Israeli and American dialogues currently focus on the “Day After,” and the aftermath of the conflict in Gaza. Research and study centres are actively engaged in crafting a post-aggression roadmap. Also, there are intensive communications between the United States and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah as well as various Arab nations on this consequential subject.
The discussions were held under the title: "Who will govern Gaza after Israel eliminates all the armed factions there?"
But first, let me point out that this whole issue is unethical, for three primary reasons:
Firstly, it shifts focus away from the crimes committed by the occupying state in Gaza and the West Bank. It also detracts from the central objective that demands prioritization – bringing an end to the war and ensuring the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza.
Secondly, it prevents us from concentrating on thwarting the occupation's plan to displace Palestinians.
Thirdly, this discourse presupposes an acceptance that the occupation should persist in its atrocities and continue to jeopardize the lives of civilians indefinitely. The stated goal, as it asserts, is the elimination of all armed factions in Gaza—an objective deemed illogical and unattainable.
Allow me to expound further; the scale of brutality witnessed in the killing of civilians is unprecedented in our modern history. Hospitals, schools, places of worship, bakeries, water tanks, sewage systems, electricity and communication stations and networks, homes, and even the roads designated as safe for the evacuation of individuals to southern Gaza— all of these are being subjected to bombardment and destruction. To this day, Israel has wholly or partially obliterated over 45 percent of the infrastructure in Gaza.
Every day, Israel kills around 200 to 500 civilians in Gaza. This level of civilian casualties surpasses any previous war, including the Serbian war in Bosnia, the Russian campaign against the Chechens in Grozny, and Israel's 2006 war on Lebanon. To put it in perspective, between 1992 and 1995, Serbia killed 32,000 civilians in Bosnia. From 1994 to 2003, Russia killed approximately 150,000 to 160,000 Chechens, encompassing both civilians and combatants. Israel killed 1,191 Lebanese during its war on Lebanon, which lasted for 31 days.
The indiscriminate killing witnessed is evidently motivated by a sense of revenge and a desire for displacement – a topic I will address shortly. The retaliatory actions stem from perceived failures in intelligence and military defenses during the events of October 7. It seems that revenge, to some extent, serves as a smokescreen for Israel's own involvement in the killing of its citizens on that day, as indicated by leaked reports from internal investigations within Israel.