How much do elections change foreign policy? Sometimes democratic elections have strong foreign policy components. In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower promised to end the Korean War and arranged an armistice soon after taking office. In 2019, Boris Johnson pledged to “Get Brexit Done” and signed a deal to exit the EU six weeks after winning a parliamentary majority.
However, such instances are generally the exception rather than the rule, and it is far more common for elections to have only a limited impact on a state’s foreign policy. Will this also prove true of the high-profile elections of 2026? Many hope outcomes in Israel and the US, for example, will prompt shifts in foreign policy, but history suggests dramatic changes are unlikely. Even in countries that have recently seen the defeat of long-ruling leaders, like Serbia and Hungary, foreign policy change is more likely to be nuanced than transformative.
There are two common reasons given by scholars why elections rarely bring about major foreign policy change. The first is that external matters are usually secondary at the ballot box. Political scientists have long argued that foreign policy is subordinated to economic and social priorities by most electorates. Even if a government has pursued an unpopular foreign policy, they’re often able to still win elections due to domestic successes. A classic example was Tony Blair’s victory in 2005, despite widespread opposition to his invasion of Iraq two years earlier.
The second is that incoming governments either don’t want to or find it difficult to make major foreign policy change. International Relations scholars, especially Realists, argue that states have relatively fixed foreign policy interests and new leaders will often only tweak previous approaches rather than abandon them.
Whoever is elected in Japan, for example, is likely to see Tokyo’s international interests as revolving around an alliance with the US, suspicion of China and opposition to North Korea. A new government may nuance policies, like détente with Beijing or more independence from Washington, but will likely remain within the parameters of Japan’s ‘core interests.’ Moreover, even if a new government wanted to make more significant foreign policy changes, structural forces make it difficult.
States’ security structures and economies are often deeply entwined with long-lasting alliances and enmities that can take years to unpick, often in the face of considerable opposition. In contrast, domestic changes, especially after receiving a new electoral mandate, are easier to achieve and hence new governments tend to focus on those.
Cautious optimism
Some caution should therefore be directed at hopes that Israel’s election will prompt a significant change in its foreign policy. The election has produced an inconclusive result: Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc secured 53 of the 120 seats in the Knesset, while the opposition took 48, with Arab-led parties winning a record 19. Neither side has an outright majority, meaning weeks of expected coalition negotiations. But even if Netanyahu is replaced, his opponents' foreign policy approach is not radically different from his own.
The opposition leader, Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of the Israeli army, has been critical of Netanyahu’s war on Iran, arguing that regime change is unachievable, but he still supports military action against Tehran’s nuclear programme. Likewise, while Eisenkot opposes annexing the West Bank as Netanyahu’s coalition allies urge, he supports settlement in the occupied territories. His proposal on Palestine is a ‘minus state’: an autonomous territory on part of the West Bank without its own military and not requiring the evacuation of Israeli settlements. Were he to lead a government, likely following some kind of deal with Israel’s Arab parties, he may need to progress these plans a bit further.
