Politics

Three seismic events that shook the Arab world in 2024

From Gaza to Lebanon and Syria, this is the story of a year of tumult and surprise which has reshaped the region and echoed through global affairs. And Trump’s return means more uncertainty ahead.

Ahmad GHARABLI / AFP

Cars drive past billboards on November 6, 2024, bearing portraits of leaders of the Lebanese Hezbollah group Hasan Nasrallah (R) and of the Palestinian Hamas movement Yahya Sinwar, who were killed by Israel in 2024.

Three seismic events that shook the Arab world in 2024

Wahid Abdel Maguid

last update on 30 Dec 2024

2024 was marked by a series of unexpected and shocking 'black swan events' that not even the most astute analyst could have predicted. Hamas's shocking attack on Israel in 2023 has had a domino effect, leading to a series of seismic events in the region throughout 2024. Al Majalla reviews each one in analytic detail and shares predictions for the coming year.

October 7 aftermath

The year’s shocks were set up 85 days before 2024, which began with the surprise Hamas attack on 7 October 2023. The incursion from Gaza into Israel caught the world off guard—especially those it targeted. Throughout 2024, the repercussions have profoundly shifted regional dynamics, extending far beyond the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, and will surely be felt well into 2025.

By the end of 2024, the Gaza war will have lasted almost 15 months, longer than all the wars between the Arab world and Israel combined since 1948. Those conflicts included three major wars – 1956, 1967 and 1973 – although each involved broader participation and larger battlegrounds.

Despite the immense disparity in military power heavily favouring Israel, no one foresaw the Gaza war lasting this long. Both troop numbers and equipment heavily favoured Israel in 2024. Although asymmetric wars tend to last longer— and this time around, the irregular forces of Hamas’ military wing, the Qassam Brigades, alongside other Gaza factions, were fighting a sophisticated modern army—the current conflict looks set to outlast the year, its sheer longevity a surprise in and of itself.

The improbability of this stands out all the more due to the confined geographic scope of the conflict and Israel's crippling siege on Gaza. The ability of Gaza's armed groups in being able to continue fighting Israeli troops—despite the assassinations of many of their leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh, Marwan Issa and Mohammed Deif, the depletion of their military supplies and the overwhelming, devastating force used against them—has defied expectations.

For its part, Israel has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the world's top courts and experts. Additionally, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and its former Defence Minister Yoav Galant.

AFP — A man prepares meals to distribute to displaced people in front of a destroyed building in Gaza City on November 2, 2024.

Palestinian civilians in Gaza also surprised the world with their astounding resilience in the face of unparalleled adversity. They have endured relentless bombardment, repeated displacement and enforced starvation due to Israel's intentional restriction of aid. Even hospitals have not been spared by Israel's brutal war, and the healthcare sector faces an acute shortage of medicine and medical supplies.

It was also unexpected that Israel's long-established security and intelligence institutions, equipped with cutting-edge surveillance technology, have been unable to locate the majority of tunnels used by Hamas and other factions.

These tunnels have proved essential in their ability to help fighters launch ambushes targeting Israeli occupation forces and served as sites for the production of rudimentary weapons. They also stored weapons, provided shelter for faction leaders, and housed Israeli hostages taken during the October 7 attacks.

Gaza’s future remains largely uncertain. Ideas of what will happen when the guns fall silent, widely known as 'the day after', remain vague.

Degradation of Hezbollah

Hezbollah intensified its clashes with Israel in what the Lebanon-based militia referred to as a 'war of support and distraction' in solidarity with Gaza the day after the October 7 attacks. For the better part of 2024, the tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah were largely contained and measured.

By September, however, the border war reached a key turning point, starting with Israel's detonation of thousands of pagers and walkie-talkie devices belonging to Hezbollah operatives, which killed dozens and maimed thousands, even uninvolved bystanders and children, who happened to be nearby.

This unprecedented security breach sent shockwaves not only within Hezbollah but throughout the 'axis of resistance' who became paranoid over the major security breach, affecting the ability of Iran-backed groups to communicate with each other.

From that point on, Israel was able to capitalise on the chaos with further targeted operations. These included systematic assassinations of dozens of senior leaders, notably Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed alongside others in a devastating bombing of a building in Beirut’s southern suburbs just weeks later.

Israel also struck Hezbollah's weapons depots across multiple locations. And while the group quickly filled leadership gaps and demonstrated resilience in ground battles that began in southern Lebanon on 1 October, it undoubtedly suffered major blows and setbacks.

