How much longer can Sudan’s ‘war of miscalculation’ continue?

After six months of failure and deadlock, the people of a shattered nation are returning to some profound – and familiar – questions about its leaders

As the deadlock in fighting continues with no end in sight, there is growing suspicion that Islamists are involved with the war and could complicate it further while suffering continues on the ground.
Al Majalla
As the deadlock in fighting continues with no end in sight, there is growing suspicion that Islamists are involved with the war and could complicate it further while suffering continues on the ground.

How much longer can Sudan’s ‘war of miscalculation’ continue?

The latest war to grip Sudan has brought with it more bloodshed, death, displacement and destruction.

It has also led its people back to a series of fundamental and familiar questions.

They are asking when the conflict will cease and what kind of outcome may follow from it, however it may end, with or without victory for one side. They are also wondering who started the war and why.

Finding answers has become more complex as the fighting has continued.

Both sides – Sudan’s regular army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia – claim they did not start the conflict. They also both accuse third parties of stoking the war. The RSF points to figures from a former national government, while the army blames political parties and foreign influence.

Whatever its origins, the war is in its seventh month. Despite its length, both sides insist a military resolution remains possible and imminent. These claims wilfully ignore the stark reality of deadlock on the ground.

Whatever its origins, the war in Sudan is in its seventh month. Despite its length, both sides insist a military resolution remains possible and imminent. These claims wilfully ignore the stark reality of deadlock on the ground.

They also show the miscalculations behind the start of the war. And that makes it harder for people to trust their leaders, adding to a deep sense of unease.

Overconfident generals

Before the fighting, the commanders of the army and the RSF were overconfident in their prospects against each other.

The army thought it was more powerful than the RSF, not least due to its air force and armoured units. It also viewed much of the militia group as part of the country's military apparatus, with officers and leaders integrated into it, along with training and intelligence functions.

In the early days, much of the Sudanese population had little doubt that the army would win – within weeks or even hours – under the leadership of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

But the RSF also expected a quick victory, saying it would apprehend al-Burhan and put him before a court within weeks.

This prediction was backed by the RSF's leader, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti. It was based on substantial intelligence and information from within army units, which he gleaned from his position as vice president of the Sovereign Council.

Hemedti's over-confidence also stemmed from his economic resources, extensive network of foreign relations, and a longstanding perception of the army as weak.

And on the ground, the RSF had been the backbone of battles in various regions of Sudan for an extended period when it was allied with the regular army to oust the Islamist dictator Omar al-Bashir from power.

At one public gathering, Hemedti even suggested that the government was "without an army." He had recently alluded to the army's inadequacies and called on them to enhance their military capabilities.

Hemedti questioned al-Burhan's leadership of the military. He claimed that the RSF had superior numbers, strategically positioned in sensitive areas both within and outside the capital, Khartoum.

Read more: Hemedti: From camel trader to second most powerful man in Sudan

But six months later, fighting is still going on there, and across large parts of Sudan. It has taken a heavy toll on a shattered nation.

The war in numbers

Sudan's death toll is approximately 10,000, although information about the number of combatants killed and injured is unclear. Nearly six million people are displaced.

Financial losses are staggering. They are estimated to have exceeded $60bn dollars.

Sudan's death toll is approximately 10,000, although information about the number of combatants killed and injured is unclear. Nearly six million people are displaced. Financial losses are estimated to have exceeded $60bn dollars.

The national healthcare system is in ruins. Around 70% of its facilities are no longer operating. Industrial infrastructure has borne the brunt of the conflict. Over 80% of it has been destroyed.

The education system has collapsed, leaving almost all Sudan's children outside classrooms and most trapped in impoverished living conditions. Universities and higher education institutions have ceased operations entirely.

The conflict zone expands with each passing day. It brings with it an atmosphere of social insecurity. Disorder is rampant. There has been a surge in the rape of girls and women, with more than 170 cases already reported and indications that it is getting worse in some regional and ethnic territories.  

The extent of the harm inflicted on the country, mainly upon civilians, is as clear as it is stark. It is much harder to define the territories the RSF and the army control.

Reuters

Early signs of failure

The failure of the warring factions on the ground became clear early in the conflict.

The RSF was unable to substantiate its claim of fighting for democracy and civilian governance against remnants of the al-Bashir regime. Its narrative fell apart amid a range of accusations against its soldiers – from racially motivated killings of civilians to the seizure of civilian properties – as well as rape, looting, and pillaging.

These accusations were not baseless. They were made by influential international organisations.

The regular army also faces accusations. They include negligence in protecting civilians and failing to provide adequate protection from the RSF as it defended only its own bases. Whatever else, its failure to end the conflict over six months has worsened the plight of the Sudanese people.

Blame for the lack of governance in the country has been laid at the door of the army, even in regions unaffected by the conflict. Employees have endured months without receiving salaries, and numerous states are struggling with diseases and epidemics, notably in Khartoum, where there is a cholera outbreak.

As a result, the Sudanese people do not trust either side. There is a lack of faith in both warring parties over their ability to shape the country's future.

The Sudanese people do not trust either side (the army or the RSF). There is a lack of faith in both warring parties over their ability to shape the country's future.

There is also growing speculation over what may happen next. Some of it centres on the prospect of the stalemate encouraging talks between the two sides, or the prospects of internal splits within the RSF and the regular army.

Any such further fictionalisation could have serious consequences in Sudan and beyond. It could go as far as mutiny within the army, or a loss of control at the RSF over some of their units dispersed extensively throughout Sudan's volatile terrain.

Getty Images
April 16, 2023: Sudanese army soldiers, loyal to army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, posing for a picture at the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) base in the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Return of the Islamists

The story that a "third party" of Islamists linked to the former al-Bashir regime played a role in starting the war – and keeping it going –  to eradicate the RSF has gained credibility as the fighting has continued.

Many officials from the old regimes have been released from captivity during the war. They have been active in various parts of the country encouraging young people to join the regular army, talking of jihad and a religious justification for the fighting, which they refer to as the "Dignity Battle."  

They have announced the formation of jihadist groups known as the "Al-Bara'a ibn Malik Battalions."

Despite receiving military support from jihadist factions and media backing from leaders of the old regime, the army has failed to bring an end to the conflict.

It deepened suspicions that Islamist factions were involved in the start of the conflict, adding to the complexity of the political landscape in a war-torn country.

As the stalemate persists, many analysts anticipate a potential confrontation between the Islamists and the army. Media sources aligned with the Islamists have started to question the competence of military leaders, accusing them of betrayal and collusion with the RSF.

That prospect points to potential complications ahead in a war that still looks intractable after so long, with such a heavy price paid by the long-suffering Sudanese people.

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