Why Russia has been openly critical of Israel's war on Gaza

Moscow's foreign policy illusion

Analysis of the public statements over Gaza seems to show that Russia is prepared to be a prominent advocate for Palestine – regardless of the prevailing narrative over the war there and the consequences for its relations with Israel. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to wage its war against Ukraine.

But it may be that this conclusion is over-simplistic, not least when put into a wider and longer context. 

Until a few years ago, there was an apparent and unprecedented renaissance in relations between Russia and Israel, which looked established enough to outlast the governments that brought it about.

At the time, the Russian media was full of stories about the two countries' ability to overcome any crisis – including military incidents in Syria – and that the Israeli leadership was perhaps one of the few in the world that could understand Vladimir Putin's real concern about the process of revising the outcome of World War II.

Indeed, the Russian president's 2020 address in Israel, at the opening of the Candle of Remembrance memorial to the residents and defenders of the Siege of Leningrad, was his warmest and most emotional speech abroad in recent years.

But it offered an illusory impression of the underlying state of relations.

Only a few months after Putin's visit, the Russian ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov, unexpectedly declared that Israel was more responsible for destabilising the Middle East than Iran. And he came out in support of Shiite military and political organisations loyal to Tehran — first and foremost, Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As Moscow tried to smooth over the diplomatic consequences of this position, it tried to keep a low profile for Beirut's place in Russia's scheme to circumvent international sanctions against Damascus.

Still, by the following year, that didn't prove easy.  

Election angle

A serious gap emerged between Moscow and Tel Aviv after the Israeli elections in 2021. The Kremlin's foreign policy strategists' forecast had no doubts about Netanyahu's victory. But they were mistaken. The Israeli prime minister needed to rely on the support of right-wing parties to reach a majority in parliament, which took time.

It complicated the politics within the coalition government over Israel's presence in Syria and affected coordination there with Russia, including the complex process of mutual notification of action.

And so, 2022 was already set up as a turning point, even before Israel's qualified support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Deeper strains were to follow amid the war, including high levels of emigration of Russian Jews to Israel after it began.

Then Moscow signalled bilateral relations were at risk if Israel backed arms sales to Kyiv. The threat was made even with over 150,000 Jews living in Russia and around 900,000 Israeli residents coming from Russia and the former Soviet Union.

The bluff worked.

Once Netanyahu was back in office, he resumed his customary and successful diplomatic manoeuvring between the West and Russia. But by then, many things have already changed, most notably Russia's foreign policy, which is increasingly tilting toward the Arab countries and, above all, Iran.

Hardening rhetoric and the sowing of discord

The war in Gaza has given the Kremlin powerful grounds for accusing the West of double standards amid Moscow's careful diplomatic response to the conflict.

Read more: Russia performs delicate balancing act as Israel wages war on Gaza

As more than 11,000 Palestinians have been slaughtered by Israel, with the backing of Washington and its allies, Moscow's criticism of the sanctions it has faced since the invasion of Ukraine and its claim to be defending itself from potential NATO aggression sounds more justified.

The crisis in the Middle East is an opportunity for Moscow, which believes that it is waging a war in Ukraine against the entire West, having become surrounded by a ring of enemies. This explains why President Vladimir Putin's rhetoric has changed to sound more anti-Israeli, according to observers, including political scientist Tatiana Stanovaya.

It could also lend credence to reports from Europe that Russia has been trying to sow discord among European societies over the situation in the Middle East, including via provocative graffiti in Paris.

Arab relations

Russia also has a shifting set of relations with the Arab world and other nations, as its moves to get around the West's sanctions redefine its diplomacy. In this respect, Turkey and Iran have become more important to Moscow, as has China.

This helps explain recent statements, including the one from Mikhail Bogdanov – the Russian president's special envoy for the Middle East and deputy foreign minister – that Moscow and Beijing are "coordinating efforts in connection with the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict".

While these words may say more about propaganda than the practicalities of on-the-ground politics, they greatly interest global diplomatic circles.

They also come at a time when Moscow views Beijing's position on Gaza as pro-Palestinian rather than neutral. But the dominant view in the Kremlin is that the West is collectively responsible for the bloodshed on the Strip.

Russia's internal politics

There is no doubt among experts in Russia's domestic politics and society that there has been an undeniable and sharp drop in anti-Semitism in the country under Vladimir Putin.

Nor did the rise in anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric after the February 2022 invasion come with any rise in antipathy or hostility toward Jews. That said, consideration of attitudes toward ethnic groups in Russia often lacks two essential elements.

Firstly, the mood of the political establishment, especially the intelligence services, is often not considered. Here, the Jewish community is often perceived as a "fifth column" playing along with the West among the agencies directly involved in the defense of the state.

But the Foreign Ministry stands out here, where anti-Semitism is less widespread due to daily political contacts, and there is a general understanding of the need to build a more subtle and balanced policy.

Secondly, Moscow has not yet fully realised the impact of its military campaign in Syria on the country's Muslim population, which is nearly 97% Sunni.

When Russia sided with the Alawites and Shiites in the Syrian civil war, most Russian Muslims found themselves in a difficult position, as an alternative viewpoint to the forces allied with Moscow could be perceived as support for radicalism.

But the deaths of fellow Muslims in Gaza are a serious enough matter for Russian followers of the religion to clearly express their views on what is going on in the Middle East. There is a precedent for this, in the form of deaths in Myanmar in 2017.

Room to manoeuvre

Whatever else, the Kremlin can make 180-degree turns in its position when it suits it to do so. This has happened many times in Russian politics.

As Moscow criticises the war in Gaza, it is also trying to shift blame for it from Israel to the broader collective West. As Putin put it, the West "is behind the war in the Middle East and elsewhere," and it is a more general battle "which Russia is fighting in Ukraine."

Israel's response to this shift in diplomacy has been limited, probably due to inertia. It is not ready to completely revise its attitude towards Moscow, instead making the occasional tactical outbursts.

There is also a backchannel into the Kremlin from figures within the Russian Jewish Congress. Businessmen Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are known for their closeness to Putin. Arkady Abramovich has been shuttling between Russia, Turkey and Israel for the past year-and-a-half as an unofficial Kremlin-appointed negotiator.

Whatever else, Israeli policy is likely to remain highly pragmatic and, to some extent, detached from the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Despite all the current issues on which Russia's and Israel's positions do not align, the mutual interest in maintaining constructive relations remains. Contacts with Moscow continue to be an element of Israel's strategy of diversifying foreign relations.

In this sense, the Iranian factor remains one of the most important: by maintaining constructive contacts with Russia, Israel contributes to preserving its role as a state that balances the interests of opposing actors in an unstable region.