As is customary, the military is capable of voluminous words claiming that the war was imposed on them and that they have the best interests of the country and its people at heart. In reality, it is the ordinary people of coup-prone republics that pay the bill for these military adventures and this greed.
Massacres in Darfur
Hemedti started out in life as a camel trader and went on to become the leader of the Janjaweed, the armed group that crushed the rebel opposition in Darfur under the orders of al-Bashir. He then became a lieutenant general in Sudan and the second most powerful man in the country.
Read more: Hemedti: From camel trader to second most powerful man in Sudan
Given his involvement in the massacres of Darfur, which claimed the lives of more than 300,000 civilians, how can this man be a partner in the civil democratic transition in the country?
How can an armed militia -- which was allowed to roam freely for years without any accountability -- accept being integrated into the army?
The question is complicated further by Hemedti's control of Sudan's enormous gold reserves, which has generated a fortune for him while the country's people suffer from poverty.
How can the Sudanese believe that Hemedti is defending democracy and the state when he refuses to submit to the apparatus of the state?
These questions do not mean that al-Burhan is a champion for democracy.
His clash with a rival military leader is more a fight for power and the benefits it brings. It is a fight for Sudan's wealth. Nonetheless, victory for the general army over the militia would be a first step towards Sudan's salvation, although it does not seem to be close.
Sudan's destruction is primarily the responsibility of the military. But the country's political movements and its parties, many with deep roots, are not absolved from blame.
Political failings
With a diverse range of ethnic, racial, and religious groups in Sudan, many of them used the army in their political struggles against each other until the army started playing its own game, especially after tasting the sweetness of power.
Perhaps Hassan al-Turabi, who hired Omar al-Bashir to overthrow his opponent, is the best example of this, when al-Bashir went on secure power in Khartoum, al-Turabi became the ruler's first victim.
Whatever comes next in this troubled country, there are a range of unanswered questions that echo over it: Who brought the army out of its barracks? Who changed the direction in which the weapons point? How did armies of Arab republics end up fighting their own people?
It has been years, but the question of the Lebanese-Palestinian journalist of An-Nahar, Samir Kassir, continues to resonate: Who is the army fighting?