IS extortion operations in full swing in Syria's northeast

The group generates several million dollars annually through this method, which is enough to sustain the group's operation costs and even rebuild

IS extortion operations in full swing in Syria's northeast

Farmers in north-east Syria find themselves trapped once again in a web of alarming threats, where the choices are limited to making payments or facing dire consequences. What distinguishes these incidents from typical cases of extortion is that the responsible party has openly identified itself.

Several farmers have shared their harrowing experiences, clutching threatening notes branded with the emblem of the Islamic State (IS) and demanding zakat payments.

Compelled by IS's established track record of exacting retribution to emphasise their seriousness, and faced with the local authorities' inability to offer sufficient protection against the group, farmers have little choice but to comply with the demands.

Despite IS's territorial defeat in Syria over three years ago, the group continues to employ the spectre of violence to operate expansive protection rackets in the governorates of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.

Insights gained from conversations with victims unveil IS's reliance on an intimate knowledge of local communities to identify targets and calculate tribute amounts.

The group casts its watchful eye not only on farmers but also professionals such as doctors, pharmacists, and prosperous business owners, including prominent shopkeepers, shepherds, traders, and investors.

Compelled by IS's established track record of exacting retribution to emphasise their seriousness, and faced with the local authorities' inability to offer sufficient protection against the group, farmers have little choice but to comply with IS's extortion demands.

Extensive intelligence network

To track targets and assess their wealth, IS employs a sophisticated human intelligence network. Wheat farmers, for instance, have recounted their ordeals, describing how IS spies meticulously monitor sales locations, documenting quantities sold and identifying recipients.

Once targets are selected and their dues are determined, IS employs various methods to communicate their demands. Victims attest that the group predominantly relies on encrypted messaging applications like WhatsApp, affording IS affiliates anonymity through end-to-end encryption.

In addition, IS delivers ominous written notices bearing the group's emblem to the doorsteps of their targets—a tactic intended to evoke deep-seated fear.

Regardless of the coercive means employed, ransom demands consistently bear the target's name, stipulate the required sum in US dollars, and outline the designated drop-off location for the payment. These messages ominously warn against delay, stressing the urgency of discreetly delivering the funds to evade punishment.

IS delivers ominous written notices bearing the group's emblem to the doorsteps of their targets—a tactic intended to evoke deep-seated fear.

The scale and frequency of these coerced payments vary, creating a distressing predicament for those affected. While farmers are expected to pay once a year, typically during or after the harvest season, other business owners find themselves subject to more frequent demands.

Take, for example, investors overseeing oilfields in eastern Deir Ezzor, who reportedly have to shell out over $5,000 per well every month — a staggering 10-20% of the well's monthly profits.

IS members reportedly arrange in-person meetings with their targets, albeit while concealing their identities behind masks. Cash exchanges do not always take place in remote areas, suggesting that IS feels relatively unthreatened by local authorities.

Receipts lend a veneer of formality

Astonishingly, the group even provides receipts to those they prey upon, not only lending a veneer of formality to the transaction but also serving as proof of payment if other IS members attempt to collect further funds.

Noncompliance with IS's extortion demands has dire consequences. The group has resorted to attacking businesses, carrying out kidnappings, and executing targeted killings as punishment.

For instance, several oil wells were reportedly destroyed by IS last year after those responsible refused to pay up. The group's ability to follow through on its threats has instilled a sense of apprehension among the individuals I interviewed, dissuading them from ignoring the payment demands.

The group's ability to follow through on its threats has instilled a sense of apprehension among the individuals I interviewed, dissuading them from ignoring the payment demands.

Revenues sufficient to rebuild IS networks

Estimating the precise amount IS garners from these illicit extortions is challenging, but media reports suggest the group generates several million dollars annually through this method.

While this figure pales compared to the $80 million per month IS once amassed in 2015, it is still ample to ensure the group's survival. The current cash flow of IS is more than sufficient to fund its hit-and-run operations and rebuild its networks.

The prevalence of fear regarding potential reprisals from authorities in northeast Syria has allowed these extortion activities to largely evade detection, making countermeasures all the more challenging.

Consequently, alongside bolstering security measures, local authorities must strive to gain the trust of their communities to secure their cooperation in combating this pay-for-protection scheme.

With scarce resources and a chorus of grievances the local population voices against the de-facto rulers of north-east Syria, the task becomes an arduous endeavour. However, unless the capacity of IS to finance its deadly operations is disrupted, the spectre of its endurance is all but certain.

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