Scale of Israel's planned ground invasion points to grand objectives

Preparations for a full-fledged move into Gaza are of a different magnitude to incursions in 2009 and 2014 ahead of unpredictable urban warfare

Scale of Israel's planned ground invasion points to grand objectives

Israel’s preparations to enter the Gaza Strip are on a different scale from previous incursions, and its intended outcome is very different. Currently, some of its troops and tanks have entered Gaza in what its military commanders have called Phase 2 of its current "war on Hamas."

Looking back, Israel's ground offensive in 2009 came eight days after the start of what was called Operation Cast Lead, which began against Gaza in late December 2008. It lasted for two weeks and was smaller in scale than what was to follow in 2014.

That was when Israeli ground forces took nine days to become part of Operation Protective Edge after it began in July 2014. It lasted 20 days, and its main objective was to eliminate tunnels in the Gaza Strip.

In both those most recent operations, the Israeli forces refrained from full incursion into the Strip. They engaged instead in sporadic urban warfare, relying on intensive gunfire and aerial support. Defending fighters from Hamas used ambush tactics and raids behind enemy lines to disrupt supply lines.

This time around, the Israeli ground operation looks much bigger. Approximately 300,000 reserve soldiers have been mobilised, a significant increase from the 40,000 deployed in 2014.

Ambitious objectives

The preparatory measures include heavy bombardment with increased firepower and daily casualties. Unlike the earlier objectives, the current goal is broader. It aims to completely dismantle Hamas's military structure, eliminate its capabilities, remove it from power, and establish a new reality in the Gaza Strip.

Destroying Hamas’ network of tunnels is now just a means toward a much more ambitious aim. The significant setback inflicted on Israel on 7 October has stoked a strong desire for revenge, up to the point of destroying Hamas.

That is the most significant difference between today's ground offensive and those waged before.

This time around, the Israeli ground operation looks much bigger. Approximately 300,000 reserve soldiers have been mobilised, a significant increase from the 40,000 deployed in 2014.

Urban warfare

It will be an exceptionally difficult goal to reach, not least because of the type of urban warfare involved. Israel's well-armed forces will face an enemy skilled in asymmetric warfare – where one side may appear weaker but possesses unique advantages – not least that defenders will fight on territory they know intimately.

Read more: Why Israel has no good options in Gaza

That means the dynamics of the battles that lie ahead are likely to shift – between both offensive and defensive strategies – on both sides.

The plan of attack is expected to be meticulously designed to secure territories from which Israeli forces can advance, allowing for more significant progress. The strategy will not be limited to targeted strikes followed by withdrawal, as seen in previous engagements in 2009 and 2014.

And so, the operation to defend Gaza is expected to begin at the points where the attackers originate, seeking to thwart their efforts before they can make deep incursions. The primary objective will be to prevent them from seizing and maintaining meaningful territorial control over territories, disrupting their advance.

The operation to defend Gaza is expected to begin at the points where the attackers originate, seeking to thwart their efforts before they can make deep incursions. 

Tested tactics

The recent ambush on 22 October – which targeted a small Israeli armoured unit during a reconnaissance mission, resulting in the loss of one soldier's life and injuries to three others – can be seen as a preliminary test of these tactics.

One element of this form of warfare remains unchanged this time, even as the Israelis scale up their attack: at the outset of the conflict, the advantage lies with the defenders. They excel at concealment, ambush tactics and strategic mine placement. They are agile and quick-moving and excel at catching attackers off guard.

This means the attacking force must outnumber the defending force by at least three to one. This explains Israel's unprecedented military mobilisation. But the crucial factor isn't just the overall number of soldiers on the offensive side. It is also the proportion of special forces with specialised training to confront non-conventional fighters.

Israeli air strikes are destroying residential and other structures in the areas where the conflict is likely to commence, notably focusing on the north and west of Gaza. They have eradicated entire neighbourhoods by levelling them to the ground. The death toll has surpassed 8,000, with the majority of the casualties being women and children.

The objective is to mitigate the risks associated with urban combat in densely populated, confined spaces. This strategy enhances their ability to manoeuvre and progress rapidly, reducing casualties among their ranks by wiping out the urban landscape in which defenders often excel at street battles.

Although this method eases the mission for the attacking forces, it does not make their task straightforward. The substantial rubble resulting from the demolished buildings poses an obstacle for the attackers, albeit to a lesser degree.

As the Israeli ground invasion presses on, the advantage lies with the defenders. Hamas militants excel at concealment, ambush tactics and strategic mine placement. They are agile and quick-moving and excel at catching attackers off guard.

Question marks

The outcomes of the current ground war are likely to be different from the last two incursions. The extent to which Israel can reach its stated goal is difficult to predict. While its firepower advantage is well-known, the defensive capabilities of Hamas are not. Neither is the extent to which the group's regional allies will help it.

Hamas' ability to withstand what looks like an unprecedented invasion remains a wildcard. The resilience of Israeli society to bear significant losses in what could be the most protracted conflict since 1967 is also in doubt.

Certainly, asymmetric warfare often makes predicting outcomes challenging. This has been observed in many recent asymmetric conflicts.

Defending forces successfully holding their ground – as seen in the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II – are relatively rare occurrences. In that battle, German forces eventually withdrew after failing to gain control of the city and incurring significant losses.

Attacking forces have more frequently achieved their objectives, but in a conflict that lasts for a long time. The battle to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State (IS) in 2016 and 2017 is a notable example.

Despite deploying around 100,000 soldiers against fewer than 2,000 IS fighters, the operation lasted over six months. The cooperation of the local population with the attacking forces played a pivotal role.

Asymmetric warfare often makes predicting outcomes challenging. While Israel's firepower advantage is well-known, the defensive capabilities of Hamas are not. Neither is the extent to which the group's regional allies will help it.

Gaza's uncertain future

There is a strong likelihood, if not a certainty, that the Israeli forces' ground campaign will bring about significant changes in the Gaza Strip.

Even if the ambitious goal isn't entirely realised and defenders manage to hold their ground in some areas, preventing a complete transformation of the region, Israel could still achieve a less dramatic change by gaining control over important areas in the north and west, establishing a strategic buffer zone.

The sheer numbers of mustering troops suggest that the results of the 2023 war are expected to be notably different from the outcomes of 2009 and 2014.

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