In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time after the attempted assassination of its ambassador in London. Following a three-pronged attack, Israel’s forces reached the Lebanese capital, Beirut, in a matter of days before laying siege to the city. Palestinian fighters had built a strong base there, operating autonomously, like a state-within-a-state.
By 1982, Syrian forces had been in Lebanon for several years, but Syrian planes were shot down easily by the Israelis, who also blocked the main route from Damascus to prevent Syria from sending reinforcements. As the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) guerrillas fled Lebanese cities like Tyre and Sidon to regroup in the capital, Syria’s calls for a ceasefire went unheeded.
Soon, Israel’s defence minister, Ariel Sharon, turned up in the Lebanese capital. For the Israelis, the PLO and its fighters—led by enigmatic chairman Yasser Arafat—had to be kicked out of Lebanon, which borders Israel to the north. Cue a flurry of shuttle diplomacy from US envoy Philip Habib. It was a pivotal moment in the history of the Middle East, and the conversations were frank.
Here, Al Majalla reveals previously unknown details of the diplomacy using first-hand documents, meeting notes, and archives from the centres of power at the time.
They cover the blockade of Beirut and the negotiations to end it, leading up to Arafat’s exit. It includes covert messages between Arafat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, two men who had a famously uneasy relationship. Gathered from a selection of sources, the archives illustrate the stance of Lebanese factions prior to the end of the Palestinian military presence in Beirut and Arafat’s subsequent relocation to Tunisia in August 1982.
They also cover discussions with the United States, including Deputy National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane’s secret visit to Damascus on 17 July 1983, which reinforced Syria’s military foothold in Lebanon until its withdrawal in April 2005.
In a sequence of instalments over the coming days—part of a five-part series—Al Majalla will chart the back-channel communications, including those of American envoy Philip Habib aimed at facilitating the evacuation of Arafat and his fighters from the besieged city.
The Lebanese goal was to protect Beirut from complete destruction, given the statements of Israeli leaders, particularly Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Arafat initially resolved to stay but was eventually compelled to leave on 29 August 1982 at the urging of Soviet advisors after negotiations between Syria and the US.
Read more: Arafat's 1982 exile from Beirut: Will history repeat itself?
The documents feature secret handwritten correspondence between al-Assad and Arafat, a significant exchange given their well-documented rivalry. They reveal Arafat’s firm resistance to leaving Beirut via Damascus, instead preferring to go by sea.
It also includes rare messages of “reassurance” from Bachir Gemayel, the controversial Lebanese commander who was elected Lebanon’s president just months later. Years earlier, in 1969, he had been kidnapped and beaten by Palestinian fighters.
These messages were sent to al-Assad and passed on by Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, who later became Syria’s vice president. Khaddam served al-Assad loyally until the president’s death in 2000, then served his son, Bashar, before becoming disillusioned and emigrating to France in 2005. With him, he took reams of paperwork (the ‘Khaddam Files’) from his time in office.
Sore point
Syria’s military presence in Lebanon was a sore point, and the Israelis wanted them out, but it would be decades before Damascus finally withdrew its soldiers. In the 1982 letters between Gemayel and al-Assad, the Lebanese stressed how critical Syria’s “fraternal” support was, urging them to “remain and continue”.
Seen as a traitor by some, Gemayel was elected president on 23 August but assassinated by a Syrian nationalist on 14 September before he could take office. A week later, his brother Amine became president.
Khaddam’s papers include confidential reports from the head of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon in 1982, who recounts several stories (some of them funny) concerning the siege, including Sharon’s surprise arrival in the Lebanese capital. Khaddam, who died in 2020, travelled to Paris on a one-way ticket in 2005. His files shed light on a US-Syria agreement on the re-entry of Syrian forces into Beirut and their subsequent consolidation in Lebanon following Arafat’s exit.
Secret negotiations
Details of several meetings help fill in historical gaps. There is even information on meetings that weren’t held, including Habib travelling to Damascus on 23 November 1982, only for al-Assad to decline to attend. They also reveal a previously undisclosed secret visit by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to Damascus to meet al-Assad on 17 July 1983, two months after a visit by US Secretary of State George Shultz.
