By examining the war between Russia and Ukraine, many have postulated that drones have had and will continue to have a game-changing effect on the battlefield.
At the same time, many also have suggested, after looking at the recent exchange of blows between Iran and Israel, that drones, in addition to a new class of advanced missiles, are not the groundbreaking weapons they are presumed to be, given Israel’s near-perfect rate of interception of Iranian weapons.
Neither conclusion is warranted, however, since both are stated in a strategic and operational vacuum. The reality, which is as old as the history of war itself, is that no matter how powerful or creative any new weapon is (except for the atomic bomb, whose inherent value, even with its non-use, is absolute), what counts the most when it comes to its performance and ultimate impact – tactical, operational, and possibly strategic – is how it is being used and for what purpose.
Indeed, the political-military objectives of the state during crisis or war—the threat(s) it is facing, the strategy it is employing, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) it is pursuing—are far more important than the characteristics of the weapon itself.
Despite their limitations, drones are here to stay
Remember the first few months of the war in Ukraine? It was as if no Russian soldier was safe on Ukrainian soil. Small Ukrainian drones filled the skies, hunting for Russian targets and effectively eliminating them.
Some opined that a new “revolution in military affairs,” or RMA, was underway. Gone are major manoeuvres of massed formations, the argument went. The future of warfare will be dominated by precision, speed, and autonomy.
Much of this is true, except that the war in Ukraine has turned into a 20th-century-style attrition where manpower and industrial production will heavily influence the course of events.
The Russians also learned how to respond to Ukraine’s tactics. Not only did they produce their own drones in large quantities and use them in combat, but they also invested in electronic warfare to jam those of their opponents (though while sometimes jamming their own). It is not as if the Russians were able to nullify the Ukrainians’ drone capabilities, but they did find a way to reduce their impact and level the playing field.
As incredibly useful as drones have been for the mission of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and that of strike, they simply cannot substitute for a range of military capabilities and human resources that are necessary to repel a large, invading force such as Russia’s.
Precision, lethality, and autonomy are vital in the modern battlefield, and those are things that drones can provide, but old-fashioned artillery and tanks—in other words, heavy firepower, and capacity—are still indispensable to defend and hold territory.
In an existential fight against a determined and formidable aggressor, which is what Ukraine is facing, technology cannot trump mass. Quantity, and not necessarily that of drones, still matters a great deal. As always, those who can cleverly combine the two—quantity and quality—are able to achieve higher levels of military effectiveness.
Take artillery, for example. Thanks to US military assistance, some of Ukraine’s artillery is more effective than Russia’s because it is precision-guided. GPS signals—enabled by US satellite imagery—have allowed Ukrainian artillery to be much more precise and, therefore, lethal. And with precision comes efficiency. You use fewer shells if you can hit your targets more accurately.
Drones have been a fantastic companion to artillery, too. By spotting a Russian target (soldiers or hardware), Ukrainian drones have rapidly shared its position with nearby artillery batteries, thus facilitating engagement.
Russia has pursued network-enabled warfare against Ukraine, too, with its constellation of satellites and spies, but it has struggled more than its adversary to find and kill moving targets.
Think of drones as flying computers with cameras able to collect and process information at high speeds and then send that information to weapons systems on the ground (and perhaps soon, in the air).
As computer software evolves, coupled with advancements in artificial intelligence, so will drones. That said, ancient tactics of camouflage, hiding, dispersion and rapid movement on the ground are back in vogue to challenge the power of the drones.
With drones, or unmanned aerial systems (UAS), nowadays being the face of technology in the modern battlefield, one must recognise that there is no monopoly over these weapons. Quite the opposite. The liberalisation of UAS is now a staple of military relations, with producers eager to export to generate profit and buyers eager to use and learn to possibly manufacture their own.
Those arms are cheap and easily accessible, and if both aggressor and defender have them, which is the case with Russia and Ukraine, and Israel and Iran, there is no obvious advantage.
