In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time after the attempted assassination of its ambassador in London. Following a three-pronged attack, Israel’s forces reached the Lebanese capital, Beirut, in a matter of days before laying siege to the city. Palestinian fighters had built a strong base there, operating autonomously, like a state-within-a-state.
Al Majalla has obtained access to what has become known as the Khaddam Files, which shed light on this turbulent period in Lebanon. Abdul Halim Khaddam was Syrian's foreign minister at the time.
Later, he became Syria's vice president and served under Hafez al-Assad and then under his son Bashar until he became disillusioned with the Syrian regime, abandoned his post and fled to France in 2005, taking with him secret documents detailing regional events during his time in office.
Below is the first instalment of this five-part series.
It is June 1982, and the Israelis invaded and advanced on Beirut, demanding the expulsion of both the Syrians and Arafat (known as Abu Ammar) and his fighters. Syrian forces had been stationed in Lebanon since 1976 as an Arab Deterrent Force. The late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad cautioned Lebanon’s President Élias Sarkis against using his army to eject Syrian forces and criticised the appointment of a Lebanese liaison officer within the Israeli army in Lebanon.
On 13 June, Damascus received a message from Beirut’s military commander saying the Israeli commander “deemed it necessary, both morally and practically, to utilise communication channels within the Lebanese army to inform the commander of the Arab Deterrent Forces of their final opportunity for an honourable withdrawal of Syrian forces from Beirut, Jamhour, and Aley”.
In the absence of a response by noon on 15 June 1982, or in the event of a negative one, it said Syrians “would be held accountable for any human casualties and ensuing destruction, as the Israeli forces were mandated to expel the Syrians from Beirut”. It added that the Israeli commander “desires to avoid going to battle, which, in his view, has known outcomes due to the significant power imbalance”.
Signalling to Sarkis
After deliberating with his core team, al-Assad relayed his response to Brigadier Sami el-Khatib, commander of the Arab Deterrent Forces. “Our presence in Beirut is sanctioned by Arab consensus and endorsed by the rightful Lebanese authority,” he said.
“Lebanon stands as an Arab and sovereign nation, and we will defend Lebanon and its legitimacy, as well as the Palestinian people, with all our capabilities.”
On the day of the deadline, Khaddam received a message from President Sarkis via el-Khatib. “The current military situation on the ground does not inspire any confidence in the so-called promises given to us regarding Israel not entering Beirut,” he said.
“We have not been able to obtain guarantees, and it is our duty to prevent the destruction of the capital and to strive to avoid it so that it does not suffer the same fate as Sidon and Tyre in southern Lebanon.”
Given the situation, Sarkis said he would order the Lebanese army into Beirut, hoping to gain political leverage, “even if it may not wholly prevent the capital’s invasion”.
He added: “I feel compelled to issue this directive imminently, necessitating the withdrawal of all forces, including Syrian forces, from within the capital to alternative areas to be designated later.
“It is incumbent upon me to appraise you of this course of action, ensuring that you are not caught off guard by any such decision aimed at salvaging what remains and fulfilling my duty during these pivotal moments of my nation’s history.”
Sharon surprise
El-Khatib informed Khaddam of two separate exchanges in Lebanon involving Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon. In the first, Sharon strode into the office of Lt. Col. Rafik Al-Hassan, a police commander in Baabda, saying: “I am the defence minister.”
Al-Hassan rose to his feet and saluted before saying: “But you are not His Excellency Joseph Beik Skaff.” Sharon replied that he was Israel's defence minister, prompting Al-Hassan to “sink back into his chair in astonishment”.
The second exchange involved Farouk Abi Al-Lama’, director of Lebanese General Security and a close friend of President Sarkis, and his visit to the palace, where he found the president and education minister René Mouawad playing backgammon. Al-Lama’ promptly relayed the news of Sharon’s presence at the Baabda Palace, to which Mouawad jokingly replied: ‘Let’s set aside these jests. It is not the time for bad jokes. Let’s proceed with the game.’
Further, the correspondence shows that al-Assad wanted to underscore “the ongoing commitment to the relationship with President Sarkis and the continued willingness to support him and Lebanon”.
Al-Assad’s response
The next day, on 16 June, Khaddam replied to el-Khatib on behalf of al-Assad on the question of a possible withdrawal of Syrian forces, as demanded by the Israelis and some Lebanese. It noted that Syria had “collaborated with President Sarkis and made sacrifices for the betterment of Lebanon”, adding that Damascus still wanted to see a strong and independent Lebanon with “a robust central authority”.
Khaddam’s letter continued: “We stand prepared to contribute actively towards this objective both now and in the future. In this vein, we assert that our foremost priority should be collective action to liberate Lebanon from Israeli occupation.
“Our collaboration aims to eliminate this occupation and implement post-occupation measures essential for the central authority to exercise control over all Lebanese territories. Our commitment to this cause is underscored by a meticulously outlined plan, which we are prepared to endorse and execute with precision and integrity. Should President Sarkis seek Arab endorsement for this plan, we propose the possibility of convening either an expanded or mini-Arab summit conference. We eagerly await a response on this matter.”
