EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton (L) speaks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on November 7, 2013, before the start of two days of closed-door nuclear talks in Geneva. (FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
Iran can live with a bad nuclear deal, but the West cannot. A bad deal for Iran—one that regime hardliners would find hard to accept—will help lift sanctions, aid Iran’s gradual return to the world stage, and even pave the way for better US–Iran relations in years to come. A bad deal for the West—in which Iran’s capabilities to weaponize go unchecked—will mean a nuclear Iran, further sanctions and even war. It would mean years of instability and bloodshed, which would lead to an even more dangerous Middle East.
By accepting the international community’s terms, Iran would have to kiss some of its long-held positions goodbye, like limitations on its right to enrich uranium under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran would also have to open many of its more controversial nuclear facilities for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Islamic Republic will also have to make its nuclear scientists available to be interviewed—a demand with which Iran refuses to comply, fearing more of its scientists will be assassinated. In short, a "bad deal" with Iran—one that would be hard for hardline supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept, would mean the following: Iran will have access to nuclear energy but will find it much tougher to build nuclear weapons.
In return for this "bad deal" the West and the international community are willing to ease sanctions, restore or improve diplomatic ties with the government in Tehran, and perhaps take advantage of Iran’s significant potential to address challenges in the region, ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanon. The prospect of this greater Iranian involvement in the West’s endeavors in the region is already worrying Iran’s regional rivals, especially the Saudis. Unlike the Israelis, they worry—perhaps incorrectly—that they are easily replaceable as allies should US–Iran relations improve. Recent remarks by Saudi officials warning the United States of Saudi dissatisfaction with President Obama’s approach towards Iran and Syria are telling signs of this strong fear among Iran’s rivals in the region.
A "bad deal" for Iran would also mean greater cooperation with the United States to fight what both countries view as a major threat: Salafist jihadists seeking to establish an Islamist caliphate throughout the region. Iran’s key regional allies, Syria and Iraq, have been fighting radical Sunni jihadists in various forms. In Syria, the despotic rule of President Bashar Al-Assad has been challenged not only by Syrians asking for their right to be free, but also by jihadists who have poured into Syria in order to topple Assad and establish an ISIS. In Iraq, the Shi’ite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, who has ruled Iraq through less than democratic means, is facing an ever-growing security challenge from Sunni jihadists. According to the Iraqi prime minister and the US president, Al-Qaeda is growing ever more active in Iraq. Every week dozens, if not hundreds, of Iraqis die as a result of sectarian bombings throughout the country. Combating Al-Qaeda and radical Islamists has been a top priority for the United States. Iran, mindful of a Salafist revival in the region, shares the same goal.
It is not only in Syria and Iraq where the United States and Iran share some mutual interests. Iran’s eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are among the most dangerous places on earth. To Tehran, the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul will be as unacceptable an outcome as it would be to the United States and its NATO allies. With the United States set to draw down its forces and eventually leave Afghanistan, and with Pakistan an unreliable ally, greater Iranian presence aiding the Kabul government in its fight against the Taliban could be welcomed in Washington.
Iran’s leaders should put state interests before ideological gains. Accepting a nuclear deal they perceive as "bad" could perhaps be the greatest opportunity they will be granted to enhance their position in the region and around the world. In other words, what the hardliners in Iran believe to be a bad deal is in fact very good. On the one hand, Iran can solidify its position in the region with greater Western support, or at least less Western and US pressure, and on the other hand, Israel will be relieved that Iran’s nuclear program does not pose an imminent danger to the Jewish state. A bad deal for the West, however, will result in more pressure on Iran to abandon its path towards weaponization and will lead to war—an outcome that would further imperil the interests of the Iranian state.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
