Should NATO consider a security arrangement with Russia?

The war was never about Ukraine. It was just a theatre for Putin to apply pressure to attain a broader goal

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The Ukraine war was a reaction to Western refusal to negotiate with Russia on what it viewed as threats to its security. NATO needs to decide if a drawn-out war is worth the effort.

Should NATO consider a security arrangement with Russia?

Wahid Abdel Maguid

last update on 16 Mar 2024

Russia was making territorial gains in the Ukraine war around the third anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s invasion on 24 February, having renewed its offensive.

Russia made significant advances on the southern front after a year-long stalemate, capturing Avdiivka, a critical stronghold previously controlled by one of Ukraine's most formidable battalions in the region.

The Russians have since been preparing for future battles in southern Donetsk, taking the small village of Pobeda, just 5 kilometres away from the main city the region is named after.

On its part, Ukrainian morale is at an all-time low. Although the army had high hopes for its autumn offensive of 2022, it fell short of its goals.

Meanwhile, accusations of corruption within the military have also had a demoralisation effect on morale in the country. Just two weeks before the war's second anniversary, Army Chief Valerii Zaluzhny was replaced by Oleksandr Syrsky.

Projected trends on the battlefield for the coming months, alongside recent developments on the ground, suggest growing challenges for Ukrainian forces. Analysts predict they will have difficulty withstanding an advancing Russian offensive.

Having said that, Russian troops are advancing at a sluggish pace and have faced stiff resistance from Ukrainian soldiers. Additionally, Russia hasn't been able to take over Donetsk and Luhansk or gain a tighter hold on Zaporizhia and Kherson.

A Ukrainian serviceman of the 3rd Assault Brigade fires a 122mm mortar towards Russian positions at the front line, near Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, Sunday, July 2, 2023.

Despite a fivefold increase in the area under Russian military control since the conflict's onset, Ukrainian forces still retain roughly two-thirds of Donetsk, half of Kherson, a quarter of Zaporizhia as well as around 5% of Luhansk.

And Russian progress in the Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine remains limited, with control primarily confined to isolated pockets in its southern reaches. This means Russia is still not in a position to partition Ukraine.

Putin in no hurry

But Putin doesn't seem to be in a hurry. He is prepared to drag out the conflict, banking on dwindling Ukrainian morale and growing impatience among Kyiv's allies in the West to fund its war effort.

Putin is also waiting to see the outcome of the US presidential election later this year. Former President Donald Trump's stated desire to end funding for the Ukraine war will certainly boost Russia's negotiating position over any resolution to the war.

It could potentially use the scattered territories it currently holds in eastern, central, and western Ukraine as bargaining chips, proposing a withdrawal from these areas in exchange for Ukraine pulling back its remaining forces in the southern regions.

In this scenario, Russia would secure control over the territories it annexed in September 2022: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson.

Even if any such talks fail to produce an agreement based on a proposed land exchange formula or any alternative, Russia would still effectively gain control over most of the territories it has seized.

Trump's stated desire to end funding for the Ukraine war will certainly boost Russia's negotiating position over any resolution to the war.

Total victory unlikely

However, even if the war ended without a formal peace agreement, Russia would still not have taken Kyiv.

Russian troops are unlikely to get as far as the Ukrainian capital even if US policy on the war was to shift. This could only happen if there were a sudden internal collapse in Ukraine.

When Putin amassed his troops on Ukraine's border, one of his main aims was to deter NATO from deploying forces and weapons in Eastern Europe.

Concerned about the impact on its own perceived security, Russia sought negotiations with both NATO and the US to reach an agreement on such controls and arrangements.

The Kremlin felt increasingly threatened by NATO expansion and the growth of US military bases in Eastern Europe.

Daniel Baxter

A revealing position

In December 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a draft of an agreement after submitting it to Brussels and Washington for negotiation.

The document was titled "Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."

It outlined the key elements of what could be perceived as Russia's strategic goal concerning its long-term security interests in Europe. It also justified the mobilisation of its forces along the Ukrainian border to exert pressure at the time.

The invasion followed after the document was rejected. The proposals had nine articles, and much of them expressed the same objective: to stop NATO expansion.

Article 4 read: "The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997."

The most important line came in Article 6, which said: "All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States."

Article 7 added: "The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia."

Russian troops are unlikely to get as far as the Ukrainian capital even if US policy on the war was to shift.

Revisiting the official Russian discourse from late 2021 and early 2022 reveals a clear emphasis on resolving the situation with NATO in accordance with Moscow's strategic objectives.

Ukraine was not the Kremlin's main concern. It was just a theatre for managing conflict and applying pressure to attain a broader goal.

NATO expansion

Putin's invasion of Ukraine can be viewed as a reaction to NATO's refusal to negotiate with Russia on matters that it saw as threatening its security interests

Whatever else, the war failed to advance Russia toward this objective. While its control over the majority of southern Ukrainian territories might constrain NATO's capacity to station missiles near its borders, since the invasion, NATO has expanded, with Finland and Sweden joining, driven by apprehension of Russian territorial expansion.

If the West continues to reject negotiations on the security arrangements proposed prior to the outbreak of the war, Russia may find itself in an increasingly tight position.

While it looks poised to claim a tactical victory in Ukraine, it is unlikely to achieve total victory, and its geopolitical strategy along its borders with Europe looks increasingly untenable.

For their part, leaders of NATO's member nations—particularly the US—must weigh the pros and cons of their refusal to engage with Russia to reach mutually acceptable security arrangements.

They will need to think long and hard about how Putin will respond if he is not satisfied with just a tactical victory in Ukraine.

For a man who aspires to be a great Russian leader like Peter the Great or Catherine II, Putin's determination cannot be discounted in Western calculations.

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