[caption id="attachment_55245966" align="alignnone" width="620"] Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan arrives at the government headquarters in Tripoli on October 10, 2013, shortly after he was freed from the captivity of militiamen who had held him for several hours. (MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]When the kidnapping of the Libyan prime minister, Ali Zeidan, made headlines on Thursday morning, the news felt like the inevitable escalation of what had been a tumultuous series of events. Zeidan made an angry and defiant speech Friday night detailing the circumstances of his kidnapping, which he called an "attempted coup."
The kidnapping came only a few days after a US forces abducted Abu Anas Al-Liby, an alleged Al-Qaeda operative thought to be responsible for the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. He is reportedly being detained aboard a Navy ship in the Mediterranean. The US claims the operation was facilitated with the full knowledge and support of the Libyan government. The Libyan government, however, claims otherwise.
The specter of Western imperialism in the Middle East will loom large over any US involvement in the region, and this latest operation is no exception. While many Libyans supported the NATO intervention during the Libyan revolutionary war of 2011, there has always been the anxious fear that the intervention has made post-Gaddafi Libya vulnerable to foreign meddling. The US Navy Seals’ abduction of Liby seems to have validated those fears, especially as the Libyan government has denied any collusion.
Perhaps denial was not the best course of action to take for Zeidan and the GNC. Denial of involvement not only undermines their competence as a functioning government, it undermines Libya’s sovereignty as a whole. Zeidan and the GNC looked weak and beaten as they gave their statement on the affair. Day by day, Zeidan looks less like a leader and more like the exasperated parent of a rowdy, disobedient child. That is perhaps why the Libyan militiamen carried out Zeidan’s kidnapping so brazenly, in full view of cameras and spectators. Libya’s weak central government has had very little success in controlling the country’s semi-rogue militias, crewed by the same young men who fought the war against Gaddafi. They operate with certain level of impunity: sometimes they work with the government, sometimes they do not. That has given them free reign to assert their power when they need it.
The militias—disparate, contentious and uncontrollable—have repeatedly rejected the government’s weary efforts to absorb them into a national army. They have also refused to lay down arms, and there are essentially no jobs for them to turn to once they have left the militias. So, in a country with a weak government and virtually no police force, the militias have amassed a certain amount of political power through their weapons. They have leveraged this power to keep control over their respective home cities and to pressure the General National Congress to make certain decisions. Most notably, they held the GNC and other government ministries under siege to force them into passing a political isolation law that prohibits former Gaddafi officials from holding political office. The kidnapping of Zeidan only represents the latest of their power plays.
At this point, it would be mere conjecture to link together the abduction of Zeidan and the US capture of Liby. But it is not unreasonable to suggest that there is maybe a link, by sheer virtue of the timing. The GNC has been at the mercy of the militias for a long while, and the Liby operation may have served as a provocation. After all, recent US involvement in Libya does not just threaten the stability of the central government. It also threatens the power of the militias themselves. Unfortunately, it might be Libyan civilians who pay the price. The kidnapping of Zeidan, despite his safe return, signals a willingness of the militias to go far as far as they must to get what they want.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
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