Normalisation with Syria and the emergence of a new Arab security framework

Will Arab states succeed in establishing a regionally-organised security framework in the post-American peace phase?

AFP

A US armoured vehicle on the outskirts of the town of Rmeilan in the northeastern Syrian province of Hasakah, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

Normalisation with Syria and the emergence of a new Arab security framework

Khaled Hamadeh

last update on 18 May 2023

The decision of the Arab foreign ministers to readmit Syria to the Arab League on 7 May 2023 marked a turning point in the standoff between Damascus and much of the Arab world.

The last time an Arab country was booted from the Arab League was in 1979, when the Arab summit that took place in Baghdad between 27-31 March took the decision to sever political and diplomatic relations with Egypt following its formal peace treaty with Israel.

#OTD in 1979, a White House ceremony marked the signing of an Egypt-Israel peace treaty brokered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The framework deal, known as the Camp David Accords and arranged in September 1978, endures today. pic.twitter.com/TO31DoWDgq
— The Carter Center (@CarterCenter) March 26, 2020

The headquarters of the league was subsequently relocated from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt later resumed its membership 10 years later on 26 May 1989.

However, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 did not produce a unanimous position from Arab League states.

The Arab Summit held on 2 August 1990 saw a divide among states, with Jordan and Yemen declaring support for Iraq, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco backed Kuwait.

On their part, Algeria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Mauritania, Sudan, and Libya were more muted in their position, expressing ‘concern’ over the invasion.

The decision of the Arab foreign ministers to readmit Syria to the Arab League comes after a flurry of meetings and measures that involved Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia.

A handout photo made available by Syrian news agency SANA shows President Bashar al-Assad (R) meets the Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan (L), in Damascus, Syria, 18 April 2023.

Experimental approach

This time, the Arab League adopted a flexible experimental approach, offering President Bashar al-Assad the option of normalisation instead of sanctions in an attempt to change his regional behaviour.

The Arab League has adopted a flexible experimental approach, offering President Bashar al-Assad the option of normalisation instead of sanctions in an attempt to change his regional behaviour.

This policy aligns with the "step-by-step" approach announced in the concluding statement of the exceptional consultative meeting in Amman on 1 May 2023, attended by the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

The foreign ministers of Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria at the Amman meeting on May 1 2023.

Although it's too early to prejudge the normalisation experiment, the steps taken are not purely symbolic.

Although there have been reservations over normalisation with al-Assad, the fact is that the regime is not going anywhere. All attempts at changing the regime have failed.

Therefore, Arab states have come to the conclusion that engagement is the best way forward in order to mitigate ongoing repercussions on the region.

In this regard, al-Assad's return to the Arab fold offers a framework for conflict management, potentially paving the way for a new regional security structure.

Bridging regional divisions — whether between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and its Gulf Cooperation Council counterparts, Turkey and Egypt, Israel and Lebanon over a maritime border dispute, Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, alongside normalisation with Syria — is crucial to deescalate long-standing conflicts in the region.

There are already positive repercussions being felt in Yemen, where Saudi-Iranian rapprochement has facilitated the longest ceasefire in an ongoing civil war that has last over 15 years.

Read more: The Yemen test

It appears that regional actors are adopting a more pragmatic approach, moving away from deep-rooted geopolitical and sectarian divisions that have persisted for decades.

However, this does not mean there will be a warming of relations between Arab states and Iran, or between Arab states themselves.

It also doesn't mean there will be less tension between al-Assad and the states that sought to overthrow him in recent years.

However, this does not mean there will be a warming of relations between Arab states and Iran, or between Arab states themselves. It also doesn't mean there will be less tension between al-Assad and the states that sought to overthrow him in recent years.

In fact, even before the ink dried on the Arab League decision to readmit Syria, the Jordanian air force conducted air strikes on a drug factory in southern Syria.

It is clear that no regional security framework can eradicate the historical enmity between Arabs and Israel and may even expose weaknesses and fragilities within the Israeli structure.

Evolving security structure

The significance of this emerging security structure lies in how regional actors respond to broader geopolitical shifts — particularly the declining role of the United States in the Middle East and the possibile beginnings of a multipolar international system.

These shifts have placed additional regional security burdens on Arab states, compelling them to readjust their priorities in managing regional threats and seek alternatives beyond the United States, including working with China to address regional disputes.

While the new framework cannot eliminate regional divisions entirely, it could help prevent existing hostilities from escalating into all-out conflict.

While the new framework cannot eliminate regional divisions entirely, it could help prevent existing hostilities from escalating into all-out conflict.

The evolving security landscape in the Middle East raises important questions about the role and position of the United States within a regional system that challenges long-standing foundations of US policy.

For decades, US policy has relied on the assumption of an Iranian threat to regional stability, whether directed towards Israel or Western-aligned Arab regimes.

The Abraham Accords, which facilitated normalisation between certain Arab countries and Israel, were built upon the premise of aligning interests against the Iranian threat while addressing the need for a Palestinian state.

However, with the concurrent Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the normalisation with al-Assad's regime, efforts to overcome the Lebanese presidency impasse, and the broader momentum in regional diplomacy, the compatibility between the underlying assumptions of US policy and the emerging regional trends is increasingly eroding.

The impact of this transformation is already apparent.

The United States initially viewed Arab engagement with the al-Assad regime as an opportunity to undermine Iran's influence in Syria, with Arab regimes often justifying their communication with Damascus on this basis.

However, the objective seems to have evolved.

Arab states now appear to accept Iran's role as a regional player, while pushing Tehran to respect state sovereignty, end its support for militias, and combat drug trafficking.

The recent visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Syria shortly before Syria's readmission to the Arab League exemplifies these changing dynamics.

Raisi flies to Syria for first Iranian presidential visit since start of civil war https://t.co/S1XFw1brFU
— The Guardian (@guardian) May 3, 2023

The rapid shifts in regional diplomacy have put the Biden administration on the defensive, with CIA Director William Burns visiting Riyadh to express dissatisfaction with being kept at a distance and to address concerns about China's mediation in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.

Meanwhile, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has claimed that the United States played a leading role in facilitating recent developments, without explicitly addressing the stalled efforts to hold the al-Assad regime accountable for war crimes and human rights abuses.

What next?

Regional stakeholders will be closely watching how the situation unfolds and how regional dynamics evolve. Having said this, economic sanctions on Syria will certainly stay in place and will be ramped up if need be.

As for Iran, Arab states are hoping it will become a more responsible regional player, but caution will be exercised as deep-rooted mistrust remains and will be hard to overcome despite the recent détente with Saudi Arabia.

As for Iran, Arab states are hoping it will become a more responsible regional player, but caution will be exercised as deep-rooted mistrust remains and will be hard to overcome despite the recent détente with Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, the US will continue to influence regional dynamics through its military presence in the region, primarily under the banners of counter-terrorism and addressing Iran's nuclear programme.

AFP — A US armoured vehicle on the outskirts of the town of Rmeilan in the northeastern Syrian province of Hasakah, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

The question arises as to whether American pragmatism and realism will contribute to transforming the normalisation with Syria from a mere conflict management system into the establishment of a new regional security framework.

Will the Biden administration be convinced to engage more actively and dependably in the emerging regional order, moving away from challenging and provoking Arab states?

It remains to be seen whether Arab states are able to independently form a regional security framework in the post-American peace era, known as Pax Americana.

This would mark a departure from the period of relative peace in the West that coincided with the military and economic dominance of the United States.

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