Non-state actors and the dangerous webs they weave

Non-state actors can shift from representing the interests of specific social groups to participating in organised crime.

The role of the state, society, and the individual has rarely been more in flux in the Middle East. The philosophical underpinning of their roles and relationships matters now more than ever.
Sara Gironi Carnevale
The role of the state, society, and the individual has rarely been more in flux in the Middle East. The philosophical underpinning of their roles and relationships matters now more than ever.

Non-state actors and the dangerous webs they weave

State and society have long been at odds. Since the very birth of the state as a political construct, its relationship with societal elements has been marked by tension.

The sharp elbows of non-state actors are nothing new. Their elbowing is almost ingrained. Political philosophers have pondered the nature of the state, society, and their relationship for centuries. There can seem to be as many definitions and systems as there are people within them.

In most societies today, there are representative civil components such as tribes, sects, religions, unions, business associations, and political entities such as parties whose members are united by ideology or values.

Yet this almost inherent tension begs the question: does a state’s existence undermine the need to represent these groups? They are, after all, co-contributors to the state’s governance of society.

Evolving relationships

The relationship of non-state actors with states (and their institutions) changes over time.

In his seminal work Bandits, historian Eric Hobsbawm looks at how marginalised social groups go from state opposition to becoming part of the establishment.

The interplay between societal elements and the state —whether real or “imagined”, as political scientist Benedict Anderson thought — has profound implications for the world in which we live.

Non-state actors can shift from representing the interests of specific social groups, potentially through armed rebellion, to participating in organised or sporadic criminal activities — a transition referred to as the social bandits phenomenon.

For instance, the FARC movement in Colombia, inspired by the Cuban Revolution and the legacy of Argentine revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara, was initiated as an armed insurgency in the 1960s.

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A young Cuban man walks by a colourful Che Guevara portrait painted on a shabby old wall in Old Havana.

However, it quickly diversified into drug trafficking and hostage-taking for ransom to raise revenue. It did so without fully relinquishing its political objectives.

In Jabal Amal, located in southern Lebanon, a "revolutionary" group came into prominence in the 1920s. This group of bandits, having been contacted by the Arab state under the leadership of Prince (later King) Faisal in Damascus, was persuaded to take up arms against the French occupation, positioning themselves as anti-occupation rebels.

Their role and impact remain contested even today.

The state as king

Throughout history, states have sought to limit or prohibit the presence and influence of such non-state actors. The French Revolution is a prime example.

The state was at odds with the Catholic Church and the nobility, so revolutionaries eliminated intermediary entities between the individual and the state, insisting on direct representation through the National Constituent Assembly.

This led to a ban on all professional, civil, and regional gatherings or groups, leaving only the individual and the state, with nothing in between. However, the utopian vision of this approach quickly dissipated.

Non-state actors can shift from representing the interests of specific social groups to participating in organised crime.

The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel famously declared the state "the highest form of social organisation". He believed it must remain transcendent and separate from society, guiding it towards the highest interest.

His view was challenged by his German peer Arthur Schopenhauer and later by Karl Popper, who vehemently opposed the notion of the state's supremacy, arguing that this was a precursor to totalitarian regimes.

Critics argue that prioritising the state over the individual only undermines and corrupts the latter. Consequently, it is essential to allow room for non-state actors to organise and rationalise social movements, ensuring a balance between state authority and individual freedoms.

An Arab context

In the context of the Arab world, the late researcher Nazih Al-Ayoubi described "inflated" and dysfunctional states in his seminal work, Amplifying the Arab State, arguing that the emergence of non-state actors is seen as an existential threat to the established order.

Over recent decades, these actors have assumed new roles in Arab nations, where political forces — often spawning affiliated armed factions — operate parallel to state functions.

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Hezbollah members stand at attention during the funeral of a fighter who was killed in conflict in the mountainous area around the Lebanese town of Arsal on the eastern border with war-ravaged Syria on August 28, 2017.

They establish insular societies through which their leaders seek to dominate all facets of power, society, and the state. This dynamic is a potent catalyst for civil conflict.

The phenomenon is evident across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, and Yemen, where numerous groups have risen to prominence.

For instance, the Janjaweed in Sudan evolved into the Rapid Support Forces that has taken over much of the country, while the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq ostensibly serve two masters: the Iraqi government and Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

Increasingly, there are signs that states are entertaining the idea of establishing armed factions that exercise control over public spaces with state-sanctioned authority.

This trend is evident in the creation of private security companies in the region, which, under the guise of filling the void left by a negligent or complicit state, often expand their operations to assume the roles traditionally held by state security forces. 

Although the state and society have always been at odds, the Arab world in the 21st century seems like a particularly live experiment in which new systems, interactions, concoctions, and relationships may emerge from the test tube.

Watch this space.

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