hotels, casinos, golf courses etc), Trump entered the White House in 2017 believing that he could solve the world's problems just by negotiating solutions to them.

That was Trump I. What will be the choices and methods of Trump II, who considers that "divine providence" led him to survive this month's assassination attempt?

Trump's track record of making decisions that benefit Putin fills Ukraine's supporters with dread, but Trump also felt Biden's withdrawal from Afghanistan made America look "weak". That may weigh on his mind when it comes to Kyiv.