Will the Saudi-Iran deal reshuffle the regional security deck?

Iran’s radicals, China’s unwillingness to play a more significant security role in the region and Israel’s fear over Iran’s nuclear programme are three factors that limit optimism over the deal

AFP

A man in Tehran holds a local newspaper reporting on its front page the China-brokered deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore ties, signed in Beijing the previous day, on March, 11 2023.

Will the Saudi-Iran deal reshuffle the regional security deck?

Bilal Saab

last update on 21 Mar 2023

There is a lot to unpack regarding the recent China-mediated agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore diplomatic ties and its likely impact on the future security landscape of the Middle East.

There are three factors that will most likely limit any security gains.

First: The Iranian regime’s radicalism and penchant for expansionism.

Second: China’s unwillingness and inability to play a more significant security role in the region.

Third: Israel’s profound apprehensions about Tehran’s nuclear programme.

This article aims to address these limitations.

Iran is nothing if not pragmatic. But history — since 1979 when the ‘Islamic Republic’ was born — has shown that it is also deeply conservative when it comes to its worldview and consistent with how it has pursued it.

Those in Tehran driving Iranian foreign policy are not the diplomats, some of whom were involved in negotiating the accord with their Saudi counterparts. Rather, it’s the ‘Supreme Leader’ and, increasingly in recent years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

These actors believe that Iran’s destiny is fulfilled only by spreading its ideals across the Arab-Muslim world. Notice that we have yet to hear from IRGC senior personnel on the agreement with Saudi Arabia, which suggests that they’re not bound by its terms.

Iran will likely renege on deal

Had Iran not been diplomatically isolated with its economy in dire straits, it wouldn’t have entertained any rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, that’s the pragmatic side of Iranian foreign policy. But the moment it reaps the benefits of this deal, Tehran will reveal its true character again and show little restraint in its regional approach.

Iraq remains in Iran’s sights, and the plan has always been to control Iraqi politics and resources through violence, intimidation, and divide-and-rule tactics.

Beijing deserves credit for portraying itself as a power broker in a region that has traditionally been under US influence. But even the most amateur observer of international relations knows that diplomacy with no teeth can be very short-lived.

The main reason why the United States was able to facilitate historic Arab-Israeli peace agreements, first between Egypt and Israel, and then between Jordan and Israel, was because it provided security guarantees to the negotiating parties.

AFP — Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore ties and to reopen respective diplomatic missions after talks in China, state media in both countries reported on March 10, 2023, seven years after relations were severed.

China has no interest in providing such guarantees because its main sphere of influence is Asia. The Middle East is too far from home, and the risk of overstretch is all too real for the Chinese.

Beijing prefers to continue to free-ride on American security and prioritise its economic interests in the region.

China has no interest in providing security guarantees because its main sphere of influence is Asia. Beijing prefers to continue to free-ride on American security and prioritise its economic interests in the region.

So, when Iran reneges on its promises (it's a matter of when, not if) and threatens security again, China will be in no position to play any meaningful policing or deterring role.

Can China expand its military presence in the Middle East? It can, to some extent. But does it want to, and can it replace the United States as a security guarantor?

Absolutely not.

For all the proclamations of the end of US influence in the Middle East, Washington is not about to surrender its powerful and unmatched military position in the region, mainly for broader geopolitical reasons.

An unaddressed ticking time bomb

While a reduction of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be beneficial for the region, nothing could revamp regional security like a resolution of the challenge of Iran's nuclear programme. In this area, there are no signs of progress.

AFP — This handout satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies and taken on June 27, 2020 shows an overview of Iran's Arak Heavy Water Reactor Facility, south of the capital Tehran.

Israel remains laser-focused on this issue and will do everything it can to stop Tehran from getting the bomb, even if it leads to regional war. For the Israelis, the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear state is an existential issue.

The Saudi-Iranian understanding does not include Tehran's nuclear programme, which leaves a major ticking time bomb unaddressed.

Israel was hoping to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia, after it had done so with the UAE and Bahrain, in an attempt to further isolate and build a regional defence architecture against Iran. But it's less clear now whether Riyadh will risk its entente with Tehran by teaming up with the latter's historical enemy.

Maybe that's a good thing, because perceptions of the Iran threat in Israel and Saudi Arabia are vastly different. Riyadh certainly worries about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons but doesn't see it as a mortal danger. Israel, on the other hand, is willing to use military force to avert such a scenario.

Riyadh certainly worries about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons but doesn't see it as a mortal danger. Israel, on the other hand, is willing to use military force to avert such a scenario.

Expanding the Abraham Accords is still an option or an insurance policy but only if Iran goes back to its old ways and bullies its neighbours again, which I believe it will.

Drastic imbalance

Saudi Arabia's motivations behind the deal with Iran are largely security-based. Iran's are economic. There's a disconnect in this exchange, for sure.

The Iranians are the aggressor and don't feel threatened by their neighbours. This drastic imbalance makes for a weak foundation for a productive security dialogue.

Perhaps with some luck and effective communication between Tehran and Riyadh, this new deal might temporarily bring down the bilateral temperature, but not the regional one. Almost four-and-a-half decades of rule in Tehran have shown that Iran, while pragmatic in its methods, remains committed to regional domination and expansion.

China is incapable of changing Tehran's ways. And Israel is inching closer to bombing Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

The Saudi-Iranian deal is potentially good news for a region looking for any kind of optimism, but whether this deal will resolve the most fundamental problems that have plagued regional security for decades remains uncertain.

-Bilal Y Saab is a senior fellow and the director of the Defence and Security Programme at the Middle East Institute.

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