Dealing with allies can sometimes be harder than dealing with foes

Iran's support when Syrian anti-government protests erupted in 2011 — providing military, political, security, and financial support — proved to be crucial in propping up the regime in the face of widespread domestic opposition.

However, amid normalisation efforts with Arab countries, Iran is sending a message to al-Assad to not cross the line and sell Tehran down the river in the process. It is also wary of Damascus aligning too closely with Moscow and wants to ensure that the Syrian government give it sovereign concessions as compensation for the "sacrifices" it has made.

Reading between the lines

Iran, whose president, Ibrahim Raisi, paid a visit to Damascus, understands the subtext of Arab initiatives aimed at engaging with Syria.

Just as Syria holds strategic importance to Iran, Iran remains a crucial pillar of strength for the Syrian regime (the same of which can be said about Russian support for al-Assad). Both countries are strategically indispensable to one another, forming an alliance based on mutual interest.

What does Iran hope to achieve by stopping oil shipments?

Clearly, Tehran was displeased with Damascus' decision to appoint an Arab company to manage and invest in Damascus Airport and the port of Latakia.

These two locations were crucial gateways for transporting weapons and ammunition to Iran's proxies and organisations in Syria and Lebanon. The concern is that these projects could serve as an "Arab alternative" to Iranian influence.

In practice, Iran seeks several outcomes.

It demands the resumption of oil shipments to the warm waters of the Mediterranean and the establishment of agreements and memorandums of understanding.

These arrangements would involve long-term sovereign concessions, including granting Iranians equal rights as Syrians in terms of ownership, education and healthcare.

Additionally, Iran aims to secure a "small port" along the Mediterranean's Syrian coast and engage in strategic projects related to oil, gas, agriculture, industry, and military cooperation, which would place the Syrian army within the realm of Iranian influence.

History repeats itself

Indeed, history tends to repeat itself in various ways.

Classified documents that I have had access to reveal an interesting incident that occurred during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. Iranian officials, finding themselves engaged in a confrontation with Iraq, requested that Syrian President Hafez al-Assad provide them with missiles as support.

Unable to bear the burden of directly supplying "Soviet" missiles to Tehran al-Assad proposed that this be done through President Muammar Gaddafi, which required the approval of the exporting country, i.e., the Soviet Union.

In order to exert pressure on Damascus to deliver missiles from Libya or former Czechoslovakia, Iran halted oil shipments to Syria, which had not yet discovered or exploited its oil reserves at that time.

A classified document from the meeting between the Syrian ambassador in Tehran and Mohsen Rafighdoust, the Minister of the Revolutionary Guard, sheds light on this episode on 19 October 1985.

During the meeting, the minister expressed his discontent, saying, "Mr. President (Hafez al-Assad) and Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam (Vice President) promised Hojjat al-Islam (Ali Akbar Hashemi) Rafsanjani to provide aid to the Revolutionary Guards." 

"However, your officials did not fulfil their promises. If Syria and Libya had implemented what we agreed upon, there would have been no issue with exporting oil, and there would have been no difficulties whatsoever."

He continued: "The war (with Iraq) has reached a decisive stage. What is the use of missiles if they remain stored in warehouses? We reached an agreement with Czechoslovakia to purchase 100 surface-to-surface missiles through Syria."

"Did President Hafez al-Assad discuss this crucial matter with Czech officials? Why haven't our Syrian brothers informed us of the progress on this issue?"

The Syrian ambassador responded, assuring the Iranian Minister, "What the President promises shall be fulfilled... We learned that you requested weapons from Bulgaria and that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia sent a request to Moscow for approval."

Rafighdoust commented: "You can exert pressure on the Soviet Union because it needs you, and it would not abandon a 20-year-old relationship... unless there are officials among you who are unwilling to assist us and are slow in implementing the President's decisions. We are fully aware of the situation in Syria."

The Iranian minister concluded, saying, "If you provide the Guards with what we have requested, I can address the issue of oil shipments."

One sure thing is that navigating negotiations with allies can be just as difficult as navigating negotiations with foes. It involves numerous compromises and careful calculations and review of circumstances, specific needs, geopolitical considerations, and a shared understanding of mutual importance.

Disregard the statistics and flowery language. This is the essence of what is discussed behind closed doors among allies in Syria, Ukraine, and numerous other contexts.