North Koreans would “eat grass” before their country would end its nuclear programme. So explained Russian President Vladimir Putin at a press conference in China in 2017.
It was a time of high anxiety over Kim Jong Un’s desire to maintain his country’s nuclear weapons in the face of international opposition and pressure.
The will of the North Korean regime to have its people endure suffering, explained Putin, outweighed the pressure that outsiders could bring to bear, including through economic sanctions.
Though widely publicised at the time, the origins of Putin’s “eat grass” comment and its implications for the effectiveness of sanctions more broadly received less attention.
The phrase had previously been used by another senior politician, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
He told the Manchester Guardian in 1965 that "If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have to feed on grass and leaves or even if we have to starve-we shall also produce an atom bomb as we would be left with no other alternative."
In 1998, Pakistan detonated its first nuclear weapon.
Bhutto wasn’t explicitly referring to sanctions but rather the determination to overcome any obstacle in pursuit of an existential goal.
Nonetheless, that sentiment is relevant to the impact of sanctions, both in the past and present, where sanctions are everywhere in the news now.
There is talk of increased sanctions against Iran over its recent attack on Israel.
At the same time, the United States and the European Union have brought in sanctions—not against the Israeli government over its ongoing military campaign in Gaza that has killed thousands of civilians but against several prominent Israeli settlers in relation to violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
Read more: Israel fears US sanctions on army battalion could open the floodgates
And, of course, there have been the extensive sanctions imposed on Russia in the aftermath of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
A 2,000-year-old practice
The imposition of sanctions is not a recent development. Over 2000 years ago, in 432 BC, the Athenian Empire imposed economic sanctions against the neighbouring city-state of Megara by prohibiting it from using ports controlled by Athens.
The actual impact of the measure imposed by Athens remains unclear, with some arguing it sparked the Peloponnesian War in which Megara allied with Sparta against Athens.
To have a modern sanctions environment, however, it was necessary for the rise of the current system of states followed by the creation of international organisations, such as the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.
A landmark moment arrived in the aftermath of the death and destruction of World War I when the graphic cost of warfare on an industrial scale became readily apparent to all.
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, at the war’s conclusion, US President Woodrow Wilson suggested sanctions as a means of avoiding future deadly conflagrations.
“Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy, and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside of the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist,” he said.
Under Article 16 of the League of Nations covenant, members agreed to in the future use economic sanctions as a primary means of averting the sort of war the world had just experienced.
Nevertheless, two consistent and often interconnected problems would arise with the arrival of sanctions: the refusal of nations to impose sanctions and the ability of targeted countries to circumvent them.
Wilson’s country, with the world’s largest economy, demonstrated the difficulty in imposing effective sanctions when the United States refused to join the League of Nations that it had helped create in 1920.