Israel’s bid to take Philadelphi Corridor comes with great risk

The Philadelphi Accord states that the Egyptian border guards are to combat terrorism and infiltration across the border, not for any military purpose.

The accord also tasked the Palestinian Authority with administering the corridor — and consequently Gaza's border with Egypt on the Palestinian side. The administration of this part of Gaza's border with Egypt moved to Hamas after it kicked out Fatah and took over Gaza in 2007.

Open to question

The corridor has become a contentious issue between Egypt and Israel as the latter implements a new phase of its military operation in Gaza, moving to control the Palestinian territory's southern border with Egypt.

On 11 December last year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a Knesset (Israeli parliament) committee that Israel would control the Philadelphi Corridor and impose a buffer zone inside the Gaza Strip.

On 13 January, he told reporters that Israel would only finish the war after closing the Strip's southern border with Egypt, describing this as a "hole".

He added: "We will demilitarise Gaza, and then afterwards, other operatives, other military hardware, other murderous equipment will enter through this hole, so it is clear we must close it."  

Israel believes that military victory in Gaza would be incomplete without control of the corridor, which it sees as an arms smuggling hub for Hamas.

Israel had earlier proposed that it station Israeli security personnel on the Egyptian side of the border with Gaza for joint patrols with Egypt.

The Egyptians refused, saying it violated their sovereignty.

Disconnecting Gaza

The Egyptian government will most likely continue to reject Israeli proposals to control the corridor on the Gaza side, especially with Israel insisting on full control of Gaza's border with Sinai.

By establishing a permanent presence in the corridor, Israel will disconnect Gaza from Egypt.

Unlinking this Palestinian territory from Egypt would constitute a major geographic change that would have big security, political and geostrategic implications for Egypt.

For many years — especially after Israel imposed an all-out blockade on Gaza — part of Egypt's political relevance and regional weight came from its connection with Gaza, with Egypt being its only functional outlet.

Since the Hamas takeover in 2007, Israel has sealed off its four crossings with Gaza as part of its comprehensive siege of the coastal enclave.

There are two other crossing points on the border between Sinai and Gaza, one for the passage of people (Rafah), the other for the passage of goods, including food and essential supplies (Karm Abu Salem).

Trust and influence

Israel's blockade on Gaza gave Egypt leverage over Hamas. This let Cairo play the role of broker, with Hamas on one hand and Israel on the other. It also allowed Egypt to mediate between Hamas and other Palestinian factions active in the occupied West Bank, such as Fatah.

The war in Gaza has brought Egyptian influence into sharp focus. Egypt is the only entry point for goods and the only exit point for people, including the thousands of foreigners trapped after war erupted.

Diplomats rushed to Cairo after the 7 October attacks to request Egyptian help to get their nationals out of Gaza to escape the inferno that Israel turned it into.

"Egypt deals with all parties in a balanced way and considers the best interests of the Palestinian people a top priority," said Mohamed al-Orabi, Egypt's former foreign minister, speaking to Al Majalla. "This is a clear Egyptian policy over the years."

Israel has reportedly informed Egypt of its plans to take control of the corridor but Cairo has rejected them, asserting its control of the area. This is rooted in the lack of trust between the two sides.

Money and men

In the past decade, Egypt has invested heavily in Sinai's security, both in terms of money and manpower.

The Egyptian military's fight with Islamic State (IS) in Sinai had both a financial and human cost. Some IS fighters slipped into Sinai from Gaza through tunnels used for smuggling.

To some extent Gaza is an Islamist stronghold, with a web of Islamist movements, some supportive of IS, including Salafis and jihadists. To them, the Egyptian army is an enemy.

Egypt's relations with Hamas are uneasy. Some in Cairo think of Hamas as an ideological offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which governed Egypt in 2012, before being ousted by the Egyptian army a year later.

Over the past decade, Egypt has destroyed dozens of smuggling tunnels between Sinai and Gaza, including by flooding them.

Likewise, Egypt and Israel have cooperated in the fight against militancy in Sinai, including intelligence sharing.

Despite Sinai being demilitarised as per the peace treaty, Israel also approved Egyptian requests to station troops and military equipment there.

Yet some Egyptian observers fear that Israel's unending atrocities in Gaza will give rise to a new wave of religious fundamentalism.

"This poses a danger to security in Sinai," said Sameh Eid, an independent Islamism specialist, speaking to Al Majalla. "This wave will give rise to terrorist attacks everywhere, including in Western states."

Everything possible

The war in Gaza drags on, seemingly without any significant Israeli military achievement. Hamas is far from weakened, let alone defeated. It continues to launch rockets at Israel, even from northern and central Gaza, areas where the Israeli army says it now controls.

The human and material cost of war is catastrophic and scandalous. It proves that Israel's fight is with Palestinian civilians, not Hamas.

Such battlefield failures may encourage the Israeli government to play a blame game with Egypt, accusing it of failing to control its border with Gaza and turning a blind eye to the flow of arms to Hamas fighters.

Israel might also choose to disregard Cairo's warnings against changing the status of the Philadelphi Corridor and impose its military presence in the area. This could mean its peace treaty with Egypt starts to fall apart, which, in turn, would give the Egyptian army reason to increase troop presence in Sinai.

The future is precarious. Decisions made in the coming weeks could affect bilateral relations for decades.