War in Gaza puts future in focus, but Palestinians differ on what that looks like

State-sponsored terror

Since then, Israel has revealed its true colonial and racist nature through its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 56 years ago. For 17 years, Israel has imposed a total blockade on Gaza, with human rights groups describing it as "the world's largest open-air prison".

For 75 years, Israel has practised organised state terrorism against Palestinians, irrespective of their politics or religion. Its current onslaught on Gaza, as well as its military raids and settler attacks in the West Bank, are only the latest incarnation of this systematic terrorism.

This terror goes beyond military action. For example, Israel has cut off water, electricity, medicine, fuel and food. It also engages in domicide, which is the demolition of civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, universities, hospitals and places of worship.

The sheer scale of its campaign is huge. The human toll of its aggression is estimated at over 100,000 people, including those killed, wounded, detained, or missing under the rubble.

Israel targets Hamas primarily because it is a resistance movement rather than due to its Islamic ideology or its ties with Iran. Previously, Israel had regarded this Palestinian movement differently, labelling Fatah and other groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), as terrorist organisations.

Despite signing the Oslo Accords at the White House, the PLO is still classified as a terrorist organisation in the United States. However, a presidential waiver since 1988 allows contact with the group.

Persisting differences

A range of anomalies and contradictions within the movement make it more difficult for Palestinians to deal with the likes of Hamas internally. This can complicate how the movement changes and evolves, especially in how it deals with Israel.

That means that differences of opinion – and the contradictions they create – persist within the movement. And so, we arrive at a situation where there is a wide range of positions among Palestinian groups — from engagement with Israel to armed attacks.

This broad and complex picture is not new. It has manifested in the experiences of Palestinians in Jordan, then Lebanon, actions during the second intifada, and the management of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

It was there during talks that led to the Oslo Accords and other negotiations toward solutions, which sharply contrasts with other actions, like hijacking planes and ships to suicide bomb operations or launching missiles.

Precedents and political change

This brings us to the point where we can review past instances of fierce debate between Palestinians on what the future looks like. 

The first instance was in the mid-1970s when the Palestinian national movement shifted its focus from liberating the land to establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This shift led to political disagreements and divisions within the Palestinian community and public opinion.

The second instance was the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, which transformed the Palestinian national movement into an authority under Israeli occupation.

Read more: 30 years after Oslo, Palestinian state elusive as ever

This marginalised the PLO in favour of the PA — effectively reducing the broader Palestinian nation to only those living in the nascent entity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This change practically and institutionally excluded the Palestinian diaspora from the Palestinian political realm.

Correcting assumptions

Moving back to the present day, with this important context in mind, two incorrect assumptions may be derived from recent events.

The first is that Israel would have acted in Gaza as it did, regardless of 7 October. This claim amounts to an oversimplification seeking to justify the attacks.  

While it's true Israel might wish to be rid of the Palestinian people and their cause, it would not have been able to unleash the war on Gaza without an excuse — much in the same way that the US would not have been able to invade Afghanistan without the 9/11 terror attacks and its tanks only went into Kuwait after Iraq's invasion there.

Israel did not respond to the first intifada – or the more violent second intifada when it faced worse violence and human losses – with the same level of viciousness that it is unleashing on Gaza. Throughout its 56-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel's current military onslaught on Gaza is unprecedented in scale and intensity.

Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah made an admission after the 2006 war, which is of direct relevance here. He stated that had he anticipated Israel's intense reaction to his party's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, he would not have allowed the operation. It led to Israel inflicting substantial human and material damage on Lebanon, including the destruction of most of the southern suburbs at the time.

The second incorrect assumption is that the Palestinian people have nothing to lose. It falsely suggests that resistance can be reckless, disregarding the need to consider the costs that follow actions taken in the name of the cause. Resistance should not be indifferent to human suffering.

Gaza is now undergoing a second Nakba. The sheer scale of the human cost it is causing is staggering. So many people are facing terrible grief, from bereavement, injury and the loss of homes, livelihoods and a way of life. These losses are clear and must be recognised.

While every Palestinian yearns to defeat Israel's brutality – and the sooner, the better – internal arguments are becoming harmful. Sharp, binary divisions categorising people as believers or infidels, patriots or traitors, will not help the cause.