Its broader support network was also significantly weakened due to Israel's widespread destruction of villages and towns in southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut’s suburbs. This devastation resulted in the displacement of over 1 million people under extremely challenging conditions.

As a result, Hezbollah was compelled to accept onerous terms when a ceasefire agreement came—something it had rejected multiple times during negotiations with US envoy Amos Hochstein. They included a flexible and ambiguous implementation mechanism for the main pre-existing international agreement on peace terms there, UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

This mechanism, officially titled ‘Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and Related Commitments on Enhancing Security Arrangements and Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701,’ is arguably the most disadvantageous version for Hezbollah.

Hamas's shocking attack on Israel in 2023 has had a domino effect, leading to a series of seismic events in the region throughout 2024

The vagueness of several provisions has allowed Israel to continue its operations, including bombing and destruction, albeit at a significantly reduced scale compared to the pre-agreement period. Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the committee tasked with overseeing implementation has hindered efforts to fully address perceived Israeli violations or breaches.

The fall of al-Assad

But before observers were able to process the shock of Nasrallah's assassination and the severe degradation of Hezbollah, an even more seismic event occurred. Immediately after the ceasefire in Lebanon was announced, armed factions in Syria launched an offensive on 27 November that no one predicted—neither in its speed nor outcome.

The Syrian military and 54-year-old Assad regime's collapse in only 11 days shocked even the most astute analysts and observers. A massive force of 14 divisions—including four infantry, seven armoured, and three special forces divisions— just melted away and fled in the face of the offensive, putting up little to no resistance.

Before the shock of the rebel offensive capturing Aleppo could even be absorbed, the armed factions advanced to Hama and then pushed into Homs, collapsing the Syrian army's defensive lines one after another. The events culminated with the rebel takeover of the capital Damascus and al-Assad fleeing to Moscow.

Until then, the Assad regime, which had maintained control over about 62% of the country's territory, had seemed somewhat stable. Arab states had begun efforts to reintegrate him into the regional fold, with some urging him to take serious steps toward political reforms to resolve the crisis. And despite al-Assad's refusal to begin reform and national reconciliation, no one predicted his regime to fall—especially with the speed and ease that it did.

In hindsight, it is clear that the opposition had been receiving significant support, arms and training since 2016 in Idlib, where al-Assad had confined them. But in all this time, the regime was becoming weaker while the rebels were becoming stronger. They had developed a joint operations room to carry out meticulously planned, coordinated, and focused attacks with remarkable discipline and proved themselves to be a well-trained, cohesive and highly organised regular army.

OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP — A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama following its capture.

In the post-analysis, it was discovered just how hollow the Syrian regime had become. Over the years, the country became over-dependent on support for Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, and its backers in 2024 were severely weakened or distracted with other priorities and could not come to its aid, unlike before.

With Hezbollah significantly weakened by Israel, it was unable to assist the Syrian army. Its fighters had largely left Syria to fight in Lebanon, where Israel had invaded. And when the rebel offensive began, Hezbollah's Sheikh Naim Qassem, its de facto secretary-general, was powerless to offer any support. He was in no position to offer assurances to the Assad regime, unlike his predecessor Hassan Nasrallah, who had once declared, "If necessary, Hezbollah and I will go all the way to Syria."

The same was true for Iran. Its inability to assist Syria mirrored Hezbollah's paralysis. And reading the writing on the wall, Iraq's government also chose to distance itself from the conflict and instead focused on securing its border with Syria.

For its part, Russia's preoccupation with the war in Ukraine also meant it could not support its ally like it had in 2015 when it played a critical role in saving al-Assad's government from the uprising against it, which began in 2011. It could not stave off the rebel offensive with air strikes alone; it needed the Syrian army to fight, which did not happen this time. As Syrian government forces withdrew en masse, Moscow recognised it was a lost cause.

Look ahead

Much of what will happen in 2025 will depend on how the dominos that fell (Iran's 'axis of resistance') in 2024 will react. Will they regroup and launch a counter-offensive or opt for self-preservation and soul-searching?

The return of Donald Trump to the White House also adds an element of unpredictability to the mix. Will he deliver on his promises to pull America out of what he calls 'endless wars', or will he succumb to Israeli pressure to go over the rest of the 'Axis' and perhaps even Iran itself?

Time will tell, but for now, there is still a lot to unpack and process from one of the most consequential years in modern Arab history.

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