Can Sudan’s warring generals meet for peace?

To complicate the diplomatic narrative further, the Ministry asked to remove a paragraph from the IGAD statement, which referred to a phone call between IGAD heads and Hemedti.

They clarified that this call, between the Kenyan president and the rebel leader, occurred post-summit and should not be included in the summit's final statement as it was not part of the official proceedings.

Despite earlier denials, it was later confirmed that UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shakhbut bin Nahyan was present at the Djibouti meeting.

Talking about talking

With the US Ambassador to Sudan, John Godfrey, some IGAD leaders held a post-summit call with Hemedti.

This call — which did not include Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, or Al-Burhan — was conducted via an RSF member's phone with a translator.

The group wanted Hemedti to agree to a face-to-face meeting with Al-Burhan to advance peace negotiations.

Despite the initial objections from the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, IGAD reports suggest that the issues were later resolved, leading to an agreement between the Army commander and the Rapid Support commander to hold a direct meeting.

This was verified by Youssef Ezzat, the RSF political advisor, in his press statements, adding that the specifics of any meeting were yet to be finalised.

Interestingly, Ezzat — who has served as a roving ambassador for RSF since the war's onset — was conspicuously absent from the crucial IGAD meeting.

Sudanese media sources reported this was due to internal disagreements between him and Al-Qouni Dagalo, Hemedti's younger brother.

This power battle resulted in Ezzat being sidelined from influential decision-making within the militia.

The prospect of a meeting between the two warring generals is mixed with hope and scepticism. Similar initiatives have raised expectations in the past, only for them to be dashed.

RSF accused of war crimes

On the ground, Hemedti's RSF is pushing forward following its recent incursion into Al-Jazira State and Wad Madani. This continues a pattern of aggression, as seen in El Geneina, Khartoum, Erdemta, and other areas in Sudan.

Grave violations, including indiscriminate killings, looting, and brutal acts of sexual violence, characterise RSF actions.

This has drawn widespread condemnation, with international and local human rights organisations accusing the RSF of conducting a horrific campaign in Al-Jazira, targeting civilians in areas devoid of military presence.

While an agreement to meet is a positive sign, there is still a lot of uncertainty. History, military actions, and the conflict's changing dynamics may all influence the outcomes.

The situation remains fluid, and the international community — along with the Sudanese people — continue to watch with cautious optimism.

The RSF media network and its affiliates vigorously deny that it committed atrocities, despite the overwhelming evidence, including reports and photos, that document these horrors. Even some of the RSF's allies are starting to criticise it.

Denials as pressure builds

The mounting pressure resulted in resignations within the RSF, including that of their chief negotiator, Faris al-Nour.

Originally from Al-Jazira region's Wad Al-Haddad, which suffered grave abuses at the hands of the militia, Al-Nour announced his resignation on social media.

Yet despite stepping down, he has continued to support for the RSF and to commend Hemedti for his peace efforts despite the ongoing war Hemedti initiated. This just adds to the surreal narrative of the militia's propaganda.

Lately, it seems that the RSF has begun to shift the blame for some of the horrors it commits to "unruly individuals" within its ranks.

Despite their claims to be upholding principles of control, restraint, and civilian protection, their declarations are not mirrored by their actions on the ground.

The brutalities in Madani and Al-Jazira State were not isolated incidents. Similar (if not worse) acts were perpetrated in Khartoum, El Geneina, and other regions.

Again, the RSF downplays the Madani crimes as the actions of a few undisciplined individuals, yet these violations in fact reflect the militia's true nature.

These last-minute efforts to dissociate the RSF from their war crimes will have no effect or impact.

It's bad and could get worse

Amidst these ongoing RSF abuses, and with increasing despair over the army's inability to make any tangible military progress, a meeting between the two generals in the coming weeks would take place at a pivotal moment in the conflict.

It is a pivotal moment because the situation could easily deteriorate.

For instance, the atmosphere of tension has recently spurred calls for a popular resistance, while others have suggested that different factions within Sudan be given arms.

To be realistic, expectations for any meeting between Al-Burhan and Hemedti should be kept low. A face-to-face, if it happens, is unlikely to facilitate any significant breakthrough, either on the ground or towards a lasting political resolution.

Mediators must try to help both generals see the detrimental nature of their conflict, with neither party's actions aligning with the interests of the Sudanese people.

The lessons from past attempts at resolution (such as in Jeddah) should be learned. Setting clear priorities is essential. Protecting civilians, and ensuring their safety, must be at the forefront of any agreement.

Lessons from the past

By focusing on the relief of civilian suffering, mediators should aim for commitments from both parties on key points, including a joint call to end looting, mass killings, and sexual violence committed by their forces.

They should also urge humanitarian organisations to resume their work in war-torn areas and direct their soldiers to allow civilians unhindered access to humanitarian aid.

Agreement on creating safe areas for civilians is vital, along with safe corridors for delivering aid to besieged areas across Sudan, including Greater Khartoum, North and South Kordofan, South and West Darfur, and Gezira State. Likewise, civilians must be allowed to leave active combat areas.

Furthermore, the generals should announce the creation of camps for internally displaced persons, with a commitment to protect these camps from hostilities.

Finally, both leaders must condemn the violence and atrocities committed by their forces, disavow such acts, and issue clear instructions against them in the future.

These fundamental demands, aimed at mitigating civilian suffering in war, are sensible and feasible, and would serve as good indicators of the generals' commitment (or otherwise) to work towards peace.

Implementing these changes would significantly improve the atmosphere for progress and, more importantly, preserve human life by ensuring the basic safety, security, and essential needs of the Sudanese.

This is the critical challenge and the true test that must be met before delving into discussions about power sharing and political influence.