Putin gets a bitter taste of rebellion

It is extraordinary for Putin to vacate his palace and address the Russian people, not to boast about Russia's latest military and space advancements, territorial annexations, counter-terrorism efforts, or prevention of civil wars abroad, but to acknowledge an armed rebellion within the country, vowing to hold the rebels accountable and prevent a domestic conflict from erupting.

Moreover, it is remarkable that the apprehensive Putin chose to pardon this traitor, permitting him to leave Russia unscathed, embarking on a journey to Belarus in his own vehicle. Instead of meeting his demise, he found refuge in exile.

However, this is not the entire narrative. It possesses various dimensions, displaying striking parallels between the events unfolding in Russia and those witnessed in other regions, countries, and enclaves revolving around Russia's sphere of influence. These similarities are worth exploring.

Sudan

The language used by Prigozhin during the announcement of his rebellion bears a resemblance to the statements made by his Sudanese ally, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), when he rebelled against the head of the Sovereign Council and army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in April last year.

Hemedti, who was educated, trained, and financed by the military, drew inspiration from the Wagner Group.

Like Hemedti, Prigozhin declared that he had embarked on a "just" March towards the capital and vowed not to cease until the army commander was either hanged or executed.

Similarly, Prigozhin was nurtured, trained, and funded by the Russian military.  As their influence and roles in various achievements grew, they set their sights on assuming leadership positions within the army and seizing power.

Read more: Hemedti: From camel trader to second most powerful man in Sudan

However, a fundamental difference thus far is that Prigozhin initially directed his anger towards army commanders, not Putin. Another distinction is that the Russian rebellion came to an end through the mediation of the Belarusian president, a mutual friend and intermediary between the conflicting parties – the teacher and the chef.

On the other hand, the two Sudanese generals are still engaged in battle on the streets of Khartoum and other Sudanese cities.

Syria

Late President Hafez al-Assad relied on his brother Rifaat and the Defence Brigades (DB) in his fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and in maintaining control over his opponents both internally and regionally.

As Rifaat and his DB gained strength, he seized the opportunity of his brother's illness in the early 1980s to tighten his grip on the capital. At that time, the decisive factor was the alignment of the army and its leaders with al-Assad, as well as the mediation of Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, between the two brothers.

Al-Assad himself took to the streets to confront his brother Rifaat and suppress his rebellion. Subsequently, Rifaat was sidelined through promotion: he was appointed vice president and, eventually, sent into exile in Russia.

The fate of the rebel Rifaat in the Syrian scenario differs from that of Hussein Kamel, the defector and son-in-law of President Saddam Hussein. Kamel defected from his father-in-law and sought refuge in Jordan in the mid-1990s, only to return with guarantees of safety from the president and his family. However, his clan sought revenge and executed him in a hail of bullets.

Putin himself attempted to replicate a similar Syrian experience following direct military intervention in Syria at the end of 2015.

Prigozhin, supported by his superior, Putin, relied on a Syrian military commander named Brigadier General Suhail al-Hassan, known as "The Tiger." He played a significant role in the Syrian war, with his forces bearing his nickname, the Tiger Forces.

Putin insisted on having him present during the bilateral meeting with President Bashar al-Assad at the Russian Khmeimim base.

Al-Assad astutely recognised the risks associated with relying on Putin and the path he was embarking on. Consequently, he opted to change the name of the Tiger Forces to Division 25 and integrated them into the Syrian army. Brigadier General Suhail al-Hassan repeatedly emphasised his loyalty to al-Assad.

Turkey

There exists a slight similarity between these two cases. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan initially relied on the movement led by Fethullah Gulen to expand his influence within Turkey and its institutions.

However, a significant turning point occurred in 2016 with the occurrence of a coup attempt. Speculation arose regarding whether the attempt was genuine or orchestrated. Erdogan underwent substantial changes following this event, and Turkey itself underwent significant transformations.

During this critical moment, Putin was among the few leaders who stood by Erdogan, offering his support and calling him. Some even suggest that Putin was the first to warn his friend Erdogan about the coup attempt.

Hence, it is unsurprising that Erdogan was among the few leaders who contacted Putin during the critical moments faced by the Czar on Saturday.

The list of comparisons and overlaps is extensive and includes Libya, the stance of army commander Khalifa Haftar in the eastern part of the country, as well as various African and non-African nations.

Throughout that eventful Russian day, analysts speculated about numerous scenarios, ranging from the armed rebellion escalating into a civil war to military and political forces mobilising against Putin, or Putin successfully eliminating the insurgency and suppressing treason.

Eventually, a settlement was reached: Prigozhin would end his rebellion in exchange for a safe exit to Belarus. At the same time, members of the Wagner Group would return to the battles in Ukraine under an amnesty arrangement. Those fighting in Ukraine and other parts of the world would be integrated into the Russian army.

Monitoring the repercussions

Russia's allies and adversaries in these countries are closely observing the outcome of this critical chapter in Russian history, marked by internal tensions and challenges faced by the army and Wagner mercenaries.

Many questions arise in this context: Are Wagner's mercenaries loyal to Putin or to their chef? How will this development impact the morale of the mercenaries and the Russian army on the front lines in Ukraine?

In Syria, the Defence Brigades were disbanded and symbolically incorporated into the army, while Rifaat was stripped of power and sent into exile. Can the Syrian experience be replicated? How will the practical dismantling of the Wagner Group occur within areas of Russian influence worldwide?

How will its members be integrated into the regular Russian army? What political, diplomatic, and military costs will official Moscow bear as it absorbs its secret army into the conventional forces? Furthermore, how will this development affect internal power dynamics within the Kremlin and the balance of power in Russia?

Rebellion followed by compromise, amnesty, and integration represents a new chapter in Russia's trajectory. Its conclusion has yet to be written, but it will undoubtedly leave a lasting impact on Russian influence across various volatile arenas in the Arab world, including Syria, Sudan, and Libya.