Managing US competition with China in the Middle East

To effectively navigate Beijing’s encroachment into the Middle East, Washington needs policy clarity and shrewd management of its relations with its regional partners

This handout picture released by the Saudi Press Agency shows Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan (C-R) walking alongside Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang (C-L) in Beijing on April 6, 2023.
AFP
This handout picture released by the Saudi Press Agency shows Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan (C-R) walking alongside Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang (C-L) in Beijing on April 6, 2023.

Managing US competition with China in the Middle East

US retrenchment in the Middle East was inevitable given America’s new global priorities, which centre on the Indo-Pacific and Europe. But this historic transition has brought with it strategic uncertainty and confusion, not just for Washington but also for US regional partners.

To effectively navigate this new contested environment in the Middle East, and more specifically, to address the issue of China’s encroachment into that vital part of the world, Washington needs policy clarity and shrewd management of its relations with its regional partners.

The old US Middle East policy playbook — which asked Arab partners for their undivided loyalty, and which assumed collective enmity toward Iran — does not work anymore, for good and for ill.

Economic interests compel several regional powers to increase their trade and do more business with China, while Gulf Arab partners’ new diplomatic approach to security has sought to pacify and normalise ties with Iran.

Read more: China-Arab Summit signals potential of new era

So, what is needed is a new set of US rules of the game — especially as they pertain to competition with China. And these rules must be carefully formulated and effectively communicated, both internally and externally.

Receding leverage

There was a time when Washington was able to impose, or at least sternly communicate, its preferences to its Arab partners. But that time is gone. Washington does not have the leverage it once had in the region.

It is also less trusted by its Arab partners, who have interpreted the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and tolerance of Iranian aggression in the region to mean that it is headed for the exit.

Read more: US hesitance to retaliate against attacks emboldens Iran

Despite its unmatched regional military presence, whatever concerns and dispositions Washington has about the Arab partners’ ties with China, it must approach them with realism and humility, but also with transparency.

US officials very well understand that asking regional partners to downgrade their economic relations with China is a nonstarter (for example, China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner).

Reuters
An aerial view shows containers and cargo vessels at the Qingdao port in Shandong province, China May 9, 2022.

They also recognise that encouraging these partners to limit their political relations with Beijing is not an option either. These partners are likely to increase their cooperation under the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

Incentivisation challenge

The one major area where Washington has enough room to shape the policy agenda with its Arab partners moving forward is defence and security.

The challenge for Washington – and it is a big one – will be to incentivise Arab partners to eschew military cooperation with China while not promising them things it cannot deliver, including, most notably, a formal defence pact or official security guarantees.

The challenge for Washington will be to incentivise Arab partners to eschew military cooperation with China while not promising them things it cannot deliver, including a formal defence pact or official security guarantees.

The United States could negotiate mutually beneficial strategic framework agreements with key regional partners to lay out shared interests, priorities, and goals.

These agreements — resembling what Washington currently has with Ukraine — would address weapons transfers, plans for combined training and exercises, prepositioned equipment, and other cooperative programmes that reinforce US regional commitment and capabilities.

In accordance with these potential agreement(s), Washington would:

First: Expedite processes for certain weapons transfers. Washington's foreign military sales (FMS) system is notoriously slow and tied to cumbersome US acquisition lead-times, foreign disclosure reviews, and ongoing global supply chain challenges.

While it is unlikely that Washington can fix those problems quickly, using authorities such as Presidential Drawdown (which has been critical in the case of Ukraine) could speed up transfers and would be appropriate for providing critical defence systems to regional partners facing urgent drone and missile threats.

Second: Increase force rotations and joint military exercises. It could also preposition more equipment and maintain contingency locations to support these activities. This would assuage concerns over US abandonment and reduced US appetite to counter Iranian aggression.

Increasingly involving partners in these exercises while building multilateral coalitions and task forces – at which Naval Forces Central Command has done a good job – reinforces US commitment to regional security.

Third: Pursue more cooperative testing, development, and production programmes that could reinvigorate defence relationships and address the growing Gulf Arab desire for indigenous production while steering partners away from similar cooperation with China.

All these ingredients of a stronger defence relationship with key and willing regional partners, however, would be strictly off the table if those partners: 

First: Allow China to establish any kind of military base or outpost on their soil. It is unclear if China is willing to allocate more military resources to a region that is far away from its immediate sphere of influence in Asia, but Washington should do everything in its power to nip that process in the bud before it gains traction.

All these ingredients of a stronger defence relationship, however, would be strictly off the table if those partners allow China to establish any kind of military base or outpost on their soil.

Second: Acquire major Chinese weapon systems — either through sales, cooperative development, or cooperative production. That includes ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defence, and sophisticated aircraft. Should any of these acquisitions happen, it would significantly harm interoperability with the United States.

Third: Show no commitment to protect US secrets and technology. Washington only approves sales of weapons systems with state-of-the-art technology to regional partners when the benefit to the United States is determined to outweigh the risk of the associated technology falling into the wrong hands.

In the case of the F-35 sale to the UAE, for example, concerns over security risks associated with Huawei Technologies' position in UAE's telecommunications network eventually jeopardised the deal.

AFP
A pilot climbs into the cockpit of US Air Force's (USAF) fifth-generation supersonic multirole F-35 fighter jet.

Fourth: Cooperate with China on civilian nuclear energy. The lack of progress in US-Saudi nuclear partnership talks has driven the Saudis to consider other countries — including China — as potential partners in developing a civilian nuclear energy capability.

Admittedly, this is a complex issue that might be a stand-alone item in US foreign policy. It also isn't limited to Saudi Arabia. Serious and possibly multilateral US-led diplomacy will be needed to prevent Saudi and regional proliferation and keep the Iranian nuclear genie in the bottle.

Fifth: Join China-led security organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In March 2023, Saudi Arabia became a SCO dialogue partner.

While that alone is not a deal-breaker, further participation as an observer or a full-fledged member would only strengthen defence ties to China and strain the Kingdom's relationship with the United States and other like-minded partners.

Each of Washington's regional partners has a sovereign right to pursue whichever strategic path they feel is most beneficial to their long-term interests. The goal for the United States is neither to scold nor to threaten.

Rather, it is to present an opportunity-based argument and equally important, to clearly delineate what the limits of US tolerance are regarding defence and security ties with China. That is America's sovereign right, too.

Credibility is key

Credibility is key to Washington's pitch, however. Regional partners may very well recognise the value of the American offer and the costs or limits of military cooperation with China, but still have little confidence in Washington's willingness or ability to deliver it.

Read more: The credibility of American deterrence in the Middle East

This is the time for bold US gestures in the Middle East, but before making any, US domestic political consensus will be required. But that should never be taken for granted in Washington's highly charged and polarised political environment.

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