Iran’s attack on Pakistan is not all that meets the eye

Tehran also struck Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly Al-Nusra – in Syria's Idlib region, some 1,300km from where Iran launched its ballistic missiles.

Iran accuses the group of sheltering IS fighters and the Turkestan Party, which comprises Uyghur fighters who want secession from China.

Another target – the one that drew the most attention - was Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) in Pakistan, comprising Baloch fighters advocating for secession from Iran.

A month earlier, Jaish al-Adl had attacked a group of Iranian policemen in Rask, Sistan-Baluchestan province, killing 11.

Piecing it all together

These alleged adversaries are accused of perpetrating terrorist attacks in and against Iran, a claim Tehran uses to assert its right to self-defence.

Iran thinks the Mossad and HTS worked together to relocate IS Khorasan members to Pakistan to orchestrate the Kerman bombings.

That claim has been met with scepticism, particularly given the enduring hostilities between Tahrir al-Sham and IS in Syria, so something doesn't add up.

On 24 December, a ship at least partly owned by an Israeli businessman was targeted by a missile or a drone in the Arabian Sea, about 200 nautical miles from the coast of India.

Experts say this is far beyond the capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen, so point to Iran as the likely assailant, prompting speculation that Iran was now getting directly involved in regional conflicts, as opposed to using proxies.

With war in Gaza, clashes in Lebanon, missile strikes from Iraq, and drone strikes in Syria, some say that there is a broader pattern of regional engagement by Iran.

Yet to understand Iran's new stance in recent weeks and months, we need to go back to 7 October, when Hamas attacked Israel.

Hamas changed things

Initially, in the hours that followed news of the Hamas attack, Iran seemed confused, alternately disavowing it then claiming responsibility.  

Weeks later, it was reported that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, while meeting Hamas's political leader Ismail Haniyeh, refused a request to get Hezbollah to initiate a war against Israel from Lebanon, in part because Hamas did not tell Iran in advance of the operation.

Iran may be feeling isolated, especially after later distancing itself from the 7 October attack. The subsequent influx of world envoys and ministers to the capitals of its regional rivals and opponents is unlikely to have helped.

Worries about a diminished status may partly explain why some officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard claimed that 7 October was conducted under Iranian instruction, in retaliation for the assassination of Soleimani.

To the north, Hezbollah has not made much of a dent in Israel from southern Lebanon, while losing hundreds of fighters. To the east, the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have launched drones at Israel.

Tehran's stance oscillates between denying any involvement and trying to garner political leverage from the escalating tensions.

To the south, adding further complexity, are the Houthis, who are engaged in an offensive against Western ships in the Red Sea.

The West showed no interest in asking the Iranians to persuade the Houthis to stop, so the US formed a military alliance to strike Houthi positions. US involvement in Yemen means that Iran's control there is not absolute.

From the shadows

Iran's missile strike on Pakistan raises significant questions, particularly given that its rationale was retaliation for the Jaish al-Adl attack in Rask a month ago.

Pakistan hit back, targeting a site in Iran, but by Friday their foreign ministers were on a call emphasising their "brotherly relations" and agreeing to "de-escalate", so there is no notable strain in Tehran-Islamabad relations.

Baloch separatists are a mutual concern for both nations, with Pakistan's foreign ministry and army pointing out the presence of Baloch separatists in Iran.

Not all of this links directly back to Gaza. Attacks in the Indian Ocean and the Baluchistan countryside might not be connected to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but they are undoubtedly related to developments in Iran.

Several observations are pertinent here. Firstly, Iran seems to be reviewing its strategy of using regional proxies.

This is possibly to reinforce its image as a formidable power that directly asserts its interests, rather than relying on smaller groups like Abu Taqwa and Al-Nujaba.

With this more direct approach, it is now striking adversaries openly and unapologetically, which suggests a willingness to confront issues head-on.

Second, Iran seems to be experiencing considerable discomfort, identifying problems in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria.

In the former, it accused authorities of failing to honour an agreement to remove Iranian Kurdish parties from their shared border, while simultaneously alleging that Mossad has a base in Erbil.

In its statement on bombing IS sites in Syria, Iran deliberately included the Turkestan Party, which could be interpreted as an attempt to curry favour with Beijing, which has waged its own campaign against the Uyghurs.

Relations with Pakistan

The third observation concerns Pakistan, with which Iran has traditionally had friendly relations.

Despite the surprise and unprovoked nature of Iran's missile strike, many feel that Pakistan's response was notably restrained.

As a nuclear power and one of China's key allies, particularly within the 'Belt and Road' initiative, Pakistan's role in the region is substantial.

Thus, the Iranian attack on Pakistani soil appears to be a multi-layered action. Targeting the Baloch separatists may be the least significant aspect.

Iran's behaviour might be Tehran trying to navigate its way through a period of distress and confusion to regain the standing and strategic advantages it held.

In essence, this could be Iran looking to reassert itself on the global stage amidst a changing geopolitical landscape.

What next for Iran?

The Iranian nuclear programme is a critical component in Tehran's strategy, but gone are the days when the United States spent time and money trying to mediate in this area.

Joe Biden's White House is now fully occupied with Ukraine and Israel, and security clearance of Rob Malley — the administration official responsible for the Iranian file — has now been withdrawn, suggesting a further shift in focus.

With critics alleging that Biden jeopardised US national security in pursuit of a diplomatic achievement with Iran, the nuclear issue has fast fallen down his agenda. As a result, Iran has lost a significant bargaining chip.

Considering the intricate nature of Iranian strategic thought, it is plausible that Tehran might contemplate leveraging its nuclear programme in its approach towards Pakistan.

Islamabad, having developed its own nuclear arsenal to deter its nuclear-armed neighbour India, might not seem an overt adversary to Iran, but there are potential flashpoints that could strain Iran-Pakistan relations.

They could the Baloch separatist movement and Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan against Tehran's interests, not least water resources.

Underlying that is the latent sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites in both countries. Extremist Sunni armed groups and periodic bombings often target the sizeable Shiite minority in Pakistan.

While some of these scenarios may seem far-fetched or imaginative, the complex nature of global politics and warfare today renders the once-unthinkable thinkable. But in today's world, the line between the plausible and the absurd is often blurred.