IS women in Al-Hol keep extremist ideology alive

With male members either dead, detained or on the run, women have been able to expand their influence

IS women in Al-Hol keep extremist ideology alive

The Al-Hol camp in the Syrian eastern province of Al-Hasakah has once again come into the spotlight. On 28 December, Syrian Kurdish security forces, supported by the United States, initiated an operation targeting a senior Islamic State (IS) official named Abu Obeida in the camp, resulting in his death.

Numerous similar security operations have been launched over the years to secure and stabilise the detention facility, housing thousands of internally displaced individuals and families of suspected IS members.

Despite these efforts, the camp has continued to experience high levels of violence and the spread of extremism among its residents.

The failure of Kurdish security efforts is largely due to an overreliance on targeting male IS leaders and operatives. Unlike in 2014, when male fighters led the militant group’s seizure of territory in Iraq, Syria and beyond, now, it is the group's female supporters who are expanding their influence.

Unless this shift is understood correctly, the group’s ascendancy inside Al-Hol and its re-emergence outside is all but guaranteed.

Historically, the role of women in violent extremist groups has been domestic and focused on supporting husbands and children. Although IS has permitted women to work, including in professions like doctors, teachers, and religious police, the group strongly encouraged most women to adhere to traditional roles within the home, especially during its peak.

Things changed dramatically after the group was territorially defeated in 2019. With male members either dead, detained or on the run, women took it upon themselves to keep the group’s ideology alive.

With IS male members either killed, detained or on the run, women took it upon themselves to keep the group's ideology alive.

Breeding ground for extremism

The creation of Al-Hol, which holds over 50,000 individuals from various nations — the vast majority of whom are women and children — made their task easier.

In addition to the high concentration of like-minded people in one place, the absence of male supervision inside the camp has allowed women to take the lead and mirror IS practices. 

One of the most concerning developments in Al-Hol is the indoctrination of children by pro-IS women. About 28,000 children inside the camp are reportedly living without access to proper education.

Benefiting from this vacuum, women have established makeshift schools to inculcate young people with IS ideology.

These schools teach sharia courses and provide older children with ideological and military training. Sadly, the camp residents' home governments view these children as threats rather than victims, which explains the lack of effort to rescue them from this ideological upbringing.

Hence, analysts and officials fear that Al-Hol is being used as a "breeding ground" for the next generation of IS.  

Women have also formed hesba — a religious police unit, to uphold IS ideology and impose its norms on other women in the camp. This force has reportedly made women wear the veil and attend informal sharia courses. It also prohibits smoking, dancing, listening to music, wearing trousers, and talking to men. 

Women have even established their own Sharia court, modelled on the IS judicial system, to hold accountable those who violate the group's religious teachings. Punishments include flogging, imprisonment, torture, food deprivation, burning of tents, and murder. 

Women have also formed hesba — a religious police unit, to uphold IS ideology and impose its norms on other women in the camp. They have also established their own Sharia court, modelled on the IS judicial system.

Paradigm shift

For the time being, the impact of these women has been predominantly confined to the camp; however, technology has enabled them to seek external support.

During the group's rise, women were primarily excluded from propaganda produced by the IS central media machine. However, this paradigm has shifted.

In Al-Hol, IS women initiate their own online campaigns to promote the group's ideology and solicit donations from outside al-Hol.

This funding—  largely transferred through the informal hawala money-transfer system—  is used to cover expenses and pay smugglers to help them escape. Eventually, these revenue streams could fund activities beyond the camp's perimeter fence.

Counter-extremism challenges

Despite being aware of these practices, security forces appear incapable of halting them. That is partially due to the novelty of these female-led structures, rendering them challenging to detect.

Additionally, fear of reprisals and harsh living conditions inside the camp make residents less willing to cooperate with authorities. As a result, security measures have been largely limited to confiscating propaganda materials and dismantling the infrastructure employed by these women, including schools and Sharia centres.

These operations inside al-Hol, however, will only reap results if these women-led structures are properly identified and countered.

Simultaneously, efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate IS supporters should be implemented on a large scale, inside and outside the camp, to ensure the group's enduring defeat.

Without these actions, al-Hol – and other camps like it – will continue to play a key role in the continued existence of IS.

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